



Trusted and secure computing properties of computer system are usually believed to behave in
a well-deﬁned way and enable the processed information to be properly protected. Nowadays,
the need to protect information is increasing, particularly on the type of computers that we
use directly for processing data with diﬀerent levels of sensitivity. A computing system
that supports multiple levels of security (MLS) provides the protections to guarantee that
information which is assigned to diﬀerent security levels is handled appropriately. The
problem of processing information with diﬀerent levels of sensitivity has been extensively
studied since the early 70s of the twentieth century. To ensure the conﬁdentiality and integrity
of information, there are often used several models (B-LP, Biba, Clark-Wilson), which provide
mandatory access control (MAC) entity (called subject) to the resource (called object).
The design of MLS systems guaranteed the correct performance with respect to security
considerations, which is a daunting challenge. There are two main approaches to the
construction of MLS systems: centralized and distributed one. Nowadays, the centralized
(i.e., no distributed) approach to build computer system with multi-level security is mainly
based on the virtualization technology for the separation of independent security domains
as diﬀerent virtual machines. The implementation of this type of MLS system design
requires the integration of available virtualization technology (software and hardware),
application of cryptographic protection and formal methods for both ensuring and control
of the conﬁdentiality and integrity of data, and advanced techniques for user authentication.
Virtualization is now becoming more broadly available and is supported in oﬀ-the-shelf
systems based on Intel and AMD architecture hardware. Virtualization can improve overall
system security and reliability by isolating multiple software stacks in their own VMs.
The application of some selected security concerned solutions for building a secure and
trust environment called Secure Workstation for Special Applications (SWSA) is a key
topic of the current issue. So, we have a developed method of secure MLS type system
constructing an application of a RT-family trust management language for an access control
model, a method of cryptographic protection of removable storage devices with USB
interface, a design of hybrid cluster system for encryption and decryption of large amounts
of data, an application of the Zak-Gabor-based iris coding to build a secure biometric
veriﬁcation station, designed a simple veriﬁcation protocol for autonomous veriﬁcation
modules, and a solution that allows to combine hard drive encryption with a trustful
boot process. Additional three papers present some results, applications and developments
concerning the reduction of the traﬃc volume of user location data updating in a cellular
network, an experimental evaluation of YouTube video transmission examining the quality
of experience of end user applications, and the method of optimal pump scheduling for large
scale water transmission system by linear programming.
The problem of building a secure and trust specialized computer systems (SCS), which are
processing data with diﬀerent levels of sensitivity becomes particularly topical, especially
in regard to the SCS applications in government institutions, military or ﬁnancial. One of
the essential questions concerning development of SCS involves a method of secure software
designing. Z. Zieliński et al. present a component based approach to development secure SCS
(SWSA) by means of integration of available software and hardware virtualization technology,
application of formal methods, cryptographic protection of data stored on hard and removable
disks and using biometrics techniques for user authentication. Also, an interesting approach
to integration of security models with models of architecture of the system described in
UML, which allows models simulation, has been proposed.
In the SWSA, multiple virtual machines simultaneously running (VMs) are used to process
sensitive information from multiple security domains, providing strict separation of the do-
mains. The users of SWSA may act in several diﬀerent roles, with diﬀerent access rights.
The problem is how to control the access of SWSA users to particular VMs in the situation
when users may have diﬀerent periods of validity of diﬀerent credentials. K. Lasota and
A. Kozakiewicz have proposed an interesting solution of this problem which is based on
an application of an RT-family trust management language, as a basis for an access control
model to VMs. In prototype implementation of SWSA this model is mapped into a set of
SELinux policy rules.
One of the necessary capabilities of Secure Workstation for Special Applications is crypto-
graphic protection of hard and removable storage devices with USB interface. The use of
solutions from ordinary systems with multilevel security (MLS), which include the SWSA,
is insuﬃcient. J. Chudzikiewicz and J. Furtak present a mechanisms to ensure an adequate
level of protection of data stored on removable storage in MLS type workstation which is
enabling to such a preparation of data stored in Flash RAM, so that the sender of data is
assured that data will be available only for designated recipient, and the recipient is assured
that the received data comes from the expected sender. In addition, the selected elements of
these mechanisms implementation used in Windows operating system have been described.
Data encryption and decryption involve cumbersome calculations, especially when consider-
ing the processing of large amount of data. On the other hand, cryptography algorithms are
natural candidates for massively parallel computations. E. Niewiadomska-Szynkiewicz et al.
present a hybrid cluster system – a novel computing architecture with multi-core CPUs work-
ing together with many-core GPUs for encryption and decryption of large amounts of data.
The experimental results presented in the paper demonstrate the eﬀectiveness and scalability
of such a cluster system.
In the next two papers the authors present the solutions for building a secure veriﬁcation
station acting as a server of biometric-based veriﬁcation within secure workstation (SWSA)
and consisting of a professional iris capture camera, a processing unit with specially de-
signed iris recognition and a communication software. The iris recognition used in this work
is based on the original methodology employing Zak-Gabor transformation. A. Czajka and
K. Piech propose an automatic iris feature selection mechanism employing, among others,
the minimum redundancy, maximum relevance (mRMR) methodology as one, yet more im-
portantly, a step to assess the optimal set of wavelets used in this iris recognition application.
The electronic communication between SWSA and the station is secured by a protocol that
is specially designed to the purpose of such an application. A. Kozakiewicz and T. Pałka
present the design and the rationale behind a simple veriﬁcation protocol for autonomous
veriﬁcation modules.
A workstation may be regarded as secure only if it runs an original, unmodiﬁed software.
The question is how we could assure that the workstation has not been modiﬁed in any way?
M. Małowidzki et al. propose a solution that allows to combine hard drive encryption with
a trustful boot process, preventing risk of software tampering. The logon process, which
have been proposed, oﬀers a reasonable level of security and could be increased by some
additional mechanisms.
The key aspects in design of modern ‘ad hoc’ sensor networks are data security and energy
aware communication. K. Daniluk and E. Niewiadomska-Szynkiewicz give in their paper an
excellent survey of energy eﬃcient security architectures and protocols for wireless sensor
networks. Also, the security requirements for wireless sensor networks are presented and
the relationships between network security and network lifetime limited by often insuﬃcient
resources of network nodes are explained.
In mobile communications (e.g., GSM, UMTS, 3G, . . . ), the location of users may change in
time. To make a communication between two users, the system must ﬁrst ﬁnd the location of
destination user which must be extracted from databases. Thus, the most important criterion
of a location tracking algorithm is to provide a small database access time. M. V. Dolama
and A. G. Rahbar propose a new location tracking scheme, called Virtual Overlap Region
with Forwarding Pointer, for cellular networks which reduces the updating information when
a user frequently moves within the boundaries of several cells grouped into a Location Area.
Video sharing services like YouTube have become very popular recently. This situation results
in a drastic growth of the Internet traﬃc statistic. On the other hand, when transmitting video
content over packet based networks, stringent quality of service (QoS) constraints must be
met in order to provide the comparable level of quality to a traditional broadcast television.
A. Biernacki et al. conducted an experimental evaluation of YouTube video transmission
(HTTP based) examining the quality of experience of end user applications expressed as
a function of playback buﬀer occupancy.
The last paper of the issue is focused on the model for large scale potable water trans-
mission system. J. Błaszczyk et al. describe in this paper a linear, the so-called Simpliﬁed
Model (SM), based on mass-balance equations, which is solved on a week horizon and de-
livers boundary conditions for the so-called Full Model (FM) that is nonlinear and takes into
account hydraulic phenomena and water quality.
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Abstract—The paper presents some of the results obtained
within the ongoing project related with functional require-
ments and design models of secure workstation for special ap-
plications (SWSA). SWSA project is directed toward the com-
bination of the existing hardware and software virtualization
with cryptography and identiﬁcation technologies to ensure
the security of multilevel classiﬁed data by means of some for-
mal methods. In the paper the requirements for SWSA, its
hardware and software architecture, selected security solution
for data processing and utilized approach to designing secure
software are presented. The novel method for secure software
design employs dedicated tools to verify the conﬁdentiality and
the integrity of data using Uniﬁed Modeling Language (UML)
models. In general, the UML security models are embedded
in and simulated with the system architecture models, thus
the security problems in SWSA can be detected early during
the software design. The application of UML topology models
enables also to verify the fundamental requirement for MLS
systems, namely the hardware isolation of subjects from dif-
ferent security domains.
Keywords—cryptographic protection, multilevel security, soft-
ware design, UML, virtualization.
1. Introduction
The issue of building a reliable Specialized Computer Sys-
tems (SCS), which are processing data with diﬀerent levels
of sensitivity becomes particularly topical, especially in re-
gard to the SCS applications in government institutions,
military or ﬁnancial. The problem of processing informa-
tion with diﬀerent levels of sensitivity has been extensively
studied since the early 70s of the twentieth century [1]–[3].
Formal base of multilevel security (MLS) are presented in
the work of Bell-LaPadula (B-LP) [2]. In the computerized
system, which uses a multilevel security, it is necessary to
determine users authorization (so-called security clearance)
who work with classiﬁed information in accordance with
the requirements of the missions’ tasks (the rule of “neces-
sary knowledge”) and the classiﬁcation of information, due
to the required level of protection.
To ensure the conﬁdentiality and integrity of information,
there are often used models of B-LP, Biba [4], Clark-
Wilson [5] which provide mandatory access control (MAC)
entity (called subject) to the resource (called object). The
mandatory access control of any entity (this can be a pro-
cess) to resource (e.g., data ﬁle, the communication chan-
nel, etc.) is assigned to a security context. In order to de-
termine entitlements in systems using MAC are designed
labels, which contain the security context in particular
pairs: <sensitivity level, information category>. On the
set of labels of protected data partial order relation is de-
ﬁned, and to subjects and objects must be used invariable
rules [3], [4], [6], among others, a rule prohibiting “writ-
ing down”, a rule prohibiting “reading up”. It should be
noted that implementing the systems and networks’ set of
rules (that is, building a reliable system based solely on op-
erating systems with multilevel protection of information)
in the computer is diﬃcult and expensive. This is mainly
because of diﬃculties to build a reliable reference monitor
and the diﬃculty of ensuring that in the system will not be
the “leak” of sensitive information due to the possibility of
the so-called covert communication channels in operating
system [7].
Another approach to the construction of a centralized (ie, no
distributed) computer system with multi-level security is to
develop software in the virtualization technology [8]–[10]
for the separation of independent security domains, called
the Multiple Independent Levels of Security. Such soft-
ware should allow for the simultaneous launch of several
speciﬁc instances of operating systems on one PC (such as
a workstation or server) designed to process data of diﬀer-
ent classiﬁcation levels (e.g., public and proprietary), or to
process the data in diﬀerent systems for which there need
for separation of data.
This approach has become today entirely possible thanks
to the availability of solutions with virtualization hardware
support in modern Intel and AMD processors, and de-
veloped software packages (COTS type) for virtualization.
Now, widely used are the extension of the x86 architec-
ture, designed to support hardware virtualization [8]–[10]
as Intel Virtualization Technology in particular VTx, VTD
for x86 processors, VTi for Intel IA-64 (Itanium), and AMD
Virtualization (AMD-V) for 64-bit x86 processors from
AMD. These technologies also allow (in addition to hard-
ware support emulation of the virtual machine) for building
a trusted environment in which a separate virtual machines
(which are separate security domains) are performed in sep-
arated hardware partitions. The implementing of this type
of design of MLS system requires the integration of avail-
able virtualization technology (software and hardware), ap-
plication of formal methods for both ensuring and control
of the conﬁdentiality and integrity of data, and techniques
for user authentication. A natural way to build such sys-
tems is component approach, which assumes the use of
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ready and available hardware components and software, in
particular virtualization packages available as open source
like Xen [11] and KVM [12].
The paper presents the requirements for a Secure Worksta-
tion for Special Applications (SWSA), its hardware and
software architecture, selected security solution for data
processing and utilized approach to designing secure soft-
ware. The developed method of manufacturing the type
systems of MLS, which is deﬁned as a Model Driven Mul-
tilevel Security (MDmls) method, organizes the process of
producing the SCS of MLS type and is derived from the
concept of Model Driven Architecture (MDA) [13], [14]
and Model Driven Development (MDD) [15], [16]. A sim-
ilar approach to build secure software is presented in [15],
but it does not include multilevel protection issues. The
integration of security models with models of systems de-
scribed in UML enables the simulation which allows to
verify the eﬀectiveness of security the designed software
of SCS type MLS at the stage of modeling.
2. SWSA Requirements
The technical solutions should be designed and prepared for
strictly deﬁned applications. This paradigm is particularly
important when considering the high assurance equipment.
The invalid deﬁnition of SWSA designation could lead to
a signiﬁcant increase in costs, realization time and the com-
plexity of security functions, and as a result to reduce the
chances of achieving the adequate quality, reliability and
security assurance of the product. The ﬁrst task in the
project was therefore to consider the technology limits im-
posed by legal requirements and then to select the suitable
usage scenarios.
2.1. SWSA Usage Scenarios
The most important discriminating factors for SWSA us-
age scenarios were adopted ad hoc, just to make the legal
analysis of usage scenarios more thorough and systematic:
– diﬀering classiﬁcation levels of information which is
processed within individual virtual machines: single-
level, multi-level, and international multi-level, while
the latter is not considered in the subsequent analysis;
– the number of users accessing SWSA categorized as
user-less and multi-user; in user-less applications the
Administrator (ADM) and the Security Oﬃcer (SO)
only have access to the system, while in multi-
user applications there are some additional users of
the workstation with access rights other than ADM
and SO;
– the connectivity of SWSA, which is recognized as:
stand-alone, local-area and wide-area; the stand-
alone SWSA has no access to any ICT networks; the
locally connected SWSA accesses a local area net-
work within a single security zone, while the wide-
area connectivity implies that SWSA is connected to
a wide area networks and may access multiple ICT
networks located in diﬀerent security zones.
The combinations of the aforementioned factors lead to dif-
ferent legal implications for related classes of SWSA usage
scenarios. The analysis of these combinations allowed to
arrange them in order of the increasing complexity of the
most important implementations, or to be more speciﬁc, the
anticipated complexity of obtaining the security approval
during the accreditation:
– single-level, multi-user and wide-area class of usage
scenarios. The workstation in these scenarios is con-
nected to several networks processing information of
the same security classiﬁcation, but diﬀering cate-
gories; an example of such application is the mutual
access of SWSA to the networks of R&D and ac-
counting departments;
– multi-level, multi-user, and stand-alone class of us-
age scenarios; example of such applications may be
the stand-alone trusted workstation in classiﬁed in-
formation storage facility;
– multi-level, user-less, and wide-area class of usage
scenarios, in which the SWSA could be the base
platform for ICT security assurance solutions, e.g., to
transfer the data between systems processing the in-
formation of diﬀering levels of classiﬁcation;
– multi-level, multi-user and wide-area class of usage
scenarios; the security requirements and limitations
for such applications are the most demanding when
compared to any other class of applications; in gen-
eral, these requirements and limitations regard the
challenging threats for the conﬁdentiality of infor-
mation in multi-level, multi-user and distributed en-
vironments.
2.2. Legal Regulations and SWSA
The main conclusion of a survey on national regulations and
guidelines in ICT security is the observation that these le-
gal documents apply mainly to the “hardware” level of ICT,
and do not contain any speciﬁc requirements for the virtu-
alization. The lack of necessary regulations does not imply,
however, the application of virtualization in the classiﬁed
information systems is forbidden due to the well-known
security principle of “what is not allowed – it is forbid-
den”. While some changes of the legal status could help
to implement such solutions, there is always the opportu-
nity to obtain the approval for such applications within the
system accreditation procedures. The next statements are
the fundamental security terms and requirements for SWSA
identiﬁed during the analysis of the Polish Classiﬁed Infor-
mation Protection Act [17], regulations and security author-
ities guidelines.
The most important requirement is that the SWSA must
ensure the protection adequate to the highest level of clas-
siﬁcation of the information processed within VMs. It is
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assumed that due to the anticipated classiﬁcation level such
a security assurance of SWSA should to be evaluated on at
least 4th level (EAL4) in accordance to Common Criteria
methodology. It was also found that at least the compart-
mented security mode is adequate for applications demand-
ing the security functions of SWSA. As a result, SWSA
should provide the technical support for strict mandatory
access control (MAC) policies.
In the wide-area applications, in which the distinct VMs
are connected to local area networks of cooperating enti-
ties, SWSA should comply with the security requirements
for system interconnection. In particular, SWSA must pro-
vide security measures to absolutely protect the conﬁden-
tiality of the information. These security functions should
be accompanied by proof of a controlled separation of SOS
including the covert channels analysis.
The wide-area application imposes some speciﬁc require-
ments on the formal labeling and registration of each work-
station and individual VMs. These terms are in a sense
analogous to the deployment of the remote IT terminal
within the security zone, which is not controlled by the
system owner. The host system of SWSA comprising of
the computer, hyper-visor and the host operating system
should be labeled and registered as a part of ICT system in
the deployment place. VMs, which are remotely attached
to other ICT systems via wide area connections, should be
labeled and registered as agreed between the cooperating
entities and the system owners. The agreements may vary
with respect to the ownership, administration duties and
responsibilities, and even liabilities regarding VM. SWSA
should therefore provide some technical and operational
support regarding the registration and labeling of virtual
machines as well as their backups.
The Classiﬁed Information Protection Act imposes also the
obligations to implement the security measures to protect
ICT equipments against the compromising electromagnetic
emanations. In general, these obligations apply to the hard-
ware part of the workstation, namely chassis, signal and
power supply lines. In particular, there are some speciﬁc
requirements on the separation of the signal and supply
lines belonging to either the unclassiﬁed (BLACK) or clas-
siﬁed (RED) parts of ICT system. However, these con-
ditions do not imply any separation requirements for the
parts of SWSA which process the classiﬁed information of
diﬀerent security level. It is therefore assumed that SWSA
should host only either the RED or the BLACK VMs.
2.3. Specification of Functional Requirements
In the SWSA environment can distinguish three types of
actors: the system administrator, security oﬃcer (here-
inafter SO), SOS user (hereinafter user) (Fig. 1).
Security oﬃcer with the administrator and others are devel-
oping special security requirements of the system (SSRS),
and safe operation procedures (SOP). The SSRS is identi-
ﬁng levels of security virtual machines installed in SWSA
and permissions for actors (users). SL involves clause of
Fig. 1. General scheme of the basic elements of SWSA archi-
tecture.
information authorized to process and its set of informa-
tion categories (range). Each level is described (according
to Bell-LaPadula model) by a pair <k, c> where k ∈ K
is the clause of information (K = {public, proprietary,
conﬁdential, secret}), and c ∈ C is a subset of the cate-
gories of information c = {c1, c2, . . . , cL}. For example,
C = {PD, GR, OS, DP, . . .}, where the symbols PD, GR,
OS, and DP denote the personal data, guidance resources,
the operational situation, the data for purposes.
The clauses are ordered (from minor to major),
∀i=(1,...,4) ki ≤ ki+1, but the categories are not. Security
levels can be compared. For example, SLa =<ka,Ca >
and SLb =<kb,Cb>, if the following conditions: kb ≤ ka
and Cb ⊆ Ca, then SLb ≤ SLa (SLa level is higher or
equal than the SLb). Let SLb =<con f idential, {PD,GR}>,
and SLa =< secret, {PD, GR, OS}>, then we have
a SLb ≤ SLa, because according to satisfy the fol-
lowing: con f idential < secret and {PD, GR} ⊆ {PD,
GR, OS}. Please note also that not all pairs of security
levels are comparable. This leads to the use of the concept
of lattice of security levels.
The security system according to Bell-LaPadula model
is satisﬁed if the following axioms are preserved: se-
curity simple, stars, stability, security discretionary, non-
availability of inactive object, the independence of the ini-
tial state. These axioms have been adopted in all models
using mandatory access control to information. The ful-
ﬁllment of these axioms ensures that classiﬁed information
in the system will not be available for those who did not
receive proper authorization. SO deﬁnes security attributes
of SOSk (k = 1,2, . . . ,n) existing in the SWSA, such as their
clauses and classes of applications, manages the database
of users and their security credentials, identifying opportu-
nities to access resources for each of the domains. Access
permissions to the domains are determined by security la-
bels. Security oﬃcer gets access to the labels management
and control of their allocation in the system through Virtual
Machine Monitor (VMM).
The administrator performs backups of host machines and
virtual machines, creates a new account for SSO users,
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Fig. 2. Functional requirements for administration subsystem
of SWSA.
creates and modiﬁes the conﬁguration of virtual machines
(Fig. 2). In the model of requirements for VMM (Fig. 1),
the user limits his task to run the SSO.
3. Architecture SWSA
It is essential for creating complex computer systems plays
an architecture solution. With regard to the SWSA to be
particularly important to recognize the hardware and soft-
ware elements of the architecture due to their signiﬁcant
impact on the security of the system.
3.1. Hardware Architecture
It is assumed the use of components that enable hardware
support for security technology and hardware virtualization
support. To isolate the separate domains containing isolated
environments implementing Trusted Execution Technology
(TXT) will be used, while an important role in ensuring
the integrity of the SWSA will play a Trusted Platform
Module (TPM) that allows the secure creation and storage
encryption keys.
Fig. 3. Block diagram of a system based on the Xeon processor
5600 series.
Because of the applied approach (using ready components),
hardware design limits itself to the conﬁguration that de-
scribes the characteristics of the applied solution. Proposed
hardware architecture of SWSA is based on a machine
with an Intel Westmere with dual-processor Xeon E5630
model (Fig. 3), each of which contains the four proces-
sor cores. This architecture gives the possibility of sharing
the responsibilities between the various hardware compo-
nents, allows for the separation of the ﬂow of information
within the hardware and allows the separation of partitions
with distinct security domains. Block diagram of a sys-
tem based on the Xeon processor 5600 series is shown
in Fig. 3. When designing the hardware architecture used
UML with using topological models which construction
is supported by a CASE environment – Rational Software
Architect (RSA).
3.2. Software Architecture
In the architecture SWSA can be distinguished the follow-
ing elements: the trusted system platform (TSP) and ex-
ecutable special versions of operating systems SOS. The
general scheme of architecture SWSA is shown in Fig. 4.
Fig. 4. General scheme of the basic elements of SWSA archi-
tecture.
The essential elements of an architecture SWSA are the SSP
and virtual machinesVMi which we write in the form of the
formula: SWSA := SSP+{VMi}, where i = {1, . . . n}. SSP
consists of: kernel of Linux operating system, its extension
in the form of a component (SELinux), and monitor vir-
tual machines (VMM), TSP = Linux Kernel + SELinux +
+ VMM. TSP allows you to run and supervise activities
of specialized operating systems SOSi (i = 1, 2, . . . n) and
acting on their environment, application programs {AP},
forming a virtual machine, VMi := SOSi +{AP}i.
The VMM is a key component of the SWSA, responsi-
ble for running virtual machines in accordance with de-
ﬁned security rules (using the hardware support) and their
switching to ensure the separation of resources. It was as-
sumed that the proposed VMM software should make it
possible to simultaneously launch several (of many possi-
ble) instances of special versions of operating systems SOSi
on a single computer with the provision of: access control,
separation of resources, cryptographic protection, and strict
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control of data ﬂow. The number of instances of virtual
machines that is run, depends on the conﬁguration of the
station, in particular on the number of physical processors
and cores. For example (Fig. 4), SSP supervises n virtual
machines, among which operate both VM1 and VM2, and
accordingly, on the VM1 is active {AP}1 (which is repre-
sented as VM1 →{AP}1), on VM2 is active {AP}2 (which
is represented as VM2 →{AP}2). The VMM manages ac-
cess to both virtual machines SOSi, as well as to hardware
resources (physical and virtualized).
The project also assumes that the instance of a special ver-
sion of the operating system (SOS) working within a vir-
tual machine (VM) is a separate Security domain (SD),
VMi [SSOi] = SDi. In each of the domains the processing
of the data qualiﬁed to diﬀerent security levels is allowed.
Figure 4 shows two security domains, and each of them
associated with one virtual machine.
It is worth noting that both the operating system kernel, as
well as special versions of operating systems in terms of
the project are ready components and their design will be
limited only to the speciﬁcations of their interfaces and con-
ﬁguration descriptions. Interfaces were described in UML,
and the conﬁgurations on the topological diagrams. In this
area, the CASE tools (RSA) were used.
4. Cryptographic Protection of SWSA
Even in the simplest systems and applications, there are
many places where the potential attack is possible, and their
number is limited only by the inventiveness of the attacker.
There are three basic areas in which information is exposed
to capture:
– when you enter (e.g., keyboard);
– during transmission (e.g, via a local network or the
Internet);
– when writing (e.g., on ﬁxed and removable media).
In the area of interest of presented data protection solution,
the SWSA belongs to the third area, including security of
data stored on ﬁxed and removable storage media.
The elaborated solution is assumed, among other things,
the exchange of data between the internal, to the operat-
ing system, medium (ie hard drive), and external media
(e.g., hard drive or Flash RAM) connected to the system
via USB. However, the data exchanging between external
media (e.g., Flash RAM) which are connected to the SWSA
by USB is not possible. The process of securing the ex-
change of data using removable media should satisfy the
following functional requirements:
– should be implemented in a manner transparent to
the user;
– should not cause any noticeable to the user loads of
the operating system;
– should not have a signiﬁcant impact on the speed of
read and write data onto data media;
– should allow to perform any operation allowed for
data storage media, such as volume, surface checking
for errors, and defragment the disk-based data.
These requirements force the use of the process of data
security, a dedicated module (driver) for the operating sys-
tem running at the kernel level. Schematic diagram of the
developed solution is shown in Fig. 5. A detailed descrip-
tion of the method of securing removable media is given
in [18].
Fig. 5. Schematic diagram of securing of data stored on an
external drive.
It is assumed that the elements involved in the process
of securing stored data are divided into two groups: the
internal and external components. The division has been
completed, taking as its criterion, the relationship between
the elements and the operating system installed on com-
puter. The internal components (Fig. 5) includes both the
hardware in a computer’s hard drive, and software mod-
ules: the driver, .DLL library that provides the functional-
ity of the implemented encryption algorithms, module of
session key generation, and a database of public keys of
users. External components (Fig. 5) connected to a com-
puter via USB include hardware components in the form of
Flash RAM, and the user identiﬁcation card in the form of
a smart card.
The process of writing (encryption) of data transferred to
external media requires the user to identify the recipient of
such a data. The process of data recording is initialized
by the user (operator) currently logged on the system. The
logged user may also be the recipient of the data. During
the reading operations (decryption) the ﬁle, the operator
is the recipient. For each of the saved ﬁle, the signature
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is created that contains the information needed to decrypt
the ﬁle. A signature is cryptographically protected, and
could be read only by the recipient of the ﬁle.
5. The Method of SWSA Software
Design
The key problem of SWSA software design boils down to
building the trusted system platform (TSP) which includes:
operating system kernel, virtual machines manager (VMM),
and running special versions of operating systems. It is
worth noting that both the operating system kernel, and
special versions of operating systems in terms of the carried
out project are ready components, and the project will be
limited only to the speciﬁcations of their interfaces and
conﬁguration descriptions. Interfaces would be described
in UML and the conﬁgurations on topological diagrams.
The essential complexity of software design is thus reduced
to the construction of VMM virtual machines manager
(Fig. 4), which will be responsible for its own implementa-
tion of the Xen hypervisor virtualization component, but it
is worth noting that the work includes the implementation
of its own unique solutions in this scope, in particular, it
provides multilevel security policies.
In the process of development of VMM software, a new
method of software design of MLS-type systems called
MDmls was proposed [19] which is based on MDD (Model
Driven Development) approach [13]. The method intended
for designing specialized MLS-type systems contains, in
particular, its basic processes, domain languages used,
stages and development environment. The essence of the
MDmls method is the integration of MLS security mod-
els with system design models expressed in UML-based
language. Such integrated models with both a concrete
notation and abstract syntax are called security design
models [20].
In the MDmls method, the activities concerning of do-
main modeling languages DSM are essential. The construc-
tion of a new class of Domain Speciﬁc Language requires
a metamodel created, because only on this basis the proﬁle
can be deﬁned. The metamodel formalizes the structure
of models, as well as scenarios, which represent possible
instances of SWSA.
From the perspective of project management, the transi-
tion to the implementation stage takes place after complet-
ing modeling, which we build the next release of “tested
models” in an incremental and agile way. Implementation,
however, is carried out, but only after delivering the ﬁ-
nal version of the system model, and considerably makes
up the result of automatic transformation of models into
system code and descriptions of the required conﬁguration.
Therefore, the method assumes that all developed, in accor-
dance with MDA, models are combined with transforma-
tions: speed manual or automatic (model-to-model [M2M],
model-to-text [M2T]).
In this scope of design process, it is proposed to use
the extended UML language with the so-called topolog-
ical models [16], [21]. The creation of these models is
supported by the CASE environment – Rational Soft-
ware Architect (RSA). The IBM RSA ver. 8.0 extended
environment was used with the Rational Software Ar-
chitect Simulation Toolkit, with support for UML Ac-
tion Language (UAL), which provides a subset of the
speciﬁcations described in OMG with technologies fUML
and ALF (Fig. 6).
Fig. 6. The outline of environment for development of SWSA
software [19].
The description of methods on how to validate the design
solutions, speciﬁcation of threat scenarios, and veriﬁcation
of the models in the RSA environment the subject of an-
other publication.
Thanks to the integration of security models with the
MLS-type SCS models (described in UML), in the pro-
posed method of designing MDmls, the possibility of simu-
lating models is obtained, which allows veriﬁcation of many
security problems of the designed system at the modeling
stage. Using the model topology also allows the (physical)
study of separating data processing processes belonging to
diﬀerent domains of security, which is one of the elements
of verifying MLS-type systems. Additionally, the topology
model enables deﬁning the SWSA conﬁguration, and then
validate the rules concerning the exhaustion of station phys-
ical resources (resulting from its current conﬁguration).
6. Summary
The main goal of the project that is to develop a secure
environment for processing data of diﬀerent classiﬁcation
levels on the same physical machine is achieved by inte-
gration of existing hardware and software virtualization,
cryptography and identiﬁcation technologies to ensure the
security of multilevel classiﬁed data by means of some for-
mal methods and components approach to provide diﬀerent
virtual machines with either Linux or Windows systems for
each security level. The SWSA project is currently in the
validation phase and its results are quite promising.
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Paper Model of User Access Control
to Virtual Machines Based on RT-Family
Trust Management Language with Temporal
Validity Constraints – Practical Application
Krzysztof Lasota and Adam Kozakiewicz
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Abstract—The paper presents an application of an RT-family
trust management language as a basis for an access control
model. The discussion concerns a secure workstation running
multiple virtual machines used to process sensitive informa-
tion from multiple security domains, providing strict separa-
tion of the domains. The users may act in several different
roles, with different access rights. The inference mechanisms
of the language are used to translate credentials allowing users
to access different functional domains, and assigning virtual
machines to these domains into clear rules, regulating the
rights of a particular user to a particular machine, taking
into account different periods of validity of different creden-
tials. The paper also describes a prototype implementation of
the model.
Keywords—RT-family languages, security model, user access
control, virtual environment.
1. Introduction
The article presents issues related to granting secure user
access to resources having diﬀerent sensitivity levels. This
subject is one of the most important aspects of the project
called “Special workstation for special applications”. The
project is focused on building a secure system to work
with documents from diﬀerent security domains located
in virtual environment. Separation of system resources
(e.g., Processors, RAM Memory, etc.) between virtual ma-
chines is not part of presented security model and it will
not be described in this article. However, it was included
in the architecture of the prototype solution.
The rest of this section presents a short description of the
“Secure workstation for special application” project and the
RT-family trust management languages, one of which is
used to describe the proposed model. Section 2 focuses on
presentation of the most important functional requirements.
The proposed security model is presented in Sections 3, 4,
and 5. Section 6 describes the implemented prototype. The
article concludes with a short summary in Section 7.
1.1. Secure Workstation for Special Application
The work presented in this paper is a part of the project
called “Secure workstation for special applications” [1],
which aim is to create a secure environment for process-
ing of sensitive information based on virtualization tech-
nology. The documents belonging to diﬀerent security do-
mains (diﬀerent sensitivity levels or functional domains)
are processed in separate, isolated, virtual machines run-
ning special secure versions of guest systems. The expected
result of the project, to be delivered later this year, is an
advanced technology demonstrator. The products of the
project will include:
– secure system platform, referenced as SSP – software
component integrating a secure host operating system
and virtual machine management tools, which is able
to run several instances of guest operating system;
– special versions of guest operating systems – secure
version of Linux and Windows systems prepared to
run under control of the secure system platform;
– technical and operational documentation of the sys-
tem, recommendations, procedures and templates;
– examples of cryptographic data protection and au-
thentication mechanisms, e.g. biometrics.
The project consortium is led by the Military University of
Technology in Warsaw and consists of Filbico Sp. zo.o.,
Military Telecommunications Institute and Research and
Academic Computer Network (NASK).
1.2. RT-Family Trust Management Language
Role-based trust management (RT) languages were intro-
duced in [2] and combine features of trust management [3]
and Role Based Access Control [4]. They are used for
representing security policies and credentials in centralized
and distributed access control systems. A credential pro-
vides information about the user access privileges and the
security policies issued by one or more trusted authorities.
So far the family consists of: RT0, RT1, RT2, RT T , RT D
languages [2], [5]–[7] which are progressively increasing
in expressive power and complexity. For language RT T
which is backwards compatible with RT0, RT1 and RT2,
in [8] time validity of credentials is proposed. The ex-
tended versions of these languages are referenced as RT T+ ,
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RT2+, RT1+, and RT0+. In [9] the general structure of
proofs of soundness and completeness of inference systems
for these languages are presented. The complete proof is
still waiting for publication.
While legal regulations enforce only using mandatory ac-
cess control (MAC [10], [11]), the proposed model of user
access control to virtual machines will be based on a trust
management language from the RT family with time va-
lidity, enabling more detailed speciﬁcation of access rules.
Language RT2+ ﬁts our expectations by supporting param-
eterized roles and deﬁning o-sets which are able to group
objects representing resources in much the same way as
roles group subjects. This enables completely abstract poli-
cies to be created where permissions are speciﬁed in terms
of roles, and o-sets and actual relations between subjects
and objects are established by assigning them to roles and
o-sets.
2. Security Model – Requirements
The basic requirement for the deﬁned model of access con-
trol to virtual machines is its validity. Additionally it has
to comply with functional requirements of the project. The
most important ones are described in this section.
2.1. Security Clauses
The security model must support various levels of security
which are assigned to system users and documents located
Fig. 1. Relations between security levels in Poland, European
Union and NATO.
on virtual machines. Figure 1 shows a diagram of rela-
tions between security levels in Poland, European Union
and NATO.
2.2. Protected Resources
Protected resources, e.g., documents, are located inside vir-
tual systems. The security model for user access to virtual
machines presumes that all protected resources are located
on virtual machines. A permission is granted to access
a particular virtual machine which holds documents with
the same sensitivity level. A user in the system can have
access to many virtual machines, as well as one virtual
machine can be accessed by many users.
2.3. Functional Domains
The security model has to support various functional do-
mains. Domain partitioning allows for more elastic man-
agement of system resources and user permissions. Ex-
amples of security domains might include: ﬁnance – this
domain holds information related to payrolls, incomes of
employees, etc., or projects – the domain holds information
about running projects.
Additionally, the security model should support separation
of resources located in the same functional domain but with
diﬀerent sensitivity levels. Security domain can hold re-
sources with diﬀerent sensitivity levels assigned to them,
but a user can only access those with sensitivity level not
exceeding his clearance.
2.4. Users of the SSP System
The security model has to diﬀerentiate users based on
the potential system utilization by them. A basic system
user can only use resources which he is allowed to ac-
cess. From the system security point of view, the people
responsible for granting other users rights to use the sys-
tem are the most important group. Additionally, due to the
accountability requirement for the secure workstation, it
is required to include users responsible for auditing the
system.
2.5. Time Validity
The security model should include information about va-
lidity period of the issued credentials. Implementing time
frames of validity for granted permissions is necessary in
the system. Security clearance and certiﬁcates of received
trainings considering data protection are valid only for spec-
iﬁed periods of time. The procedures for assigning access
rights to protected resources for a user need to enforce
a deﬁnition of their validity period, so that the model will
be similar to a real system.
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3. Security Model – Subjects
and Objects
Security model is based on two types of entities – a se-
cure workstation and system users – and the same number
of objects corresponding to the resources of the system –
virtual machines and shared storage areas.
Secure workstation is a central point of authority. Only
roles and sets deﬁned by the Secure Workstation and cre-
dentials issued by it are supported by the deductive system.
The most important attribute of an entity is a unique iden-
tifier that is referenced as B later in the article.
System User is a key entity. Based on issued credentials,
protected system resources are made available to it. User
entity possesses a number of attributes that are derived from
requirements for security model:
– Unique identifier – referenced as uid – used to diﬀer-
entiate between users;
– Security levels – referenced as ulev – contains a list
of all sensitivity levels which the user has access to.
Additionally each clause has a deﬁned time period of its
validity. The validity depends on the clearance held by the
user, e.g., in Polish law validity is determined by owned se-
curity credentials and completed trainings on protection of
classiﬁed information. The time period of certiﬁcate valid-
ity is referenced as vl , where l corresponds to the identiﬁer
of security level.
Virtual machine and shared storage area. All resources
of the secure workstation to which access is determined
by the deﬁned model are contained in the described ob-
jects. The main purpose of virtual machines is to allow for
working with documents of diﬀerent security level. Shared
storage areas provide access to resources that are located
directly on the secure workstation. They enable diﬀerent
access to be assigned to directories or hard drives for dif-
ferent users. In particular, a separate hard drive destined
for collecting logs is intended and available only for the
safety auditor. The most important attributes of an object
are:
– Unique identifier – referenced as mvid and ssid – used
to diﬀerentiate between objects.
– Validation period – referenced as vmv and vss – period
of time when particular object is available for systems
users.
– Security level – referenced as mvlev and sslev – at-
tribute speciﬁes security level of all resources con-
tained in a particular object.
4. Security Model – Roles and O-Sets
The RT1 is an extention of RT0 and introduces parameter-
ized roles, while the RT2 language extends RT1 with o-sets.
In the following section all roles and o-sets used by the
access control model are described.
4.1. Parameters
All deﬁned roles for grouping subjects, and also all object
sets can depend only on the following parameters:
User role parameter – referenced as rol – has a slightly
diﬀerent meaning depending on the context where it is used,
either referencing security model roles or o-sets. In case of
security model roles, it deﬁnes a role for the system user.
Second case is when it describes a user’s role necessary
to access protected resources (either a virtual machine or
shared storage area). The parameter can be assigned the
following values:
– USER – references users with basic rights in the sys-
tem which can get access only to resources assigned
to them;
– SPEC – references Chief Information Security Of-
ﬁcer (security specialist) with function of granting
users access rights to resources, but does not have an
access to these resources himself. This is the only
role which can add new credentials interpreted by the
system. In fact, a user with this role can be viewed
as the host system’s administrator;
– AUDIT – references Chief Audit Executive (security
auditor) whose role is assuring system accountability
by validating system event log ﬁles;
– ADMIN – additional role for virtual machine admin-
istrators responsible for the conﬁguration of virtual
machines.
Functional domain parameter – referenced as dom – cor-
responds to system partitioning into separate domains al-
lowing an easy management of users and resources. A user
gains access to resources by acquiring proper credentials to
access a domain. A particular resource is accessible only
if it is assigned to a domain. The parameter does not have
a deﬁned set of allowed values. The only restriction is
a unique identiﬁer of a newly added domain.
Type of access parameter – referenced as rig – the security
model provides means to determine the access type granted
for a user to a resource. Two basic types of access rights are
distinguished: a right to read referenced as R and a right to
read and write referenced as RW. The ﬁrst type is applicable
in case of shared storage areas containing log ﬁles of system
events. A system administrator should have an access to it,
but should not have a right to modify it. An auditor has the
ability to create a backup of secured data and delete the old
one by using an additional software. In case of resources
on virtual machines, only the second type of access rights
is used.
Security level parameter – referenced as lev – The secu-
rity model requires specifying a sensitivity level for each
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resource. The resource may not be accessed by users with-
out a security clearance for this – or higher – level of se-
curity. The following security level identiﬁers are used to
reference proper security clearances used in Poland, EU
and NATO:
– J – public level, common for security clearance in
Poland, EU and NATO;
– Z – restricted level, references: Polish ‘ZA-
STRZEZONE’, and ‘EU RESTREINT’ or ‘EU RE-
STRICTED’ and ‘NATO RESTRICTED’;
– P-PL – conﬁdential level, references Polish
‘POUFNE’ clearance;
– P-EU – conﬁdential level, references ‘EU CONFI-
DENTIAL’ or ‘CONFIDENTIEL UE’ security clear-
ance;
– P-NA – conﬁdential level, references ‘NATO CONFI-
DENTIAL’ security clearance;
– T-PL – secret level, references Polish ‘TAJNE’ clear-
ance;
– T-EU – secret level, references ‘SECRET UE’ or ‘EU
SECRET’ clearance;
– T-NA – secret level, references ‘NATO SECRET’
clearance;
– S-PL – top secret level, references Polish ‘SCISLE
TAJNE’ clearance;
– S-EU – top secret level, references European ‘EU
TOP SECRET’ or ‘TRES SECRET UE’ clearance;
– S-NA – top secret level, references ‘NATO COSMIC
TOP SECRET’ clearance.
4.2. User Roles
The security model allows for grouping of the entities re-
lated to users in three roles. Role B.ide of the security
model contains information about all system roles that can
be assigned to users, and is deﬁned as follows:
B.ide(?rol) in V , (1)
where:
rol – may take all deﬁned values.
It is very important in the context of real system operations.
Taking into account that a user can be assigned to diﬀerent
roles, identifying a particular one is done by user ‘Identity’
(denoted as ide in role names). The Identity is deﬁned as
a combination of user and assigned role, and typically cor-
responds to an account in the system – a user may have
more than one account and change roles by switching be-
tween them. From the security point of view, assigning to
the same user AUDIT role and any other is forbidden. Next
two roles, deﬁned as:
B.ide dom rig(?rol,?dom,?rig) in V (2)
and
B.ide dom lev(?rol,?dom,?lev) in V , (3)
where:
rol – may take values from set {ADMIN,USER,AUDIT},
dom – may take all deﬁned domains,
rig – may take all deﬁned values {R,RW},
lev – may take all deﬁned values {J, Z, P-PL, P-EU,
{P-NA, T-PL, T-EU, T-NA, S-PL, S-EU S-NA},
are holding information about an access of user identities
to functional domains. Role (2) determines the type of an
access to domain resources and role (3) deﬁnes restriction
on the highest sensitivity level of resources which a given
identity is allowed to access. User identity can only access
those resources with sensitivity level not exceeding clear-
ance.
4.3. Virtual Machine O-Sets
The security model allows to group objects related to virtual
machines in two ways. The ﬁrst one (4) deﬁnes membership
of a virtual machine to resources of a particular functional
domain. Sensitivity level of data located on a virtual ma-
chine is an attribute of an object representing the virtual
machine. The assignment is performed with a speciﬁc se-
curity level which may not diﬀer from the sensitivity level
assigned to the virtual machine itself.
The second one (5) describes a system role which a user
has to be assigned to gain access to a particular virtual
machine.
B.mv dom(?dom,?lev) in V (4)
where:
dom – may take all deﬁned domains,
lev – may take all deﬁned values.
B.mv rol(?rol) in V (5)
where:
rol – may take values from set {ADMIN,USER,AUDIT}.
4.4. Shared Storage Area O-Sets
Similarly as for virtual machines, the security model al-
lows two groupings of objects related to shared storage
areas. The ﬁrst one (6) deﬁnes functional domain with
a particular sensitivity level that has the shared storage area
in its resources. The second one (7), aside from deﬁning
a system role a particular user has to be granted with,
deﬁnes the type of access. There is no possibility to as-
sign shared storage area as a resource designed for users
in USER system role.
B.ss dom(?dom,?lev) in V (6)
where:
dom – may take all deﬁned domains,
lev – may take all deﬁned values.
B.ss rol(?rol) in V (7)
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where:
rol – role – may take values from set {ADMIN,AUDIT},
rig – rig – may take all deﬁned values.
4.5. Main Role
The most important role (8) of the security model can pro-
vide information about speciﬁc time when user is allowed
to access a particular resource, based on user credentials
and deductive system.
B.main(?rol,?dom,?rig,?lev) in V (8)
where:
rol – may take values from set {ADMIN,USER,AUDIT},
dom – may take all deﬁned domains,
right – may take all deﬁned values,
lev – may take all deﬁned values.
Fig. 2. Visualization of user access control model.
5. Security Model – Credentials
A security model based on the RT2+ language featuring
time validity of credentials is presented in Fig. 2. It is
composed of roles and o-sets, as deﬁned in the previous
section. Furthermore, it presents all possible credentials
the system is able to process. Two types of credentials
were distinguished: credentials created by an Information
Security Oﬃcer, and credentials obtained from the deduc-
tive system process.
The ﬁrst type of credentials includes:
– a user role attribution, creating a user identity (9);
– an identity access type to resources of a particular
functional domain (10);
– an identity access to resources of a functional domain
with particular sensitivity level (11);
– a virtual machine inclusion as a resource of a partic-
ular domain with speciﬁc sensitivity level (13);
– a virtual machine attribution to users holding speciﬁc
system role (14);
– a shared storage area inclusion as a resource of a par-
ticular domain with speciﬁc sensitivity level (16);
– a shared storage area attribution to users holding spe-
ciﬁc system role and type of access (17).
The second type of credentials include:
– a type of access allowed to resources of a domain
with particular sensitivity level for a user holding
speciﬁc role (12);
– a virtual machine inclusion as a resource of a domain
with a particular sensitivity level, with access type
available for a user holding a certain role (15);
– a shared storage area inclusion as a resource of a do-
main with a particular sensitivity level, with speciﬁc
access type available for a user holding a certain
role (18).
5.1. User Credentials
B.ide(rol = X) in V
←−
B.USER(u id = I) in v
(9)
where:
X – role value which is assigned,
I – value of user unique identiﬁer,
v – base time validity of credential,
V – active time validity of credential.




B.USER(u id = I) in vide∩ v
(10)
where:
X – role value which is assigned,
Y – domain value which is assigned,
Z – access type value which is assigned,
I – value of user unique identiﬁer,
vide – active time validity of component credential (9),
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v – base time validity of credential,
V – active time validity of credential.




B.USER(u id = I,u lev = L : W ∈ L)
in vide∩ vW L∩ v
(11)
where:
X – role value which is assigned,
Y – domain value which is assigned,
W – sensitivity level which is assigned,
L – set of all security levels accessible to
a particular user,
vide – active time validity of component credential (9),
vWL – time validity of user sensitivity level,
v – base time validity of credential,
V – active time validity of credential.
B.main(role = X ,dom =?Y,rig =?Z, lev = W )
in V
←−
B.ide dom rig(role = X ,dom =?Y,rig =?Z)
∩




X – role value which is assigned,
Y – set of domain values which are assigned,
Z – set of access type values which are assigned,
W – security level value which is assigned,
vrig – active time validity of component credential (10),
vlev – active time validity of component credential (11),
V – active time validity of credential,
5.2. Virtual Machine Credentials
B.mv dom(dom = Y, lev = W )in V
←−
B.MV (mv id = M,mv lev = W ) in vmv∩ v
(13)
where:
Y – domain value which is assigned,
W – security level value which is assigned,
M – value of virtual machine unique identiﬁer,
vmv– time validity of virtual machine,
v – base time validity of credential,
V – active time validity of credential.
B.mv rol(role = X)
in V
←−
B.MV (mv id = M) in vmv ∩ v
(14)
where:
X – role value which is assigned,
M – value of virtual machine unique identiﬁer,
vmv– time validity of virtual machine,
v – base time validity of credential,
V – active time validity of credential.
B.main(role =?X ,dom =?Y,rig =′ RW ′, lev = W )
in V
←−






X – set of role values which are assigned,
Y – set of domain values which are assigned,
W – security level value which is assigned,
vdom – active time validity of component credential (13),
vrol – active time validity of component credential (14),
V – active time validity of credential.
5.3. Shared Storage Area Credentials
B.ss dom(dom = Y, lev = W ) in V
←−
B.SS(ss id = S,ss lev = W ) in vss∩ v
(16)
where:
Y – domain value which is assigned,
W – security level value which is assigned,
S – value of shared storage area unique identiﬁer,
vss – time validity of shared storage area,
v – base time validity of credential,
V – active time validity of credential.
B.ss rol(role = X ,rig = Z)
in V
←−
B.SS(ss id = S) in vss∩ v
(17)
where:
X – role value which is assigned,
Z – access type value which is assigned,
S – value of shared storage area unique identiﬁer,
vss – time validity of shared storage area,
v – base time validity of credential,
V – active time validity of credential.
B.main(role =?X ,dom =?Y,rig =?Z, lev = W )
in V
←−
B.ss dom(dom =?Y, lev = W )
∩
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where:
X – set of role values which are assigned,
Y – set of domain values which are assigned,
Z – set of access type values which are assigned,
W – security level value which is assigned,
vdom – active time validity of component credential (16),
vrol – active time validity of component credential (17),
V – active time validity of credential.
6. Prototype
The software implementing the adopted user access con-
trol model can be divided in two parts: server and client
side. The architecture of the software divided into func-
tional modules is presented in Fig. 3. The server part of
Fig. 3. Architecture of prototype solution.
the software is responsible for handling client requests ac-
cording to adopted security model, and it is divided into
three modules:
• The Core – responsible for handling communication
with clients and other server modules.
• The Credential Database – provides functionality of
knowledge base about possible actions of the SSP
system users.
• The Guard – responsible for translating existing cre-
dentials located in the knowledge base into SELinux
rules, eﬀectively granting actual access to resources
for running applications to users of the secure work-
station.
The client part is implemented as a set of dedicated libraries
used by all applications, requiring communication with the
security model provider.
6.1. Server – Core Module
The Core module is responsible for communication with
client applications and validation of incoming requests for
access and modiﬁcation of user access rights to resources.
Its purpose is also to conﬁrm a connecting users right to ac-
cess, and to modify data located in the Credential Database.
It coordinates cooperation between the rest of the server
side modules implementing the access control model: the
Guard and the Credential Database. It was implemented
in C++ language using the functionality of an XML-RPC
server library.
6.2. Server – Guard Module
The Guard Module is responsible for implementing rules
of granting access to resources for applications and users of
the secure workstation. The rules are derived from creden-
tials located in the credential database and implemented
with functionality of SELinux. The temporal validity of
credentials allows the Guard module to use Linux cron
daemon for issuing and revoking access rights at speciﬁc
points of time. The SELinux policy used by SSP is based
on a modiﬁed and extended Multi Level Security (MLS)
policy.
6.3. Server – Credential Database Module
The Credential Database module represents the adopted se-
curity model. It provides the functionality of a knowledge
base of allowed actions in the SSP system performed by
the users. It consists of two elements: API and a database.
Communication is implemented via an API implemented in
C++. Database used in the system is PostgreSQL. Access
to information in the database is restricted by the control
mechanism available in PostgreSQL, based on the model
Role Base Access Control (RBAC). Requests coming from
diﬀerent versions of the library, prepared for speciﬁc ap-
plications are handled by the Core Module on a separate
restricted connection.
6.4. Client – Libraries
The client part of the software is composed from sev-
eral versions of libraries designed for applications requiring
communication with the Core Module of the server. The li-
braries provide interface for reading and modifying creden-
tials in the Credential Database. The functionality shared
by the libraries corresponds to the API of the Credential
Database module. The libraries were implemented in C++
with the same XML-RPC library as the Core Module. Keys
required for digital signing of messages are obtained from
the key database protected by the Trusted Platform Module
(TPM). The set of shared functions of a particular library
corresponds to the actual purpose of the library. There are
ﬁve versions of the library:
• Basic version – intended for the application used to
login, allows validating the logged-in user role.
• User version – intended for applications with active
USER role. It only provides ability to check which
resources are accessible by the logged-in user.
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• Admin version – intended for applications dedi-
cated for administrators of virtual machines. It al-
lows checking which resources are accessible by the
logged-in user and obtaining information required for
correct conﬁguration of the system, e.g., which users
have access to the virtual machine.
• Spec version – intended for Information Security Of-
ﬁcers. It allows for unrestricted reading and modiﬁ-
cation of data in the Credential Database.
• Audit version – intended for Chief Audit Executives,
it allows for unrestricted read-only access to data in
the Credential Database and has access to history of
changes.
7. Conclusion
The article presents a security model of user access con-
trol to virtual machines, which complies with functional
requirements of the “Special workstation for special appli-
cations” project. Additionally, it includes new functionality,
like introduction of a new SSP user role – Administrator
of virtual machines or adding shared storage area as a sep-
arate resource with controlled access. A presentation of
a fully operational prototype software, implementing pre-
sented security model underlines the model’s usability in
real applications. The paper presents the access control
module’s architecture and a short description of all deﬁned
modules.
The Guard module is of particular interest, as it shows
how complex access models can be mapped in a practical
way into simple rules for the well known SELinux solu-
tion. RT -family languages can be even more powerful and
complex (see, e.g., RT T+ ), and they are very well suited for
large, distributed systems with many independent centers
of authority providing users with credentials, with complex
trust relations between them. The presented architecture is
adaptable to this setting, showing that local security mech-
anisms, such as SELinux, are still applicable in such dis-
tributed systems. The necessary approach is to infer simple
access rights from the RT credentials. These rights can
be applied in an automatic way, even taking into account
limited periods of validity of credentials.
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of Removable Media with a USB
Interface for Secure Workstation
for Special Applications
Jan Chudzikiewicz and Janusz Furtak
Military University of Technology, Warsaw, Poland
Abstract—This paper describes one of the essential elements
of Secure Workstation for Special Applications (SWSA) to
cryptographic protection of removable storage devices with
USB interface. SWSA is a system designed to process data
classified to different security domains in which the multi-
level security is used. The described method for protecting
data on removable Flash RAM protects data against unau-
thorized access in systems processing the data, belonging to
different security domains (with different classification levels)
in which channel the flow of data must be strictly controlled.
Only user authenticated by the SWSA can use the removable
medium in the system, and the data stored on such media
can be read only by an authorized user by the SWSA. This
solution uses both symmetric and asymmetric encryption al-
gorithms. The following procedures are presented: creating
protected a file (encryption), generating signatures for the file
and reading (decryption) the file. Selected elements of the pro-
tection systems implementation of removable Flash RAM and
the mechanisms used in implementation the Windows have
been described.
Keywords—filter driver, removable media protection, symmetric
and asymmetric encryption.
1. Introduction
Nowadays, the most comfortable Removable large-capacity
data devices are connected to the system via the bus Univer-
sal Serial Bus (USB). Such devices include ﬂash memory
RAM with a capacity of several tens of GB and hard disk
drives with a capacity of several TB. The popularity of
these devices forces the need for mechanisms to ensure an
adequate level of protection of data stored on them. This
is important in the case of sensitive data which have a sig-
niﬁcant impact on the safety of the institution. This fact
is particularly important in the systems where conﬁdential
data are processed. It is hard to imagine a contemporary
computer system in which the data storage devices cooper-
ating with the system through the USB bus are not avail-
able. This observation also applies to Secure Workstation
for Special Applications1 (SWSA) [1], [2].
1SWSA is a computer system in which multi-level protection mecha-
nisms have been implemented. In this system, the stored and processed
data (objects) are classiﬁed due to the required level of security. Users of
the system (subjects) have speciﬁc authorization to work with classiﬁed
data. In order to ensure conﬁdentiality and integrity of data for subjects
are used mechanisms of mandatory access control to objects.
In ordinary systems to protect data on the media Flash
RAM, the most commonly used software (e.g., USB Flash
Security, Secure Traveler, Rohos Mini Drive, etc.) must be
installed on the media prior to its use. During the installa-
tion of such software, in Flash RAM is created an encrypted
volume which is accessed by using then deﬁned password.
The power of safeguard of the medium using this type of
software depends on the used symmetric encryption algo-
rithm and key length. This type of security is suﬃcient
in the case of a loss or theft of the media. The use of
such solutions in systems with multilevel security (MLS)
which include the SWSA is insuﬃcient for the following
reasons:
– system does not provide the possibility of the control
of an access to data copied to such a secured remov-
able media, in particular, an entity with the lower
clause cannot be blocked by system, while trying to
read to the data with a higher classiﬁcation contained
on the medium;
– transfer of data between diﬀerent entities that use
such media possesses problems arising mainly from
the need to provide the transfer of the medium and
an encryption key with help which the medium has
been encrypted;
– entity that creates a copy of the data on the media
does not assure that the data are only available for the
appropriate recipient and the recipient does not have
an assurance that data is received from the expected
sender.
The article presents a solution enabling to such a prepa-
ration of data stored in Flash RAM, so that the recording
medium can be used to secure the transfer of data ﬁles,
during which the sender of data (i.e., the creator of the pro-
tected media content) is assured that data will be available
only for designated recipient, and the recipient is assured
that the received data comes from the expected sender. The
described mechanism uses both symmetric and asymmet-
ric encryption algorithms and asymmetric. The presented
solution uses a ﬁlter driver [3]–[5].
In this solution, it is assumed that in terms of operating
system data can be processed in two directions: from plain
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Fig. 1. Schematic diagram of securing data stored on removable media.
text form stored on your hard disk to secure form on re-
movable media (e.g., Flash RAM, hard drive) connected to
the system via the USB bus and, conversely, from secure
form on removable media to plain text form on the hard
drive. Do not allow the possibility of using the software
for the direct exchange of data ﬁles between removable
media (e.g., ﬂash memory) connected to the system via
the USB bus.
The process of securing the data exchange using remov-
able media should satisfy the following functional require-
ments:
– it should be implemented in a manner transparent to
the user,
– it should not cause any noticeable loads of the oper-
ating system to the user,
– it should not have a signiﬁcant impact on the speed
of read and write data onto data media,
– it should allow the use of various encryption algo-
rithms to ensure the required level of conﬁdentiality,
– it should be built on removable media, protected ﬁle
and the signature for this ﬁle (signature should con-
tain securely stored data necessary to encrypt/decrypt
the protected ﬁle, and to ensure the integrity of the
ﬁle,
– it should allow to perform any operation allowed for
data storage media, such as volume, surface checking
for errors, and defragment the disk-based data.
These requirements force the use of the process of secur-
ing the data separate modules (drivers), operating at the
kernel-level of operating system [4]–[7]. Schematic repre-
sentation of a solution being developed in the environment
of Windows systems family is shown in Fig. 1.
Described solution is available for a user of the secure work-
station through the control application (CApp). The main
elements of the built system are interacting drivers: encryp-
tion driver [3] and driver supporting, which are compatible
to the Windows Driver Model [6]. Both elements work in
kernel mode, operating system and communicate with each
other using the internal mechanisms of the operating sys-
tem (in the ﬁgure they are labeled as IRP) [6], [8]. These
mechanisms are described in details in Section 2.
The purpose of the encryption driver (EnD) is the realiza-
tion of the process of encryption/decryption of data and
determination of its hash value for these data. The driver
supporting (DSu) sets the signature for protected data (ac-
cording to the algorithm presented in Section 3) and medi-
ates the transfer of messages/commands between EnD and
CApp. The other components of the system are: the .DLL
library that provides the functionality of the implemented
encryption algorithms, module of generation of session key,
and the database of public keys of users.
The product of the process securing the original ﬁle con-
sists of two ﬁles: a ﬁle with encrypted data and the ﬁle
containing the signature for the encrypted ﬁle. Both ﬁles
can be stored on one medium or each ﬁle on a separate
medium. Choosing a storage location of the signature ﬁle
is deﬁned by the user through CApp. It should be noted
that saving the encrypted ﬁle and the signature ﬁle on sep-
arate media increases the security of stored data, but it is
inconvenient to use.
2. Filter Drivers in Windows
Construction of Class Windows operating system assumes
the use of two modes: user mode and kernel mode [6], [8].
Architecture of such a system is shown in Fig. 1. Modular
design allows for an easy expansion of system functions
(which is clearly visible in Fig. 2, showing the components
operating in kernel mode), while the use of hardware ab-
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Fig. 2. Architecture of operating systems Windows [6].
Fig. 3. Process of communication between user application and
the driver [6].
straction layer (HAL) provides portability between diﬀerent
hardware architectures.
From the point of view the task of securing the content of
removable storage media in the SWSA and the drivers of
these devices (in the part relating to user mode) are relevant
only the following components:
– user application (the CApp in the solution which is
presented in this paper);
– Environment Subsystem (Windows);
– ntdll.dll system library that allows a communication
with the elements working in kernel mode.
Environment subsystems form a working environment for
applications running on them. It translates the application
call to the system and its resources to the primary functions
of Windows. The process of communication between user
application and driver uses packets IRP that are created
Fig. 4. Windows Driver Model [6].
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by the I/O Manager on the basis of the generated request
type. The process of handling requests from the user’s ap-
plication in which the IRP packet is generated is shown
in Fig. 3.
The Windows Driver Model assumes that the devices are
controlled by a stack of drivers working together, each of
which is responsible for the implementation of other tasks
of the device. The driver stack model is shown in Fig. 4.
In this model, there are always two drivers: a bus driver at
the bottom of the stack and the functional driver which de-
ﬁnes the utility functions of the device. The model allows
for the possibility of using additional ﬁlter drivers that are
placed in the stack and allow you to monitor and modify
the contents of packages I/O requests directed to device.
DEVICE OBJECT is a representative of a particular de-
vice, such as ﬂash RAM, and is associated with a driver
(DRIVER OBJECT) that supports it.
Driver objects are created by the I/O Manager when the
driver is loaded. Drivers are responsible for creation of
Fig. 5. Objects stack for the storage device connected to the
system via the USB [3].
Fig. 6. The drivers stack for data storage devices using mecha-
nisms of Filter Manager [4].
the DEVICE OBJECT representing the system devices.
Creating an object of this type occurs when the AddDe-
vice procedure is called by the I/O Manager. Depending
on the role of the driver, created object can represent:
– Physical Device Object (PDO) – representing the
connection between the device and the bus;
– Functional Device Object (FDO) – functional driver
uses it to determine functions of the device;
– Filter Device Object (FiDO) – ﬁlter driver uses it
to process data from the packet I/O requests, and
in particular their encryption, which is used in the
described solution.
The I/O Manager can start sending packets I/O requests to
the supported device after all DEVICE OBJECT objects
will be created.
Implementation of the described drivers model for the stor-
age device connected to the system via the USB bus is
more complex. Figure 5 shows objects stack associated with
drivers of such a device. The presented diagram shows
that on the top of the objects stack there is an object of
ﬁlters manager. Below are the objects corresponding to
25
Jan Chudzikiewicz and Janusz Furtak
the FAT32 ﬁle system (marked on the diagram as an object
of type FS). An attention should be paid to the ﬁle system
drivers that are not explicitly included in the driver stack.
The association between driver of ﬁle system FS and object
representing a partition in the storage device is executed by
a data structure Volume Parameters Block (VPB).
The presented solution uses a kernel component called the
Filter Manager. Filter Manager performs a signiﬁcant part
of the tasks. Otherwise it would have to be performed
by the ﬁlter drivers. As a result, using the ﬁlter manager
(called mini-ﬁlters) is simpler and easier to implement. Fil-
ter Manager is available in all systems ranging from Win-
dows Server 2003 to Windows XP with Service Pack 2.
Figure 6 shows the drivers stack for data storage devices
using mechanisms of Filter Manager.
3. The Process of Creating and Reading
a Protected File
In the process of creating a protected ﬁle on removable
ﬂash memory (that is a creating an encrypted ﬁle and the
signature of this ﬁle), and reading (decrypting) the ﬁle from
the removable ﬂash memory are the necessary attributes of
the user who created the protected ﬁle (this user will be
called the sender), and user for whom the protected ﬁle
was created (this user will be called the recipient). When
creating a protected ﬁle, sender is role plays a user logged
into the system and he speciﬁes a ﬁle recipient using CApp
(you can select one from among the users who meet the
requirements of SWSA closely related to the multilevel se-
curity of system). When reading a protected ﬁle with the
use of CApp, the logged user plays the recipient role, and
the sender attributes are read from signature ﬁle after the
successful decryption of this ﬁle, using the private key of
the logged on user. Permissible is a situation in which the
logged user is simultaneously the sender and the recipient
of data.
The process of creating a protected ﬁle includes the step
of encryption, and then creating a signature for that ﬁle.
However, during the process of reading a protected ﬁle in
a ﬁrst step, the attributes needed for decrypting this ﬁle are
obtained from the signature. In the second step, the ﬁle is
decrypted.
3.1. Creating a Protected File
The process of writing the ﬁle, including ﬁle encryption
and hash generation is performed by the EnD. Operation
of EnD has been presented in [3]. The diagram describing
the process of writing the ﬁle is shown in Fig. 7. Dashed
line in that ﬁgure indicates operations implemented by the
EnD. During the process of ﬁle encryption, the value of
the hash function is determined to ensure the integrity of
the ﬁle.
Fig. 7. The process of writing data to removable ﬂash memory.
The determined value of the hash function and the gener-
ated session key after completion of record are transferred
to the DSu in order to generate a signature for the stored
data. The process transferring of the hash function value
and the session key transferring is implemented using the
system mechanisms marked in Fig. 7, as the IRP.
Fig. 8. The algorithm of signature generation for protected ﬁle.
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3.2. Determining the Signature
For each of the protected ﬁle the signature is generated
which contains the information needed to read this ﬁle.
Signature of the ﬁle contains the following ﬁelds:
– SeK – random key to encrypt/decrypt the secure ﬁle,
– HASH – value of hash function which is determined
on the basis on the content of protected ﬁle after
encrypting this ﬁle,
– H ID – identiﬁer of the algorithm used to generate
the hash,
– En ID – identiﬁer of the algorithm used to encrypt-
ing,
– O ID – identiﬁer of the logged user (the sender) who
initiated the operation of data write – this identiﬁer is
required to determine the public key of sender when
the ﬁle is read,
– TMS – time stamp of ﬁle creation – this value cor-
responds to the date of ﬁle creation.
Fig. 9. The structure of signature secure ﬁle.
The process of signature creation proceeds according to the
diagram shown in Fig. 8, and the structure of signature is
shown in Fig. 9.
3.3. Reading a Protected File
The process of reading of the ﬁle requires that the signa-
ture to be read before and then decrypted. These activities
are performed by the logged user (recipient of ﬁle) using
CApp. The process starts with decrypting the signature ﬁle
using the private key of the logged user, then reading time
stamp and user identiﬁer (O ID) which assumed the role the
sender creating a protected ﬁle. The time stamp protects
the encrypted ﬁle before moving it to another medium that
it was originally written on. Incompatibility of date and
time stored in the time stamp and date and time, when the
ﬁle was created, causes displaying the message and termi-
nating the procedure of ﬁle reading. Along compatibility
of the parameters, the next part of the signature is decrypt-
ing using the user public key of which identiﬁer (O ID) has
been read. The next steps of ﬁle decoding are schematically
shown in Fig. 10.
In Fig. 10, the operations performed by the EnD are
marked using thick dashed line, and the operations per-
Fig. 10. The process of data reading from an external ﬁle.
formed by the DSu are marked using the thinner line (two
dots dash).
During the data reading, the value of hash function
(HASH de) is determined. If the value HASH de is
diﬀerent from the values obtained from the signature
(HASH sig), a message is displayed and the decrypted ﬁle,
which was saved on hard disk, is being deleted.
4. Implementation Mechanisms
of Encryption/Decryption
This section presents the implementation of selected ele-
ments of drivers EnD and DSu. In particular, it describes
the pieces of code relating to the registration of the EnD
driver in the driver stack of the ﬁle system, and initiate
a logical device by the DSu driver and its associated data
structure that stores the signature components of the pro-
tected ﬁle.
4.1. Implementation the Selected Elements
of Encryption driver (EnD)
The driver registration process in the stack of ﬁle system
drivers is realized when loading it into the system by the
I/O Manager. The I/O Manager calls the DriverEntry driver
function, which will be the entry point to the driver [6]. In
this function, as the ﬁrst step shown in Fig. 11, Lookaside
list of type is initialized, in which there are held objects
representing the context of substitution data buﬀers.
In the next step, the functions made available by the ﬁlter
manager are called [4], [6]. First, the driver is registered
in the system by these functions and then ﬁltering process
is launched (Fig. 12). After registering a mini-ﬁlter using
FltRegisterFilter function, the ﬁlter manager takes over the
management of the ﬁlter.
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Fig. 11. Initializing a Lookaside list.
Fig. 12. The ﬁlter registering and activating ﬁltering process.
From this moment, a mini-ﬁlter captures all messages sent
to the functional driver of ﬁle system. One of these mes-
sages may be a message about trying to mount a new vol-
ume. Then InstanceSetup function is called. This function
checks whether there is a mounted volume on a storage de-
vice connected via USB and includes the correct ﬁle sys-
tem type. If these conditions are met, the volume is con-
nected and its context2 is initialized. Otherwise, to the ﬁlter
manager is returned the STATUS FLT DO NOT ATTACH
status code, which block the connection of the mini-ﬁlter
to the volume. A piece of code referring to the previous
steps is shown in Fig. 13.
Fig. 13. Veriﬁcation of volume data.
Initiating the volume context requires allocating the neces-
sary quantity of non-paged memory, which is done by call-
ing the FltAllocateContext function. After the correct mem-
ory allocation, this function returns STATUS SUCCESS.
One should pay attention to the need to verify this value.
2The volume context is deﬁned by the volume status, which is described
in a data structure containing the properties of a volume. In this structure
the basic data about a mounted mass storage device are described.
A piece of code executing this operation is shown in
Fig. 14. If one omits this check, in case of failure of mem-
ory allocation can cause an unstable system.
Fig. 14. Appointment of the volume context.
Fig. 15. Setting the volume sector size.
For correct implementation of the operation encryp-
tion/decryption the data included in the volume context is
necessary. These data can be downloaded each time dur-
ing encryption/decryption from the volume context, but
the storage of this data in the driver structure acceler-
ates the process of encryption/decryption. Therefore, the
recommended solution is a single download of this data
by using function FltGetVolumeProperties, as it is shown
in Fig. 15.
4.2. Implementation the Selected Elements
of Supporting Driver (DSu)
In the structure of DSu driver are used drivers marked as
LEGACY DRIVER that runs in kernel mode. This solution
has been accepted because the driver doesn’t need to create
the device objects dynamically. This driver, due to the need
for communication with other components of the system,
creates one logical device object which is also used to store
base elements of signature. At the moment of loading, the
driver in the system is being called by I/O Manager the
DriverEntry that has a driver function which in the ﬁrst
step initiates an MajorFunction array. These functions will
be handled by I/O’s request addressed to the driver. A piece
of code which implements an operation of MajorFunction
array initialization is shown in Fig. 16.
Then in the DriverEntry function is being called
IoCreateDevice function which creates a device object in
the non-paged memory area. Device object is not related to
any physical device occurring in system, but is used only
28
Cryptographic Protection of Removable Media with a USB Interface for Secure Workstation for Special Applications
Fig. 16. Initializing the MajorFunction array.
Fig. 17. Initializing the device object.
as an element that stores necessary data to generate the
signature. Figure 17 shows a piece of code responsible for
creating the device object.
Fig. 18. Deﬁnition of the extension structure.
IoCreateDevice function call is preceded by a deﬁnition
of the internal name (which is functioning on the kernel
mode of system) and the symbolic name used as the refer-
ences to the driver from user mode. Veriﬁcation of correct-
ness of the device object creation is realized by checking
whether the value of status returned by the IoCreateDevice
function is equal to the value of pointer to the device ob-
ject – pDevObj. Validation of creating a device object is
achieved by checking whether the status value returned by
the function IoCreateDevice is consistent with the value of
a pointer to the device object – pDevObj. If the returned
value of status will be diﬀerent from STATUS SUCCESS
the function terminate working and returns the error code
of input/output to the parent function. After successful cre-
ation of the device object, the function returns the handle
to it, which will be then used to realize the later refer-
ences to this device. Then the initialization process of the
extension structure is realized which deﬁnition is shown
in Fig. 18.
A communication between the encryption driver (EnD)
and the driver supporting (DSu) is always initiated by
the EnD driver. The type of request directed to the driver
supporting depends on the direction of copying data,
which is initiated by the currently logged user on the
system.
4.3. Handling for Creating and Reading a Secure File
Logged user (ﬁle sender) conﬁgures the parameters of
the process of creating and reading a protected ﬁle using
CApp which window is shown in Figs. 19 and 20, respec-
tively.
Fig. 19. The window of control application CApp for write data.
First of all, the process of creating protected ﬁle requires
connection one or two (depending on where the ﬁle with
the signature will be stored) removable Flash RAM memo-
ries to a computer through USB interface. The devices are
automatically detected by EnD which transmits information
about them via the DSu to CApp.
The logged user should determine the parameters required
for encrypting the ﬁle and generating a signature. He does
this by selecting (see the Fig. 19):
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Fig. 20. The window of control application CApp for read data.
– drive in which the protected ﬁle will be stored (“Data
Drive” ﬁeld),
– drive and path to the directory in which the ﬁle with
the signature will be stored (“Signature Drive” ﬁeld),
– identiﬁer for the algorithm used to encrypt (“The en-
cryption algorithm” ﬁeld),
– identiﬁer for the algorithm used to generate hash
value for the protected ﬁle (“The Hash function al-
gorithm” ﬁeld),
– identiﬁer for user (receiver) encrypted data (“Data
Recipient” ﬁeld),
– location of public key data recipient ﬁle (“Location
of Public Key” ﬁeld).
Identiﬁer (O ID) and the private key of the sender (the
elements required to generate the signature) are automati-
cally retrieved from the system. After determining the data
conﬁguration, logged user can begin the process of copy-
ing the ﬁle using, e.g., Windows Explorer. The name of
a ﬁle which stores the signature will be concatenation of
the name of protected ﬁle and string “SIG”. The process of
creating a ﬁle with the signature is started after the encryp-
tion process is ﬁnished and, just as the encryption process,
it is invisible to the user. When the next ﬁle for the same
recipient is being encrypted it does not need to change
the conﬁguration data unless the other parameters (that is
the identiﬁer of encryption algorithm or identiﬁer of algo-
rithm generating of hash value) will be changed. Always
for the next ﬁle, a new session key will be automatically
generated.
The process of reading protected ﬁle requires a connection
to a computer through USB interface one or two (depending
on where is stored the ﬁle with the signature) removable
Flash RAM memories. The devices are automatically de-
tected by EnD which transmit information about them via
the DSu to CApp. The logged user (recipient of the data)
has to specify the drive using CApp on which encrypted
ﬁle is stored and indicate the ﬁle with the signature cor-
responding to the encrypted ﬁle. He accomplishes this by
selecting (see the Fig. 20):
– drive on which is stored the protected ﬁle (“Data
Drive” ﬁeld),
– drive and path to the directory on which is stored the
ﬁle with the signature (“Signature Drive” ﬁeld).
Other parameters required to decrypt the ﬁle are determined
based on the signature. After initializing by the logged
user, the process of copying a ﬁle EnD sends to the DSu
the name of the copied ﬁle and pauses the copy process to
the moment when are receives data required to decrypt the
ﬁle (that is the identiﬁer of encryption algorithm, session
key and identiﬁer of algorithm generating of hash value).
Based on submitted by the EnD the name of encrypted ﬁle,
DSu identiﬁes a ﬁle containing the signature and performs
the process of signature decryption and reading the conﬁgu-
ration data. Then performs the veriﬁcation process read out
TMS with the date and time of the creation of an encrypted
ﬁle. In the case of inequality of these values, message is
displayed and the ﬁle reading process is interrupted. In the
case of equality of those values, other conﬁguration data
read from the signature are passed to EnD, which resumes
the process of decryption. During the process of decrypting
the ﬁle, the EnD determines the value of a hash function
for that ﬁle. After completion of the copying process, EnD
transmit to DSu determined value of the hash function for
veriﬁcation. If the designated hash value is not equal to
the value read from the signature, a message is displayed
and the DSu deletes the ﬁle.
5. Conclusion
The SWSA uses proprietary solution for securing data on
removable Flash RAM. There have not been applied widely
available tools to secure the contents of this type of remov-
able storage media due to the fact that these solutions typi-
cally uses only symmetric encryption when writing ﬁles. In
these solutions, the key needed for encryption/decryption is
speciﬁed by the user who creates a protected ﬁle and it is
assumed that this key is known to the user when a protected
ﬁle is read. The problems associated with the transmission
of the key between the users are not taken into account.
Such a solution in the SWSA was not useful.
The solution presented in this paper is an unique and more
complicated one. The problem with the transmission of the
key does not apply users of SWSA, because they are using
the advantages of asymmetric encryption which gives as-
surance secured transfer of encryption key between parties,
involved in the exchange of data. In addition, the SWSA
uses Trusted Platform Module which supports the creation
and management of cryptographic keys.
The developed system requires the user who creates a pro-
tected ﬁle, to specify only the recipient’s ﬁle and the ﬁle
encryption parameters. The recipient of the ﬁle can only
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be the user authorized by the SWSA. The process of pro-
tecting ﬁle is closely linked with the mechanisms of sys-
temic support for removable media Flash RAM, and is
transparent to the user. When the protected ﬁle is read,
user is not burdened with any additional activities. In ad-
dition, protections are constructed in such a way that the
reading of a ﬁle is possible only by the authorized user
by the SWSA, and only with the medium on which the
ﬁle was originally saved. An attempt to copy the pro-
tected ﬁle to a diﬀerent medium locks the ability to read
the ﬁle.
The described method for protecting data on removable
Flash RAM protects data against unauthorized access in
systems processing the data, belonging to diﬀerent secu-
rity domains (with diﬀerent classiﬁcation levels) in which
channel the ﬂow of data must be strictly controlled.
The described solution protects data stored on removable
Flash RAM in case of loss or theft of the medium, but
also makes it possible to secure transfer of that data
through an unsecured transmission channel, for example
using a courier.
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Abstract—The main advantage of a distributed computing
system over standalone computer is an ability to share the
workload between cores, processors and computers. In our
paper we present a hybrid cluster system – a novel comput-
ing architecture with multi-core CPUs working together with
many-core GPUs. It integrates two types of CPU, i.e., Intel
and AMD processor with advanced graphics processing units,
adequately, Nvidia Tesla and AMD FirePro (formerly ATI).
Our CPU/GPU cluster is dedicated to perform massive paral-
lel computations which is a common approach in cryptanalysis
and cryptography. The efficiency of parallel implementations
of selected data encryption and decryption algorithms are pre-
sented to illustrate the performance of our system.
Keywords—AES, computer clusters, cryptography, DES, GPU
computing, parallel calculation, software systems.
1. Introduction
Data encryption and decryption are generally complex
problems and involve cumbersome calculations, especially
when consider processing of large amounts of data. The
restrictions are caused by demands on computer resources,
i.e., processor and memory. However, in many cases the
calculations performed by cryptography algorithms can be
easily partitioned into large number of independent parts
and carried out on diﬀerent cores, processors or comput-
ers. It was observed that parallel implementation based on
MapReduce programming model improves the eﬃciency of
the algorithm and speeds up a calculation process.
CPU and GPU clusters are one of the most progressive
branches in a ﬁeld of parallel computing and data process-
ing nowadays, [1], [2]. A cluster is a set of computers work-
ing together so that in many aspects they can be viewed as
a single system. Typical cluster consists of homogenous
Central Processing Units (CPUs). A new model for paral-
lel computing based on using CPUs and GPUs (Graphics
Processing Units) together to perform a general purpose
scientiﬁc and engineering computing was developed in the
last years, and used to solve complex scientiﬁc and engi-
neering problems. Using CUDA or OpenCL programming
toolkits many real-world applications can be easily imple-
mented and run signiﬁcantly faster than on multi-processor
or multi-core systems [3].
In this paper we describe and evaluate a hybrid cluster sys-
tem HGCC that integrates two types of multi-core CPUs,
i.e., Intel and AMD processors equipped, adequately, with
NVIDIA and AMD graphical units. We have designed and
developed a dedicated software framework for parallel ex-
ecution of computing tasks which aim is to hide a hetero-
geneity of the cluster – from the user’s perspective, the
cluster system serves as one server. The objective of this
software is to divide the data into separate domains, al-
locate the calculation processes to cluster nodes, manage
calculations and communication.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. We
present a brief survey of modern GPU clusters in Section 2.
The architecture of our cluster and software framework that
manages calculations are described in Section 3. Finally, in
Section 4 we brieﬂy summarize results of tests for selected
types of data encryption and decryption algorithms. The
paper concludes in Section 5.
2. Survey of CPU and GPU Clusters
Every year in June and November the TOP500 list is pub-
lished. The announcement of the list is not only the chance
to ﬁnd out what are the most powerful supercomputers
but also a great opportunity to observe new trends in the
HPC technologies. In June 2012, as compared to Novem-
ber 2011 list, when there was no turnover in the Top10,
this time around, there are six brand new machines, plus
one, Jaguar, that has beneﬁtted from an upgrade to faster
processors. The majority of these new machines is built
using latest IBM solution called Blue Gene Q. Only one
of new supercomputers is equipped with GPU. However
it doesn’t mean that the interest in applying GPU technol-
ogy in supercomputers is falling down. Many of the most
powerful supercomputer centers are waiting for new accel-
erators from NVIDIA, AMD and Intel. For example a new
supercomputer Titan, which will be a successor of Jaguar
and is currently being built in Oak Ridge National Labo-
ratory, will be equipped with almost 15 000 of NVIDIA
cards from “Keppler” family.
When we look at the whole Top500 list we can observe
a rising signiﬁcance of GPU accelerators. In June 2012
ranking, there are 58 machines that are equipped with GPU
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accelerators, up from 17 only one year ago – see Fig. 1. It
is worth noting that 53 of them use NVIDIA Tesla GPU co-
processors while only two of them are equipped with IBM’s
Cell coprocessors and other two with AMD’s Radeon cards.
Moreover, a new product of Intel utilizing Intel MIC accel-
erator had its debut on TOP500 in an experimental cluster
with pre-production Knights Corner chips. MIC chip will
be available in the end of 2012, as Intel Xeon Phi copro-
cessor.
Fig. 1. Number of systems from TOP500 utilizing accelerators.
The most common operating systems used for building
clusters are UNIX and Linux. Clusters should provide fol-
lowing features: scalability, transparency, reconﬁgurabil-
ity, availability, reliability and high performance. There are
many software tools for supporting cluster computing. In
the beginning of XXI century, the common idea was to
provide a view of one supercomputer for a cluster built
from a group of independent workstations. The SSI (Single
System Image) clusters were designed and developed. In
this approach all servers’ resources such as disks, memory,
processors are seen by a user as one unique machine. The
whole cluster is identiﬁed from outside by one IP address.
The popular systems that implement the idea of SSI are
Mosix (http://www.mosix.org) that does not cover all SSI
features, and two comprehensive clustering solutions of-
fering full SSI environments: OpenSSI (http://openssi.org)
and Kerrighed (http://www.kerrighed.org). A brief over-
view and comparative study of stability, performance and
eﬃciency of Mosix, OpenSSI and Kerrighed systems is
presented in literature [4].
Other commonly used systems that can be applied to
high performance data processing and calculations in clus-
ter systems are software frameworks that perform job
scheduling. Commonly used Portable Batch System PBS
(www.pbsworks.com) provides mechanisms for allocating
computational tasks to available computing resources. Var-
ious versions of the system are available, open source and
commercial: OpenPBS, MOAB with Torque, PBS Profes-
sional.
Most of the presented cluster systems are mature solutions.
However, they have some limitations. Mosix, OpenSSI and
Kerrighed systems focuss on load balancing. The idea is
to implement an eﬃcient load balancing algorithm which
is triggered when loads of nodes are not balanced or lo-
cal resources are limited. In general, processes are moved
from higher to less loaded nodes. Unfortunately, migration
of processes involves extra time for load calculation and
overhead in communication. Moreover, Mosix, OpenSSI,
Kerrighed systems were designed for CPU clusters.
Currently, users are provided with software environments
that allow to perform calculations on a single GPU
device. There are only a few software tools for run-
ning applications on GPU clusters. Virtual OpenCL VCL
(www.mosix.org/txt vcl.html) is a software platform for
GPU clusters. It can run unmodiﬁed OpenCL applications
on Linux clusters with or without the Mosix system. VCL
provides a view of one superserver for cluster built from
a group of GPU units. The components of VCL, its per-
formance and applications are presented in [5].
Our goal was to develop a software framework that allows
unmodiﬁed OpenCL applications to transparently and con-
currently run on multiple CPU and GPU devices in a clus-
ter. In case of our application we need a simple function-
ality, i.e., a calculation speed up, resistance and ease of
use. We perform static decomposition of the problem in
calculation startup, hence the dynamic load balancing is
superﬂuous. Our software framework is quite similar to
VCL platform [5], however, in our solution it is possible to
utilize both CPUs and GPUs on computational nodes.
3. HGCC System Overview
3.1. Hardware Components of HGCC
The aim of our work on utilizing a cluster composed of
CPUs and GPUs in cryptography and complex data analy-
sis is providing the system which functionality allow us to
perform: eﬀective computing of applications implement-
ing MapReduce programming model, comparison of per-
formance of CPUs and GPUs from many vendors along
with comparison of diﬀerent interconnects performance.
We have built a heterogenous cluster system with multi-
core CPUs working together with many-core GPUs. The
system consists of 24 nodes and integrates two types of
CPUs: 12 servers with two Intel Xeon processors each
and 12 servers with two AMD Opteron processors each.
All servers are equipped with advanced GPUs, adequately,
NVIDIA Tesla and AMD FirePro units. It is worth to note
that FirePro V7800 has a peak performance in the sin-
gle precision almost two times better than NVIDIA Tesla
M2050, and a peak performance in the double precision
equal 0.8 of Tesla’s performance. Moreover, AMD GPU
is approximately four times cheaper than NVIDIA GPU.
However, eﬀective programming of GPU based on Very
Long Instruction Word (VLIW5) architecture – AMD Fire-
Pro V7800 – is not a simple task and not every application
is capable to achieve performance close to the peak one.
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Fig. 2. Hybrid system architecture with Intel+NVIDIA and
AMD+ATI/AMD nodes.
The system architecture is depicted in Fig. 2. The spec-
iﬁcation of components that form the HGCC cluster is as
follows:
CPU Intel : Intel Xeon X5650, 2.66 GHz/3.06 GHz turbo,
6 cores / 12 threads, 6x256 L2, 12 MB L3 cache.
CPU AMD : AMD Opteron 6172, 2.1 GHz, 12 cores /
12 threads, 12x512 KB L2, 12MB L3 cache.
GPU NVIDIA : NVIDIA Tesla M2050, 448 CUDA cores,
384-bit memory bus.
GPU AMD : AMD FirePro V7800, 1440 stream proces-
sors (equivalent of 288 CUDA cores), 256-bit mem-
ory bus.
The computing nodes are supported by a dedicated master
and storage nodes providing access to disk arrays and man-
agement capabilities. Communication between nodes is or-
ganized using diﬀerent interconnects: InﬁniBand 4x QDR,
10GbE and 1GbE. Such redundant network conﬁguration
allows us to verify the impact of selected interconnects on
computation eﬃciency. Moreover, it is possible to sep-
arate communication connected with IO operations from
computational traﬃc. The current conﬁguration assumes
utilizing InﬁniBand network for providing access to data
storage. 10GbE Ethernet and the 1GbE Ethernet are used
for computational purposes.
3.2. HGCC Software Framework
The HGCC software framework provides an environment
for parallel calculations that are performed on a cluster
formed by heterogenous CPU and GPU devices. The goal
was to hide a heterogeneity of the cluster and minimize
the user’s eﬀort during the design, implementation and
execution of the application. From a user’s perspective,
the cluster system should serve as one server. So, it allows
a user to focus only on the numerical part of his applica-
tion. The concept was to allow applications developed by
users to transparently utilize many CPU and GPU devices,
as if all the devices were on the local computer. A single
system image model is implemented – all servers’ resources
such as CPU, GPU or memory are seen by the user as one
unique machine. Therefore, applications written for HGCC
beneﬁt from the reduced programming complexity of a sin-
gle computer, the availability of shared memory and multi
threads, as in OpenMP (http://openmp.org/wp), and a con-
current access to cluster nodes and their devices, as in MPI
(http://mpi-forum.org).
In order to take advantage of GPU accelerators from dif-
ferent vendors, we decided to use OpenCL, which is a low
level GPU programming toolkit, where developers write
GPU kernels entirely by themselves with no automatic code
generation [6]. OpenCL is an industry standard computing
library developed in 2009 that targets not only GPUs, but
also CPUs and potentially other types of accelerator hard-
ware. In OpenCL, an eﬃcient implementation requires
preparation slightly diﬀerent codes for diﬀerent devices,
however, it is much less complicated than writing code in
many native toolkits for NVIDIA and AMD devices.
The facilities of the HGCC system are provided in the
form of four groups of services. These are: user interface,
calculation management, communication services and data
repository services. User interface services provide a con-
sistent user interface supporting the process of deﬁning
an application, processing of the calculation results and
providing communication with the user. Calculation man-
agement services allocate the calculation processes into
cluster nodes and manage execution of the user’s appli-
cation. Communication services manage communications
between running processes and system kernel, and ﬁnally
data repository services provide a store for all data objects.
HGCC Architecture. The cluster framework consists of
several components presented in Fig. 3. The most important
are: MasterApp – master node application, the main com-
ponent that is responsible for the user-system communica-
tion and calculation management and SlaveApp – the com-
putational node application, the component that is respon-
sible for calculations that are performed by the assigned
server. Each computational node contains some number
of resources. In our framework we distinguish and collect
information about two types of such resources: CPUs –
central processing units and GPUs – graphics processing
units. The computational resource can be in one of the
following states: waiting – ready for loading a new task
to execution, working – occupied, calculations are executed
and lost – lost because of the node failure.
Inter-process Communication. The system implements
the master-slave communication scheme. An XML-based
communication protocol based on the TCP/IP protocol and
BSD sockets is used to perform communication between
34
A Hybrid CPU/GPU Cluster for Encryption and Decryption of Large Amounts of Data
master and slave nodes. Our goal was to develop a simple,
ﬂexible and failure resistance mechanism.
HGCC System Operation. A user implements the com-
putational task in an object oriented way and deﬁnes his
problem in the task descriptor. The XML Schema spec-
iﬁcation for building XML ﬁles with task description is
provided in HGCC. The task descriptor contains: a type of
the task, an algorithm, a destination platform and device.
All these parameters are mandatory. The rest of this ﬁle
is ﬁlled by parameters speciﬁc to a given task. The cluster
framework can handle any computational task which was
implemented by the user. A committed task is sent to the
MasterApp component. All parameters deﬁned in the task
descriptor are parsed inside MasterApp. Next, the task is
divided into smaller subtasks. MasterApp creates the list of
such subtasks. They are allocated to the slave nodes, which
contain any free resources. Two operations are performed
after SlaveApp initialization: a plugin list is loaded from
a plugin descriptor ﬁle, and a socket is opened and wait for
MasteApp’s connection. The plugin descriptor ﬁle contains
information about all plugins currently available in the sys-
tem. Whenever a slave node gets a new set of subtasks to
execute it looks for available valid plugin, and loads it to
the memory. Next, the control ﬂow inside SlaveApp splits,
and the newly spawned thread launches calculations stored
in the loaded plugin.
4. Case Study Results: Parallel
Cryptography
Cryptanalysis and cryptography techniques are natural can-
didates for massively parallel computations. The algo-
rithms for encryption and decryption of large amounts of
data can be easily decomposed and executed in parallel.
The popular schemes using symmetric ciphers were found
to give a signiﬁcant speed up when ported to GPU, espe-
cially such schemes like Data Encryption Standard (DES),
Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) [7]–[10] or Blow-
Fish [11]–[13]. GPU-based implementations of algorithms
using asymmetric ciphers (RSA, ECC, NTRU and GGH)
are described in the following papers [14]–[18]. In this
paper we present the evaluation of the performance of our
HGCC-based implementations of symmetric DES and AES
cryptography algorithms.
4.1. DES and AES Implementations in HGCC
The HGCC cluster is the general purpose hardware and
software system that can be used to solve any complex com-
puting problems that require a processing of large amounts
of data (see [19], [20]). In our research, which results are
presented in this paper we used HGCC to eﬃcient crypt-
analysis and cryptography. The evaluation of selected tech-
niques of cryptanalysis, i.e., the password recovery from
hashes are described in [21]. In this paper we focus on
eﬀective cryptography working on CPU and GPU units.
The numerical results of extensive tests of our implemen-
tations of DES and AES algorithms are presented and
discussed.
Fig. 3. Core components of the cluster framework.
We performed four series of experiments. The aim of
the ﬁrst series was to test the eﬃciency of parallel im-
plementations of the DES and AES algorithms on the
cluster formed only by the CPU units. Various modes
of the algorithms operation were compared. The current
modes of operation listed in Table 1 are speciﬁed in
http://csrc.nist.gov/index.html and in [22]. The simplest of
the encryption modes is the electronic codebook (ECB)
mode. The message is divided into blocks and each block
is encrypted separately. In CBC (cipher-block chaining)
mode, each block of plain text is XORed with the previ-
ous cipher text block before being encrypted. This way,
each cipher text block depends on all plain text blocks pro-
cessed up to that point. The PCBC (propagating cipher-
block chaining) mode was developed to cause small changes
in the ciphertext to propagate indeﬁnitely both when de-
crypting and encrypting. The CFB (cipher feedback) mode
that is relative to CBC makes a block cipher into a self-
synchronizing stream cipher. The OFB (output feedback)
mode makes a block cipher into a synchronous stream ci-
pher. The CTR (counter) mode has similar characteristics
to OFB, but also allows a random access property during
decryption. It should be pointed that several of listed modes
are suited to parallel implementation (see Table 1).
Table 1
Modes of operations of symmetric ciphers







Table 2 and Fig. 4 demonstrate the performance of
the single thread CPU-based implementations of the block
ciphers: DES, 3DES and AES. The table collects the
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Fig. 4. Block ciphers performance on CPU (1 thread).
Fig. 5. Block ciphers performance on GPU.
amounts of data in MiB/s (MiB/s = 1,048,576 bytes/s)
that were encrypted/decrypted per second in case of
all tested algorithms. The eﬃciency of our implemen-
tations of DES and AES (NASK) were compared with
the results presented in the Internet: GNU Privacy Guard
GnuPG 1.4.11 (http://www.gnupg.org/download/) and free
open-source disk encryption software TrueCrypt 7.0a
(http://www.truecrypt.org/).
Table 2
Block ciphers performance on CPU (1 thread) in MiB/s
Algorithm
Implementation
NASK GnuPG 1.4.11 TrueCrypt 7.0a
DES 63.82 60.01 67.95
3DES 23.10 25.48
AES(encrypt) 123.70 107.50 110.60
AES(decrypt) 131.80 110.80 130.70
The presented results show that the eﬃciency of our im-
plementations of DES and AES on CPU is similar to the
results provided by other projects. It is worth to men-
tion that both GnuPG and TrueCrypt are widely used
products of teams that have extensive experience in cryp-
tography.
The aim of the second series of experiments was to com-
pare the eﬃciency of the DES and AES implementations
on diﬀerent GPUs provided by various vendors. The cal-
culations were carried out on three types of GPU units:
AMD FirePro V7800, NVIDIA Tesla M2050 and AMD
Radeon 6970. Table 3 and Fig. 5 present the amounts of
data in MiB/s that were encrypted/decrypted per second in
case of all tested algorithms and decryption and encryption
operations.
Table 3
Block ciphers performance on GPU in MiB/s
Graphics Processing Unit
Algorithm AMD FirePro NVIDIA AMD Radeon
V7800 Tesla M2050 6970
DES 660.73 1038.02 1295.60
3DES 658.11 837.67 1031.73
AES(encrypt) 1135.96 1316.82 1901.25
AES(decrypt) 1129.54 1329.62 1963.91
In general, the GPU-based implementations of all algo-
rithms were much more eﬃcient than implementations
working only on the CPU unit. The best results were ob-
tained for the Radeon 6970 graphics processing unit.
The aim of the next series of experiments was to com-
pare the performance of two implementations of the AES
algorithm. The original AES implementation was com-
pared with implementation utilizing an Advanced Encryp-
tion Standard – New Instruction Set (AES-NI) extension.
New Instruction Set is an extension to the x86 instruc-
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Fig. 6. Performance of the AES algorithm implementations with/without AES-NI extension; CPU and GPU.
tion set architecture for microprocessors from Intel and
AMD (http://ark.intel.com/). The purpose of this instruc-
tion set is to improve the speed of applications perform-
ing encryption and decryption using AES, which is an in-
dustrial standard nowadays. In our cluster only Intel Xeon
X5650 Westmere processors provides AES-NI extension.
Unfortunately none of our processors provides support for
Advanced Vector Extensions (AVX), so we were not able
to assess impact of AVX instruction set on AES perfor-
mance. Table 4 and Fig. 6 demonstrate the performance
of AES executed on three types of GPU and two types of
CPU units. We can see that the application of the new
instruction set causes massive acceleration of the AES al-
gorithm.
Table 4
Performance of the AES algorithm implementations




AMD FirePro V7800 no 1135.96 1129.54
NVIDIA Tesla M2050 no 1316.82 1329.62
AMD Radeon 6970 no 1901.25 1963.91
2xOpteron – 24 threads no 1272.00 1394.40
2xXeon – 12 threads no 1546.80 1533.60
2xXeon – 12 threads yes 14848.80 14841.60
Table 5
Scalability of the AES algorithm
Processor
Speedup
1 node 2 nodes 4 nodes
Xeon X5650 1 1.95 3.71
Opteron 6172 1 1.93 3.73
The aim of the last series of experiments was to present
the eﬃciency of our cluster system. In this paper we
present the evaluation of the AES implementation in two
subclusters: the ﬁrst formed by four Opteron processing
units and the second one formed by four Xeon processing
units. As it can be seen in Table 5 the AES algorithm
scales up very well – the speed up value for four nodes is
between 3.71 and 3.73.
5. Summary and Conclusion
The paper provides a short overview of the components of
our heterogenous cluster system integrating CPU and GPU
devices from various vendors. We described the hardware
architecture and the software framework that form our clus-
ter. The cluster system was designed to be powerful, eﬀec-
tive, scalable, ﬂexible, and easy to use. It is especially use-
ful in complex calculations and parallel processing of large
volumes of data in which a speed of calculation and data
decomposition are of essence. Cryptography algorithms
are natural candidates for massively parallel computations
in GPU/CPU clusters. Our experimental results presented
in this paper demonstrate the eﬀectiveness and scalability
of the HGCC cluster system, and conﬁrm that the direc-
tion to speed up cryptography techniques is to port them
to GPU units. As a ﬁnal observation we can say that het-
erogeneous computing systems oﬀer a new opportunity to
increase the performance of parallel HPC applications on
clusters, by combining traditional CPU and general purpose
GPU devices.
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Abstract—This paper describes an application of the Zak-
Gabor-based iris coding to build a secure biometric verifi-
cation station (SBS), consisting of a professional iris capture
camera, a processing unit with specially designed iris recogni-
tion and communication software, as well as a display (LCD).
Specially designed protocol controls the access to the station
and secures the communication between the station and the
external world. Reliability of the Zak-Gabor-based coding,
similarly to other wavelet-based methods, strongly depends
on appropriate choice of the wavelets employed in image cod-
ing. This choice cannot be arbitrary and should be adequate
to the employed iris image quality. Thus in this paper we
propose an automatic iris feature selection mechanism em-
ploying, among others, the minimum redundancy, maximum
relevance (mRMR) methodology as one, yet important, step to
assess the optimal set of wavelets used in this iris recognition
application. System reliability is assessed with approximately
1000 iris images collected by the station for 50 different eyes.
Keywords—application of biometrics, feature selection, iris
recognition, Zak-Gabor-based iris coding.
1. Introduction
Iris recognition has recently emerged as one of the top
biometric authentication methods due to its accuracy and
outstanding identiﬁcation eﬃcacy. It is also commonly be-
lieved that the pattern of iris tissue is highly stable through-
out the human live, although recent scientiﬁc notiﬁca-
tions start to surprisingly suggest the opposite hypothesis.
However, without a doubt, iris recognition became a ma-
ture technology supported by numerous implementations in
places requiring reliable identity veriﬁcation, and the most
common applications concern border and physical control.
This paper is conformable with this trend, as we apply the
iris recognition as a key element of a secure veriﬁcation
station, being a server of biometric-based veriﬁcation. The
station is autonomous, i.e., it consists of image capture
hardware, the processing unit with the operating system
and the display for communication with veriﬁed subjects.
The electronic communication with the station is secured
by a protocol specially designed to the purpose of this ap-
plication.
The iris recognition used in this work is based on origi-
nal methodology employing Zak-Gabor transformation [1].
The optimal features selection procedure consists of two
stages: selecting the best iris features – in terms of an
iris recognition eﬃciency – in the ﬁrst stage, and select-
ing the optimal Zak-Gabor-based coding parameters based
on the results of the ﬁrst stage [2]. For reading ﬂuency,
the applied Zak-Gabor-based coding is brieﬂy explained in
Section 2, some remarks related to the iris template cre-
ation and matching are provided in Subsection 2.4, and an
in-depth explanation of the feature selection mechanism is
presented in Section 3.
Selection of coding parameters, i.e., the optimal wavelet
families emphasizing the relevant individual iris features, is
strictly dependent on the database, in particular on the qual-
ity of iris images used. The resulting parameters estimate
an optimal, yet unknown, conﬁguration of wavelet trans-
formation adequate in the iris template creation. However,
when applied to other image sets (not used at the estima-
tion stage), these transformation parameters typically result
in a lower accuracy than expected (in particular the gen-
uine comparison results deteriorate, e.g., see p. 289 in [3]).
It is thus reasonable to adapt – if possible – the coding
parameters to the expected iris image quality by estimat-
ing the optimal features using the database collected in the
assumed scenario, i.e., employing target equipment oper-
ated in a target (or precisely modeled) environment, and
applying all possible procedures that are expected at the
operational stage.
However, feature selection is a very demanding process,
especially when rich datasets are to be applied and the
feature space is signiﬁcantly large. Therefore, achieving
a global minimum of the recognition error cannot be often
guaranteed within acceptable time (or cannot be achieved
at all due to a huge number of calculations that make the
search process infeasible), and we have to be satisﬁed by
quasi-optimal solutions. Repeating this process prior to
any application of our recognition methodology may be
thus annoying. To make the iris feature selection an easy
process, and further to select satisfying parameters of the
Zak-Gabor-based coding, we have built a tool that performs
this task automatically for provided dataset of iris images,
Section 4.
To build a secure veriﬁcation station we decided to use
one of the existing iris capture cameras and our choice was
mainly motivated by speed of capture and ease of use, due
to high priority of practical aspects of the station. As we
expected diﬀerences in quality of images captured by the
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station and images used to build the original method, we
ﬁnally applied the developed feature selection tool to adapt
the coding and improve the accuracy. The achieved three-
fold reduction of the EER justiﬁes the need of adaptation
for a new image quality. The station development is de-
scribed in Section 5.
2. Zak-Gabor-Based Iris Recognition
This section brieﬂy presents the Zak-Gabor-based iris cod-
ing [1], [2], developed earlier by the ﬁrst author, and used
in this work to build a tool for automatic iris features se-
lection, which ﬁnally is applied in the developed secure
station.
2.1. Iris Images and their Segmentation
Iris recognition starts from the acquisition of an iris im-
age of suﬃcient quality. The raw image contains the iris
but also its surroundings, and the iris is often disturbed
by occlusions, thus it has to be processed prior to feature
extraction, Fig. 1. Building a map classifying the image
points into those representing the iris and lying outside
the iris is called the segmentation. Although the feature
extraction routines are directly responsible for delivering
iris features, the segmentation process mostly inﬂuences
a reliability of iris recognition, and most of current en-
deavors go towards development of robust iris segmentation
methods.
Fig. 1. Iris image captured by the station and the segmentation
result. The two circles approximate inner and outer boundaries
of the iris. Small empty circles point to the detected occlusions,
and the broken line approximates them between detection points.
Two sectors, automatically selected by the segmentation proce-
dure, cover the iris portion used in feature extraction.
The segmentation method used in this work comprises of
two main stages: localization of the inner and outer bound-
aries of the iris, and localization of any disruptions occlud-
ing the iris tissue. Neither the iris nor the pupil are circles,
nevertheless, due to the simplicity and speed of algorithm
implementations, it is a common practice to model the iris
boundaries by circular, non-concentric shapes. The method
applied in this paper employs a modiﬁed Hough transform
to detect circular shapes, and the coarse-to-ﬁne analysis is
applied to speed up the calculations, i.e., rough positions
of the pupil and the iris are ﬁrst determined in a low reso-
lution, and higher resolutions are used to precise the ﬁnal
result.
Two determined circles representing inner and outer bound-
aries only roughly approximate the actual iris region, due
to occlusions that typically exist in iris images. To detect
local non-uniformity within the iris body, a set of angular
directions is constructed, originating from the iris center
in which the iris texture is analyzed. Among all the angu-
lar directions, a set of reference directions are singled out,
which cover those sections that are known to be always
free of occlusions, and they are used for calculation of the
maximum allowed non-uniformity. Once the maximum al-
lowed non-uniformity is set, the iris region is analyzed for
each analysis direction and an occlusion is detected when
the irregularity in a given direction exceeds the reference.
This procedure constructs an occlusion map as a series of
radii, each representing the distance between the iris center
and the boundary of the occlusion (cf. small empty circles
in Fig. 1).
Based on localized occlusions, the method sets two inde-
pendent iris sectors, each of 90◦ in angular width, to be
further used for features extraction. The choice of angular
width was made at the stage of development of the Zak-
Gabor-based method, and it was based on experiments with
the iris enrollment images. Since users of the secure station
are not forced to open their eyes in a particular way dur-
ing capture, it is concluded that once the eyelid coverage
is too high, the system may ask for the eye to be opened
more widely to ﬁnally extract two such sectors with mini-
mum eﬀort by the user. As ISO recommends [4] to have
at least 70% of iris body not obscured, the assumption that
two iris sectors – constituting only 50% of the iris body –
free from occlusions can be found, seems not to be very
demanding.
Iris texture analysis may be qualiﬁed as a 2D pattern anal-
ysis task, yet it is often simpliﬁed to a set of 1D prob-
lems. The Zak-Gabor-based method maps two iris sec-
tors into R one-dimensional P point functions. We fur-
ther call these functions stripes, as they represent image
intensity distributed along angular direction, and for each
angle the resulting value is calculated within small radial
neighborhood, resembling the division of each iris sector
into R/2 stripes. These one-dimensional functions are fur-
ther used in the Zak-Gabor-based method to extract iris
features.
In order to ascertain whether the acquired image is of the
required quality (in terms of focus and iris body availabil-
ity), the Zak-Gabor-based method investigates two addi-
tional image attributes: focus factor and the iris body cov-
erage by eyelids. These attributes are basis for separate
‘experts’ judging on the image quality, and giving a binary
decision whether the image passed the test. It is assumed
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that image quality (from the iris recognition perspective)
is suﬃcient if both experts’ answer is aﬃrmative.
2.2. Zak-Gabor-Based Iris Features
The Zak-Gabor-based method characterizes a discrete-time
signal in the joint time-frequency domain, describing its
stationary energy distribution locally, thus ﬁnding the dis-
tribution of signal energy in local (possibly overlapping)
time segments. As we deal with images, not time series,
the ‘time’ variable is replaced by the ‘position’ variable in
this work. The Zak-Gabor-based method performs this lo-
cal analysis by a family of wavelets, each characterized
by a quadruple: scale, frequency and radial/angular po-
sitions. Since it is diﬃcult and not recommended to set
an arbitrary scales, the natural extension of such position-
frequency analysis is to allow the scale and to be adapted
independently of the frequency coordinate. Thus direct-
ing these calculations toward the so called wavelet packet
analysis. Following [2], we explain brieﬂy the calculation
principles of the Zak-Gabor coeﬃcients, being a base for
iris features used in this work.
Let gs be a one-dimensional Gaussian function character-







where s = 2, . . . ,S and S = 8, and the factor of 12 lets gs to
be symmetric over the sampling grid when P is even. The
Gabor elementary function (GEF) [5] is deﬁned as shifted
and modulated version of gs, namely
gmk;s(p) = gs(p−mK)eikp2pi/K, p = 0 . . .P−1 . (2)
Let M be the number of translations of gs, and K be the
number of frequency shifts, where m and k denote posi-
tion and frequency shifts, respectively (m = 0, . . . , M − 1,
k = 0, . . . ,K − 1), and gs is wrapped around the P-point
domain. Zak-Gabor-based iris coding applies critical sam-
pling and always takes M = P/K. Let f
ℓ
be the intensity
function deﬁned on a stripe ℓ. The ﬁnite discrete Gabor
transform of f
ℓ
is deﬁned as a set of complex-valued coef-











amk;sℓgmk;s(p), p = 0 . . .P−1 (3)
and K = 2s is set in further analysis. Note that the number
S of scales together with the stripe size P determine both
M and K.
The set of amk;sℓ coeﬃcients is a base of iris features.
Gaussian-shaped functions, used in the Zak-Gabor trans-
form, are however not orthogonal (the inner product of
any two of all functions is nonzero), therefore its coeﬃ-
cients cannot be determined in a simple way, and Zak’s
transform is applied for this purpose. The discrete ﬁnite
Zak transform Z f
ℓ
(ρ ,φ ;K,M) of a function f
ℓ
sampled
equidistantly at P points is deﬁned as the one-dimensional
discrete Fourier transform of the sequence f
ℓ
(ρ + jK),
j = 0, . . . ,M−1, namely [5]
Z f
ℓ






(ρ + jK)e−i jφ2pi/M (4)
where φ = 0,1, ,M− 1, ρ = 0,1, . . . ,K − 1 and M = P/K.




(ρ ,φ ;K,M) = Fasℓ(ρ ,φ ;K,M)Z gs(ρ ,φ ;K,M) (5)
where Fasℓ[ρ ,φ ;K,M] denotes the discrete 2D Fourier
transform of an array of asℓ, representing the coeﬃ-
cients determined for the iris stripe ℓ and scale s, and
Z gs[ρ ,φ ;K,M] is the discrete Zak’s transform of the Gaus-
sian window gs. The expansion coeﬃcients amk;sℓ can be
thus recovered from the product form (5) and choosing K
and M to be a power of 2 yields possibility of FFT ap-
plication, thus making computation times proportional to
those in the FFT. As this way of calculating the Gabor
expansion coeﬃcients is often called the Zak-Gabor trans-
form [5] (instead of simply Gabor transform), we further
call amk;sℓ coeﬃcients as the Zak-Gabor coefficients.
Zak-Gabor-based iris coding deﬁnes the signs of the real
and imaginary parts of Zak-Gabor coeﬃcients amk;sℓ as iris






where m = 0, . . . ,M − 1, k = 0, . . . ,K − 1, ℓ = 0, . . . ,R− 1
and s = 2, . . . ,S. Since the Fourier transform of real sig-
nals (e.g., iris stripes f
ℓ
are real) consists of two parts being
complex conjugates of each other, for each position m the
coeﬃcients with the frequency index k > K/2 are ignored.
Since M = P/K, for each s there are (N−1)P/2 coeﬃcients
determined. Taking into account that this analysis is carried
out for all iris stripes, and remembering that R = 32,S = 8
and P = 512, the total number of coeﬃcients calculated
for the iris image is R(S−1)P/2 = 57,344. Both real and
imaginary parts are coded separately by one bit, hence
N = #(B) = 114,688 features (bits) are achieved.
2.3. Iris Features Matching
The order of features (bits) is kept identical for all images
and thus the matching requires only a XOR operation be-
tween two feature sets. The Hamming distance is applied
(as it is typically done for binary feature vectors) to calcu-






(b(1)n XOR b(2)n ) (7)
where b(i)n is the n-th bit of i-th sample. Factor 1N makesξ ∈ 〈0,1〉.
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2.4. Iris Template Creation and Verification
Iris templates used by the Zak-Gabor-based coding con-
sist of iris code bits and positions of the individual sectors
(calculated within the segmentation procedure) for which
the iris features are determined. The sector positions are
necessary to allow calculating the code at the same an-
gular positions each time the images have to be matched.
The implementation of the Zak-Gabor-based which is used
in this work [6] may use any number of iris images (start-
ing from just one) to create the iris template, however, cap-
turing more than one image at the enrollment is recom-
mended. In the latter case we may take advantage of the
Zak-Gabor-based implementation that selects the best iris
code among a number of those calculated for the enroll-
ment images. Namely, if multiple images are available at
the enrollment time, the template creation procedure ﬁrst
rotates all the images to the one representative which is
the least rotated to all the remaining images. Next, for
all images the iris sectors are determined and their aver-
age positions are taken. The consistency of the codes is
checked by calculating the comparison scores between the
analyzed code and the codes related to the remaining en-
rollment images, obtained for these new (averaged) sector
positions. To ﬁnalize the template creation, all the compar-
ison scores must fall below the acceptance threshold, which
denotes that the enrollment images were of suﬃcient qual-
ity to deliver information about the iris texture. If any of
the matching results exceeds the acceptance threshold, the
procedure allows for a replacement of the defective image
and calculations are partially repeated.
In contrary to the enrollment procedure, the veriﬁcation
should proceed quickly, in particular only single image is
acquired. However, the absolute eyeball slope cannot be
assessed accurately in one-eye capture system, as it was
applied in the secure station, and no such information is
linked to the template. Once an eye is rotated during cap-
ture relatively to the images employed in the enrollment
process, corresponding features apply to diﬀerent parts of
the iris, thus making the features inadequate. Using a raw
iris image at the veriﬁcation stage, without correcting eye
rotation may lead to false rejections. The implementation
of the Zak-Gabor-based coding solves this problem by gen-
erating a series of iris templates at the enrollment stage and
each of the generated template corresponds to one micro-
rotation of the original iris (in both directions). The angles
of these micro-rotations are not equidistantly placed in the
angular axis, and were selected according to the sample
distribution of observed rotations in this application. It
produced a map of rotations, with greater number of el-
ements near zero (small rotations are more probable) and
less elements near the maximum rotations observed (as they
are still probable to occur, yet less than the smallest ones).
It slightly extended the enrollment procedure (as the Zak-
Gabor-based features has to be calculated several times), yet
the eyeball rotation compensation at the veriﬁcation stage
is done in the blink of the eye, as only a few (instead of
one) XOR operations are needed to conclude the match. In-
troducing this eyeball rotation correction was compulsory,
and neglecting this compensation would lead to signiﬁcant
and unacceptable false rejections.
3. Iris Features Selection
Not all elements in B are useful for iris recognition, and
only a subset of the features in B constitutes an optimal fea-
ture set B0. However, simple selection of optimal features
yields to a subset of coeﬃcients indexed by selected scales
and frequencies, but also by selected positions (angular and
radial). There is however no rationale behind selecting only
subsets of positions, as entire areas of both iris sectors are
considered useful in the recognition.
Therefore, a two-stage procedure of Zak-Gabor-based iris
features selection proposed in [2] is used in this work. In
the ﬁrst stage, the optimal parameter quadruples are se-
lected that yield features maximizing the classiﬁcation mar-
gin between the same and diﬀerent irises. This is an ex-
haustive computation problem, yet many feature selection
routines may be applied here (e.g., we may use Fisher’s
information related to each feature to sort them out and
iteratively check the features’ usefulness). In the second
stage, it is checked how the scale-frequency pairs are pop-
ulated by the optimal features (the more a scale-frequency
pair is populated, the more it is signiﬁcant in iris coding).
The latter stage allows for selecting scales and frequencies
optimal for a given database of iris images, being a good
prediction of optimal scale-frequency pairs in iris recogni-
tion.
Peng et al. [7] proposed to use a mutual information
(i.e., a Kullback-Leibler divergence of a product P(X)P(Y )
of two marginal probability distributions P(X) and P(Y )
from the joint probability distribution P(X ,Y )) to select
best features employed in classiﬁcation problems. There-
fore, their selection criterion is based on the maximum sta-
tistical dependency between the variables X and Y . Due
to diﬃculties in direct implementation of the maximum
dependency condition, Peng et al. developed an equiva-
lent form of this criterion, called the minimal-redundancy
maximum-relevance (mRMR). In this paper we are apply-
ing the mRMR search methodology in the ﬁrst stage to
select the optimal feature set (instead of applying Fisher’s
information, as it was used in [2]). To make this process
an automatic one, and to allow an easy adaptation of Zak-
Gabor-based coding to various iris datasets, the methodol-
ogy was integrated in the form of a convenient tool.
3.1. Estimation Database
Estimating optimal parameters for the Zak-Gabor-based
coding requires suitable data. A database of 1000 iris im-
ages was collected by the station operated in similar en-
vironmental conditions, as the expected in ﬁnal applica-
tion, guarantying the appropriate quality of images. Twenty
ﬁve volunteers, males and females, aged between 20 and
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40 years, participated in the iris images acquisition pro-
cess. The acquisition station was organized in a way that
helped to take advantage of natural lighting to narrow the
pupil. The quality of collected images was manually ana-
lyzed, and images of poor quality, or those generating seg-
mentation failures were removed. Censoring, not carried
out in system evaluation, is necessary when the optimal
coding parameters have to be established. Any failures in
delivering good quality data to the feature selection mech-
anism may have fatal consequences of selecting features
not relevant to given iris tissue. Finally, in this work we
use 946 samples representing 50 diﬀerent eyes.
3.2. Stage I: Selection of Optimal Features B0
Zak-Gabor-based coding, being a member of wavelet pack-
ets family methods, analyses both the scale and frequency
interdependently, so they should be considered simultane-
ously in feature selection. The optimal selection of features
is complicated, since the most common frequencies that
characterize all iris images cannot be guessed a priori due
to signiﬁcant and undetermined iris texture variability.
In general, when introducing new elements to the feature
set, one expects the system to behave better in the sense of
unambiguous biometric recognition. To assess the useful-
ness of a given feature (or feature set) we have to calculate,
e.g., equal error rate (or a similar error measure, which
is usually an increasing function of the feature set size),
and compare the result with those obtained for alternative
conﬁguration of features. Single equal error rate may be
obtained for a particular dataset of iris images, given the
actual variant of the coding. This means that every selec-
tion of Zak-Gabor-based features requires recalculating all
genuine and impostor scores. As the last step is extremely
exhaustive, one may ﬁnd alternative methods of feature use-
fulness assessment.
The mRMR method used in this paper, similarly to the rou-
tine employing Fisher’s information, does not require cal-
culation of the genuine and impostor scores each time we
want to judge about the usefulness of a particular feature.
A reference implementation of mRMR method has been
made public [8], thus its incorporation into our feature se-
lection tool was straightforward and it saved development
time.
All features belonging to the set B were sorted in de-
scending order of their usefulness, expressed as their mu-
tual information, ending up with a set Bsorted. Then each
ﬁrst N′ features constitute the intermediate iris binary tem-
plate that is used in EER calculation. Note that during the
search procedure required to sort elements of B into Bsorted
we need the genuine and impostor scores only when prob-
ing subsets of the sorted set of features, and not for all
combinations of features.
The EER is one of many possible measures of a biomet-
ric system reliability. EER may be however useless when
it falls to 0, thus we need other measure assessing the
usefulness of a given set of features. For this purpose we
cumulate both sample mean and sample variances of com-
parison scores ξ in the form of the so-called decidability
factor (detectability or d-prime), namely
d′ =
|ξ g− ξ i|√
1
2
(ξ g + ξ i
) (8)
where ξ and ξ denote sample mean and sample variance
of ξ , respectively. The further the mean values are lo-
cated for same variances, the better is the separation of
distributions. Similarly, keeping the same ξ g and ξ i and
simultaneously narrowing ξ g and ξ i one may get higher
level of distinction between genuine and impostor patterns.
Consequently, the value of d′ estimates the degree by which
the distributions of ξg and ξi overlap (the higher d′ is, the
lower is the overlap).
Fig. 2. EER (thick line) and decidability d′ (thin line) vs. the
number of sorted iris features. Best solution (minimizing the
EER), achieved for ﬁrst 416 features, and the corresponding d′
are marked by circles.
Starting from a small number of best features from Bsorted,
we iteratively add new features (yet keeping the Bsorted
order), each time building a new iris recognition system.
According to observations (Fig. 2), the system reliability
(in terms of the EER and d′) ﬁrst increases then dete-
riorates once the feature set enlarges, and the minimum
EER = 0.79% for N0 = 416 can be found. Figure 3 depicts
the distribution of genuine and impostor scores achieved
on the estimation database of iris images. The set B0 of
optimal features is consequently used in the second stage,
namely in the estimation of feature families (and the ﬁnal
iris coding conﬁguration).
As each coeﬃcient amk;sℓ (and thus each feature in B) is
positioned within the iris sector, we may analyze a popu-
lation of the iris sectors by selected features. Experiments
show that the population of the iris sectors by their fea-
tures is uneven, Fig. 4. Areas located in the middle of iris
sectors are apparently more attractive, while the boundary
parts are almost neglected by the feature selection method-
ology. This behavior related to the angular positions is easy
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Fig. 3. Genuine (solid bars) and impostor (thick line) scores
distribution achieved for a system variant employing 416 opti-
mal features, i.e. the set B0 (cf. Fig 2). Dashed lines show the
worst scores (minimum impostor and maximum genuine) and the
dotted line points the acceptance threshold value set to calculate
the EER.
Fig. 4. The population of the iris sectors by their features. Values
are averaged for two iris sectors, and lighter color denotes higher
usage of the sector area in the optimal feature set B0.
to be explained, as Zak-Gabor-based coding treats each iris
stripe as a periodic function (this assumption comes from
the principles of Zak’s transform application). The same
assumption, however, results in incorrect iris features cal-
culated for non-continuity points at zero positions, i.e., fea-
tures with weak abilities in distinguishing between same
and diﬀerent irises. Hence, the feature selection method-
ology correctly neglects those element of B. However, the
interpretation of the selection of middle elements in radial
direction should refer to the anatomy of the iris, and the
result may prove that the population of individual areas
within the iris is uneven, with more discriminating parts
located closer to the pupil than to the sclera. This inter-
esting observation is worth of making further investigation,
yet larger iris image datasets should be used.
3.3. Stage II: Selection of Optimal Feature Families B∗
The second stage of feature selection, proposed for the Zak-
Gabor-based coding, considers partitions of the set of all
bits B onto feature families Bk,s, namely
Bk,s = {sgn(ℜ(amk;sℓ)),sgn(ℑ(amk;sℓ)) :
m = 0, . . . ,M−1, ℓ = 0, . . . ,R−1} . (9)
A single family collects all bits corresponding to the given
frequency and scale indices, k and s, respectively. This
second stage aims at searching the optimal frequencies
and scales, and the previously determined set B0 is used
to prioritize pairs (k,s) by their population of features
from B0.
Following [2], we plot the number of elements in the set
Bk,s∩B
0 separately for real and imaginary parts of the Zak-
Gabor coeﬃcients, Figs. 5 and 6.
Fig. 5. A 2D histogram showing how families Bk,s are ‘popu-
lated’ by optimal features B0 determined for the imaginary part
of Zak-Gabor coeﬃcients.
Fig. 6. Same as in Fig. 5 except that the real part of Zak-Gabor
coeﬃcients is used.
Note that the number of winning features is not identical
for all families, which means that families diﬀerently con-
tribute to the ﬁnal discrimination capability of the resulting
iris feature set. Thus the last step selecting the ﬁnal set of
families is required. Selecting the families of features may
be done in various ways, and we use two variants of this
selection. In the ﬁrst variant we sort the families Bk,s by
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the decreasing number of winning features B0 included
in a given family, separately for real and imaginary parts
of coeﬃcients. This procedure prioritizes families that are
most ‘populated’ by optimal features, and estimates each
family’s usefulness. Including a new feature family into
the ﬁnal code results in a new iris recognition system that
Fig. 7. EER (thick line) and decidability d′ (thin line) versus
the number of sorted iris feature families Bk,s. Best solution
minimizing the EER (achieved for the ﬁrst 8 families) and the
corresponding d′ are marked by circles.
Fig. 8. Same as in Fig. 7 except that only families increasing the
system’s accuracy are iteratively added to the ﬁnal set.
Fig. 9. Same as in Fig. 3, except that the optimal feature fami-
lies B∗ are employed.
may be, as in the ﬁrst stage, assessed by calculating EER
(or additionally d′), Fig. 7. Families characterized by the
minimum EER may be thus chosen and deliver the ﬁnal
conﬁguration of the Zak-Gabor-based coding in this ap-
plication.
However, one may observe that a few families increase the
EER once they are added to the feature set. Thus the second
variant of feature families selection adds only those Bk,s
which increase system accuracy (i.e., decrease EER),
Fig. 8. This variant results in best EER = 0.98% achieved
for 8 families, constituting a set B∗ of 576 elements
(i.e., bits of the code). Figure 9 presents the distribution
of genuine and impostor scores obtained for the winning
variant.
4. Implementation of the Automatic Iris
Feature Selection Tool
For the convenience and repeatability of calculations in the
ﬁrst stage of the iris feature selection, an automatic iris fea-
ture selection tool is introduced. It is a hybrid environment
where Matlab scripts manage executable programs written
in C/C++. This conjunction gives ﬂexibility of script im-
plementation and easiness in replacing any element of the
tool, if needed. All the calculations related to iris image
processing (segmentation, Zak-Gabor-based feature extrac-
tion, iris template creation and matching) is realized by
ACIrisSDK libraries [6], integrated into the tool.
The tool contains two main non-volatile ﬁle sets. The ﬁrst
one is the Iris Data Base (IDB) for which optimal encoding
parameters are calculated. The second one is called Sup-
port Repository (SR) where processed intermediate objects
are stored. IDB has a simple internal structure where im-
ages are located in folders named by user identiﬁer and
an indicator of the left/right iris. Because of the huge
amount of data loaded to the tool, not all operations and
its variables might be stored in the RAM simultaneously.
Each phase of automatic feature selection collects needed
data from the SR, processes it and puts back the results
there.
In the ﬁrst phase, the proposed tool performs iris segmen-
tation of images stored in the IDB. For each representation,
the implementation of methods described in Subsection 2.1
provides the set of segmentation coordinates: centers of cir-
cles approximating inner and outer boundaries of the iris,
detected occlusions and sectors chosen for features calcu-
lation. The results in a serialized form are placed as ﬁles
in the SR.
Images stored within the IDB includes samples that contain
distortions typical for iris image acquisition (e.g., blurred
images, half-closed eye or incorrect cropping). To ensure
the highest quality of the used data, a simple and heuris-
tic algorithm of best samples selection is also build-in in
the proposed tool. Namely, for each iris image two kinds
of biometric templates are calculated: the enrollment tem-
plate and the veriﬁcation template. These templates are
matched within the iris class. The results are collected
46
Secure Biometric Veriﬁcation Station Based on Iris Recognition
and these irises which are not matched to some (experi-
mentally determined) number of other are rejected from
further processing. This simple mechanism automatically
ﬁnds outliers within a class, i.e., images of signiﬁcantly
worse quality than the remaining in the class. If necessary,
other poor quality images, not rejected automatically, may
be removed manually.
Third phase concerns calculation of a full Zak-Gabor-based
feature set for each iris that was not rejected during pre-
vious stage. Before that, a very last distortion must be
compensated. When the image of the eye is taken, there is
a possibility of unintentional tilt of the camera or the ob-
ject’s head. The best way of ﬁxing this problem is to shift
the polar iris images in angular direction with a simulta-
neous checking of their correlation. The highest obtained
correlation determines the angle for tilt correction of one
iris in relation to the others. Then the conﬁguration that
minimizes the average tilt correction angle is selected, and
all polar images are modiﬁed this way. During the next
step, based on shifted polar images, the full Zak-Gabor-
based feature set B is calculated for each iris and stored in
the SR separately.
The ﬁnal phase begins with aggregation of calculated fea-
ture sets into one matrix. First row of this matrix contains
feature indices, and the remaining rows are composed with
the iris class index, and values of its Zak-Gabor-based fea-
tures. This matrix is an input for chosen mRMR method
used for feature selection. The output is a set Bsorted of
feature indices sorted by decreasing usefulness.
The proposed feature selection tool was previously used
to estimate Zak-Gabor-based features (and coding parame-
ters) for a few databases, e.g., publicly available Bath Iris
Image Database, and our proprietary databases: BioBase
collected by an IrisCUBE camera [2], and DatastripBase
collected by a Datastrip DSV2+TURBO-SC mobile cam-
era. The estimated time needed for feature selection for
1000 images is approximately 8 hours (assessed when
running on the machine with Intel r©Core i5 processor,
equipped with 4 GB of RAM).
5. Implementation of the Secure
Biometric Veriﬁcation Station
Secure biometric veriﬁcation station (SBS) is designed to
be a part of a larger system [9], consisting of one or more
external PC units, which send requests of user’s identity
biometric veriﬁcation. In the following subsections, we
present the hardware and software components, respec-
tively.
5.1. Hardware Specification
For the purpose of the station development we used a conju-
gation of two ready-to-use devices. The ﬁrst one, Kontron
Micro Client IIA 70 is a fanless microcomputer equipped
with the Intel r©AtomTMN270 1.6 GHz CPU, 2 GB of RAM
and 8 GB of a Compact Flash memory, a 7.0” TFT LCD
touch screen, USB and LAN 10/100/1000 interfaces and
Kontron customized Windows XP Embedded. This con-
ﬁguration provides a compact and fully functional environ-
ment for Windows based x86 applications.
Fig. 10. Components of the developed station: a processing
unit with a display for communication with a subject and an iris
capture camera.
Second device, Corvus Vista FA2, is a face and iris cap-
ture camera. Connected to the Kontron microcomputer
with USB 2.0 interface guarantees fully automated cap-
turing of iris images compliant with ISO/IEC require-
ments [4] at the resolution of 640×480 pixels. The iris
camera is equipped with multi-wavelength IR illuminants,
a distance-sensed auto focusing system and the LED-based
feedback for captured subjects convenience. Provided SDK
for C/C++ enables also gaining RGB face images (up to
2048×1536 pixels) and setting basic illumination adjust-
ments for both images acquisition modes. Figure 10 shows
hardware components of the station (intentionally presented
without casing).
5.2. Software Functional Requirements and
Implementation
Designing the secure biometric veriﬁcation station induces
a few security, comfort and simpliﬁcation aspects to be
considered. In particular they concern:
– secure protocol of communication with an external
unit,
– clear and understandable Graphical User Interface,
– proper iris image acquisition,
– internal data organization system,
– handling of biometric processes.
The implementation of the proposed station functionality
is divided into individual components, Fig. 11. They are
designed as follows:
– SBS – exports three main biometric functions
(SBS Enroll, SBS Verify, SBS Delete) in a form
of Dynamic-Link Library (DLL); SBS integrates also
the remaining components;
47
Adam Czajka and Krzysztof Piech
– GUI – handles the Graphical User Interface;
– FILE SYSTEM – contains necessary ﬁles (GUI
items, users biometric templates and log ﬁles) in
a specially designed folder structure;
– BIOMETRICS – provides biometric operations with
the use of ACIrisSDK libraries, including creating
and matching of user templates stored in the OS ﬁle
system;
– CORVUS VISTA FA2 – provides communication
and control over the iris camera used.
Fig. 11. Component diagram of the SBS software modules.
Communication protocol. Cooperation with any other PC
unit (even in the immediate vicinity) requires establishing
a secure communication between these two machines. If
a communication channel is not appropriately protected,
any biometric data transmitted may be stolen or modiﬁed.
To prevent the system from abuses, special communication
protocol is developed.
For ﬂexibility in developing of the proposed solution,
a communication layer is separated from the veriﬁcation
procedure, in particular from handling biometric devices,
controlling acquisition processes and data processing (tem-
plates creation and matching), as well as database and er-
rors logging. To achieve this goal, all non-communication
functionality is supplied in C/C++ Dynamic-Link Library
(DLL) which provides three general functionalities: new
user enrollment, user veriﬁcation, and deleting users data
from the system.
Graphical User Interface with Qt. Neither enrolling to
the system nor verifying the user is an atomic process. Both
processes consist of several stages where each of them may
take some time and result in an error or warning. There-
fore, for making a proposed solution more user friendly,
we also introduce Graphical User Interface (GUI) imple-
mented in Qt 4.7 technology, and fully compatible with the
provided 7” LCD touch screen of the microcomputer. The
Information about the type of current process, its result and
commands may be displayed in a clear form to the user. In
the presented solution, there is no need for a user to in-
put any information using the screen, mouse or keyboard,
besides presenting the iris after the message. This is due
to controlling current biometric processes by the external
unit.
Iris image acquisition. Prepared solution contains neces-
sary functionality (based on the Corvus Vista FA2 ven-
dor’s SDK) for ensuring proper device initialization, han-
dling of image capture timeouts, illumination adjustments
and terminating of the connection with the camera, after re-
ceiving captured iris images. The procedure of iris capture
is fully automatic. Provided SDK uses build-in distance
sensor for estimating face position in front of the lens, it
controls the NIR illuminants for appropriate scene illumi-
nation and corrects sharpness of the image. The quality of
the iris image is assessed on-line, and when it is acceptable
the capture process terminates, sensor and illuminants are
set oﬀ, and the image is available in the indicated memory
buﬀer.
Users database and log files. In order to be simple, bio-
metric templates, logging results and selected GUI ele-
ments are stored in a local nonvolatile memory. There
is no need for installing detached Database Management
System (DBMS) (like mySQL or Microsoft SQL Server)
as the user database structure is deﬁned by biometric tem-
plates, serialized to binary ﬁles placed in the USERS local
folder, and the conﬁguration data is kept within the CONF
local folder. Users can be added and removed only upon
the external unit secured request. The station implements
a simple logging mechanism. The results of component
functions along with threat level (one of six possible), time
stamp (set with thousandth of a second precision), associ-
ated user ID information and a message with a description
are appended to a text ﬁle (named by daily date) in the LOG
folder.
Biometric operations. The main software component of
the station is responsible for biometric operations, i.e., en-
rolling new users and verifying them upon the request of the
external unit. The enrollment process starts with checking
of the possibility of adding a new user (speciﬁed by UID).
It may not be possible when the maximum number of reg-
istered users has been reached or indicated that the UID
already exists. In the latter case, the request is revoked and
no further action is taken. Otherwise, three enrollment iris
images are captured (each after a speciﬁed time interval),
the biometric template is created, and it is placed under
provided UID in the user database. If timeout occurs dur-
ing the acquisition of images, but at least one image was
captured, template can still be created with the obtained
samples. The enrollment process is also revoked when no
image is captured.
At the veriﬁcation stage, only one image on the eye is
captured, and temporarily created veriﬁcation template is
matched with the enrollment template stored in the user
database (if UID provided is registered within the database).
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Veriﬁcation result is displayed on the LCD (’MATCH /NO
MATCH’) and it is sent to the external unit requesting the
veriﬁcation.
The enrollment process takes typically one minute (includ-
ing capturing of three iris images, template creation and
its storage) and the veriﬁcation process does not exceed
a second, which very favorably compares to the most of
commercial iris recognition systems.
6. Summary
This paper describes an application of the well-established
Zak-Gabor-based iris coding to build a secure veriﬁcation
station. To adapt the coding parameters (i.e., iris fea-
ture families, corresponding to frequencies and scales of
wavelets emphasizing individual iris features) we used the
mRMR method using the mutual information as an indi-
cator of the iris feature usefulness. To make the selection
process an automatic one, the iris feature selection tool was
designed and built. A database of iris images collected by
the developed station was used to automatically adapt the
iris coding to the quality of iris images employed. The
feature selection tool allowed for convenient adaptation of
the Zak-Gabor-based method parameters (in a reasonable
time of several hours) and a promising EER = 0.98% was
achieved for iris images collected by the designed veriﬁca-
tion station.
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Abstract—The paper presents the design and the rationale
behind a simple verification protocol for autonomous verifica-
tion modules, and the architecture enabling use of such mod-
ules. The architecture assumes strict separation of all per-
sonal metadata and the actual verification data. The paper
also describes a prototype implementation of the protocol and
its extension enabling the state of the module to be monitored
from the main system. The proposed design solves the prob-
lem of using advanced verification methods, especially biomet-
ric ones, in systems where direct implementation is not pos-
sible due to hardware incompatibilities, insufficient resources
or other limitations.
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1. Introduction
The security of any computer system depends to a large
extent on the proper veriﬁcation of the identity of its user.
The access control policy used in the system is meaningless
if the user is misidentiﬁed and allowed to work as someone
else, especially if the user is not authorized to use the sys-
tem at all. In most systems, this veriﬁcation of identity is
very simple, usually requiring the knowledge of a password.
Naturally, systems with higher security requirements should
employ more secure methods of veriﬁcation. The pass-
word protection is actually quite good, there is no reason
to eliminate it, but it should be accompanied by other meth-
ods, preferably employing hardware identiﬁcation devices
(tokens, cards, etc.) and/or biometric measurements.
In this paper we are dealing with the problem of applying
advanced biometric veriﬁcation methods in a system, which
– for reasons stated in the next section – cannot implement
them directly. We introduce a separate module, called BSB,
responsible for performing the veriﬁcation. We present the
architecture of such a solution and the protocol used to
connect the host system with the veriﬁcation station.
Section 2 shows the background of this research, ex-
plaining the reasons why a separate veriﬁcation module
is needed in our solution. The section also presents a sim-
ple architecture which satisﬁes our requirements. As the
architecture requires a special protocol for communication
between the BSB and the host, we review the existing so-
lutions in Section 3 and – having explained why none of
them ﬁt our needs – describe the protocol we designed,
called BSBI, in Section 4. Section 5 describes our proto-
type implementation and Section 6 explains how it could
be perfected in the future. We conclude with a short sum-
mary in Section 7.
2. Background, Assumptions and Design
The secure workstation for special applications [1] is
a Linux-based system using visualization to process data
from diﬀerent security domains in separate environments.
The guest systems can be either Linux- or Windows-based,
but the main point of access control is the host system,
based on Linux (speciﬁcally the project uses Red Hat En-
terprise Linux). The task of verifying the identity of the
user is performed at the host level. The built-in capabil-
ities, including password-based veriﬁcation are available.
However, the system’s high security level requires more
advanced access control, preferably using several diﬀerent
methods in parallel.
Among the project goals is the demonstration of diﬀerent
authentication mechanisms [2], including hardware-based
veriﬁcation (e.g., token or card [3], [4]) and biometric
veriﬁcation [5], [6]. Speciﬁcally, we chose to implement
iris recognition [7], [8]. This biometric modality is rela-
tively reliable from the technical point of view, guaran-
tees low false negatives and – more importantly – false
positives.
The combination of iris recognition and Linux host op-
erating system is unfortunately a signiﬁcant compatibility
problem. The commercially available specialized cameras
for iris recognition rarely have drivers for Linux systems.
Even the few that do, do not oﬀer full functionality with
those drivers. Furthermore, iris recognition requires quite
advanced numerical analysis, available in the ACIrisSDK
library developed at NASK [7], [8]. However, due to the
driver issues described above, that library was written for
the Windows system and porting it is not an easy task. Im-
plementing iris recognition on the host system level would
therefore be prohibitively diﬃcult.
The diﬃculty is not the only reason against a host-level im-
plementation. For security reasons, the host operating sys-
tem should be minimal and based on well-tested software.
The biometric processing is quite complex and works with
externally provided data (photos of the iris). This makes it
a potential weak spot in the system, especially since – as
stated before – it would have to be new, implemented from
scratch or ported in a non-trivial way. With no prior pro-
duction use, even after rigorous tests this implementation
would be likely to contain numerous bugs, some of which
may be exploitable security vulnerabilities.
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This situation left the designers with only two possible
choices. The iris recognition would have to be performed
on a Windows-based system, separate from the host. That
system could be a virtualized guest or an external module.
Since the workstation is basically designed as a minimal,
secure virtualization environment, a hypervisor is already
present on the host and the virtualization approach may
seem suﬃcient. In fact, this is illusory. Implementation
as a virtual machine would have several important conse-
quences for the whole workstation, quite contradictory to
the projects goals. The physical separation of virtual ma-
chines, postulated in the project, would require a whole
physical CPU to be reserved for the biometric virtual ma-
chine1. A computer with two physical processors would
then not be enough to run two protected, user-accessible
virtual machines in parallel, as required. The alterna-
tive, deactivating the biometric VM when not necessary,
would solve the issue, but greatly increase the veriﬁcation
delay.
The requirements of the biometric machine are also prob-
lematic. It would require full access to the camera, most
likely connected via USB, and two-way communication
with the host. The other virtual machines are not allowed
to have any two-way communication with the host and
their access to USB ports is heavily controlled (only spe-
cial, cryptographically protected USB drives are allowed).
Adding exceptions increases the probability of introducing
vulnerabilities.
Fig. 1. The general architecture of the system. Note that the two
types of data are kept separate and linked only with a numeric
identiﬁer.
For the above reasons, the ﬁnal decision seems clear – the
iris recognition will be performed on a separate physical
machine. The system will consist of two separate mod-
ules, as shown in Fig. 1: the secure workstation and the
veriﬁcation station (called BSB). The authentication tasks
are clearly divided between the two modules – every ac-
tion is only performed on one of the stations, e.g., the
password-based authentication is performed by the host sta-
tion without any interaction with the BSB, while biometric
authentication is performed entirely by the BSB. The BSB
is autonomous in its operations. The biometric database
and the biometric software are placed only on the BSB, no
1This is a simpliﬁcation, multiple VMs may in fact use the same CPU
if and only if they belong to the same security domain.
such details are passed to the host station. Any necessary
hardware must therefore be also connected to the BSB.
The only information about the user passed between the
two modules is a numeric identiﬁer. The BSB is equipped
with its own screen and does not need the host system as
a proxy for user communication.
The architecture described in the previous paragraph is in-
spired by the way in which credit card terminals are often
integrated with ticket vending machines, etc. The termi-
nal is only activated on request and is autonomous. The
machine instructs the user to follow the instructions dis-
played by the card terminal and waits for a conﬁrmation
from the terminal. This makes the integration very easy
for the designers of the vending machine.
The construction of the BSB itself is a separate issue, out-
side the scope of this paper. If the autonomous nature of
the BSB is preserved, then the issue is not at all impor-
tant for the host system. The integration would be done
exactly the same way if the veriﬁcation used a completely
diﬀerent biometric modality or hardware ID. However, this
elasticity depends on the ﬂexibility of the communication
protocol connecting both modules.
3. Related Work
There is a multitude of existing authentication protocols. In
theory, using them would be the simplest and best way to
meet the requirements of the project. However, the exist-
ing protocols are in fact designed for a completely diﬀerent
task. They are usually used as scalability enhancers for
distributed systems, delegating the task of user authentica-
tion, authorization and accounting to a central server. This
approach is used in protocols like RADIUS [9] or Diam-
eter [10]. Also Kerberos [11], [12] uses a central server
approach, focusing on a cryptographic ticket mechanism
to provide single logon. All of these protocols are power-
ful tools enabling eﬀective management of large networks.
However, our needs are much simpler. The authentication,
assignment of rights, etc., are all performed on the host
system. However, the veriﬁcation tasks delegated to the
BSB are handled there completely.
The TACACS+ [13] protocol and its predecessors
(TACACS, XTACACS) take a diﬀerent approach. They do
provide the means to perform remote interactive authen-
tication, separated logically from authorization. The pro-
tocol handles password-based authentication very well and
can be adapted to any other similar authentication method,
e.g., hardware tokens. Adapting it to use biometric veriﬁca-
tion is a lot more diﬃcult, but probably possible. However,
the assumptions of the TACACS family of protocols are
a reversed version of our design. The authentication server
performs the actual authentication, but the user interaction
is done on the terminal side. In our setting the entire ver-
iﬁcation process is performed on the BSB side. The host
system simply requests the authorization to be performed
and awaits results. This makes TACACS+ a suboptimal
51
Adam Kozakiewicz and Tomasz Pałka
choice for our system. Taking into account the minimal
amount of necessary communication, the decision was to
develop a specialized protocol.
Since biometric veriﬁcation was our main goal in this
project, it was also possible to use an existing biometric
protocol. Such a protocol exists – the standard biometric
API called BioAPI [14] can be mapped into network mes-
sages using ASN.1, resulting in BIP – BioAPI Internet-
working Protocol [15]. However, from our point of view
this protocol is very low-level, giving access to many de-
tails of the biometric processing. It would be useful, if the
user database was placed on the host machine, but since all
biometric activity is limited to the BSB, introducing such
low level information in the protocol only serves to make
it less universal. A simpler protocol could easily be used
with diﬀerent conﬁgurations of the BSB, using diﬀerent
biometric modalities, or even non-biometric methods.
4. Communication Protocol
The design of a communication protocol for identity veriﬁ-
cation is relatively simple in this setting – the required set
of operations is very small. In fact, the minimal set would
include only two operations: adding a user by registering
the necessary data given the user’s identiﬁer or veriﬁcation
of the identity of the user given the identiﬁer of the user
he claims to be. For practical reasons, a third operation is
quite useful – deleting the user with the given identiﬁer,
removing all data collected for him.
The basic design requirements, apart from providing the
speciﬁed minimal set of operations, were as follows:
1. The design must be based on well known, standard
solutions.
2. The autonomous nature of BSB, as speciﬁed in the
proposed architecture, must be preserved.
3. The messages should be limited to ASCII characters
and not excessively long, so that the protocol can be
used unmodiﬁed on any link.
4. The messages should be human readable when unen-
crypted (useful in implementation and testing phase).
5. The protocol should be easy to implement.
6. The protocol should be easily extendable.
The requirements and the natural request-response nature
of communication with BSB resulted in a solution based on
Web Services. The choice between SOAP and XML-RPC
was also clear, as SOAP is unnecessarily complex – we
have no use for its advanced capabilities and the large en-
velope directly contradicts the requirements. Since ASCII
is a subset of UTF-8, it is easy to satisfy requirement 3 us-
ing XML entities and BASE64 encoding where necessary.
Also, the clear hierarchical structure of XML documents
satisﬁes requirement 6.
4.1. Extended Functionality for More Advanced BSBs
While the three basic operations are suﬃcient for the veriﬁ-
cation module, the actual protocol provides two additional,
optional features – capabilities and log collection.
Capabilities, although simple, are a powerful extension, al-
lowing more advanced veriﬁcation modules with multiple
veriﬁcation methods to be designed and used without fur-
ther modiﬁcations to the protocol. A capability is simply
a name of a veriﬁcation method. The protocol allows the
host to obtain a list of capabilities supported by the ver-
iﬁcation module and to specify the desired set of meth-
ods during veriﬁcation or registration of a user’s identity.
The veriﬁcation module is also required to deﬁne internally
a default set of veriﬁcation mechanisms, allowing it to be
used with a host which does not support capabilities.
Capabilities are described in the format
<capabilityname>_<mode>. The <capabilityname>
part identiﬁes the general method of veriﬁcation (e.g.,
biometric modality) and should be uniﬁed. The BSBI
protocol provides names for most popular veriﬁcation
methods:
• CHIP Chip ID card or other intelligent hardware ID
inserted into a reader,
• FACEGM Face geometry,
• FPRINT Fingerprint,
• FVEIN Vein pattern in a ﬁnger,
• HANDGM Hand geometry,
• IRIS Iris,
• PASS Password or PIN code,
• RCHIP Wireless chip card or other intelligent wire-
less hardware ID,
• RETINA Retina,
• RFID RFID-based ID card or other simple wireless
hardware ID,
• SIGN Written signature,
• SPASS One-time-password,
• SWIPE Magnetic ID card or other simple hardware
ID inserted into a reader,
• TOKEN Hardware token,
• VOICE Voice.
The above list is by no means complete. Additions to it
should be done in a consistent manner.
The <mode> part is not strictly deﬁned – it may be any
string (without whitespace) specifying a variant of the
method, preferably in a clear and descriptive way. Short
mode names are preferred. If only one variant is imple-
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mented for a given capability, it is allowed to use only the
capability name as its identiﬁer, but the preferred name uses
mode default. This mode is not reserved for that use, so
it is, for example, perfectly acceptable to oﬀer capabilities
SIGN_default, SIGN_press and SIGN_nopress, where
the latter two modes deﬁne whether pressure measurements
should be taken into account and the defaultmode is syn-
onymous to one of the other variants. Synonyms are not
treated in any special way, from the point of view of the
protocol all modes are diﬀerent.
The log collection is simply a way to access more detailed
information about the operations of the veriﬁcation module.
The host system may use it to obtain a copy of some of
the module’s logs. The proposed speciﬁcation assumes that
the logs are treated as a single stream of entries by the
host, delegating the selection of entries to the veriﬁcation
module. Better granularity may be provided by extending
the protocol, if necessary.
4.2. Specification of Operations
The protocol consists of ﬁve methods – one for each of
the elementary operations of the BSB, one listing the ca-
pabilities of the BSB and one used to collect the logs. The
methods generally report their execution status using nu-
meric error codes, which are deﬁned as follows:
– 0 BSBI_SUCCESS – successful completion;
– 99 BSBI_UNKNOWN – unknown error;
– 100 BSBI_USER_NEXIST – the given user ID is not
registered in BSB database;
– 101 BSBI_USER_EXIST – the given user ID is already
registered in BSB database;
– 110 BSBI_USER_LIMIT – number of registered users
exceeds a preset limit;
– 200 BSBI_PROC_TIMEOUT – processing timeout in
veriﬁcation module;
– 210 BSBI_PROC_INTERNAL – internal error in veri-
ﬁcation module;
– 299 BSBI_PROC_UNKNOWN – unknown error in veri-
ﬁcation module;
– 300 BSBI_CAPA_NSUPPORT – requested capability
not available in the BSB;
– 301 BSBI_CAPA_NCOLLECT – data required by the
requested capability not collected;
– 310 BSBI_CAPA_NODATA – no user template for the
requested capability for the speciﬁed user.
Additionally the following library-level error codes (900–
999) are deﬁned. These are never sent as part of
the protocol and are reserved for use by libraries imple-
menting BSBI:
– 900 BSBI_CONN_FAIL – cannot establish connection
to BSB (connection refused or other problem);
– 901 BSBI_CONN_TIMEOUT – timeout while waiting
for BSB response;
– 910 BSBI_CONN_PARSE – bogus response from BSB;
– 920 BSBI_CONN_FATAL – BSB or link security
breach suspected (e.g. invalid BSB certiﬁcate);
– 930 BSBI_CONN_INTERNAL – BSBI library internal
error;
– 940 BSBI_CONN_PROTO – protocol incompatibility –
BSB does not support requested functionality;
– 999 BSBI_CONN_UNKNOWN – unknown connection er-
ror.
The methods of the protocol are deﬁned as follows:
enroll.user(uid, capa) – the method registers a new user
with the supplied ID. The BSB is expected to collect and
store autonomously all necessary information, e.g., biomet-
ric data.
The mandatory parameter uid contains the numeric ID of
the user.
The optional parameter capa may contain a list of veriﬁ-
cation methods the host system intends to use in the future.
The BSB is required to collect and store all necessary data
for these veriﬁcation methods, failure to collect any of them
must cause the entire operation to fail. It may also collect
data for other variants, but failure to obtain those must not
be considered an error. Specifying a capability not sup-
ported by the BSB is an error and user enrollment must
fail in this case. If the list contains a capability speciﬁed
only by capability name (omitted mode part of the name),
the BSB is free to use any of the available modes of that
capability.
If the parameter capa is not provided, the BSB is free to
choose which kinds of data should be collected. As a min-
imum, the BSB should collect data for all capabilities used
by default (that is when the capa parameter is omitted) by
the verify.usermethod – failure to collect those may and
should be considered a failure to register the user. The pre-
ferred action is to collect data for all installed capabilities,
but tolerate failure to obtain data for veriﬁcation methods
not used by default.
The method returns a single value code, which is a numeric











– BSBI_CAPA_NSUPPORT (only if the capa parameter
was provided),
– BSBI_CAPA_NCOLLECT.
verify.user(uid, capa) – the method veriﬁes the identity
of a user, based on the supplied ID. The BSB is ex-
pected to collect autonomously the necessary data and ver-
ify its correctness for that ID using templates created by
the enroll.user method.
The mandatory parameter uid contains the numeric ID of
the user.
The optional parameter capa may contain a list of veri-
ﬁcation methods that should be used. The veriﬁcation is
successful if and only if all of the listed capabilities were
successfully used and conﬁrmed the user’s identity. The
BSB may not use any capabilities not in the list. Speci-
fying a capability not supported by the BSB is an error.
If the list contains a capability speciﬁed only by capability
name (omitted mode part of the name), the BSB is free to
choose one or more of the available modes for which data
was collected during enrollment of the user being veriﬁed.
If user data is not available for any mode of the capability,
then the veriﬁcation obviously fails.
If the parameter capa is not provided, the BSB is free to
choose which capabilities to use for veriﬁcation and how to
proceed if one of them fails. The choice should be limited
to the capabilities used during enrollment of the user being
veriﬁed.
The method returns one or two values. The ﬁrst value is
code, a numeric error code. The following error codes are







– BSBI_CAPA_NSUPPORT (only if the capa parameter
was provided),
– BSBI_CAPA_NODATA.
The second value, also numeric, called verifica-
tionResult, is provided if and only if the value of code
is BSBI_SUCCESS and is either 0 if the user’s identity was
conﬁrmed, or 1 if the user’s identity was rejected.
delete.user(uid) – the method removes from the BSB all
data related to a user identiﬁed by the supplied ID.
The mandatory parameter uid contains the numeric ID of
the user.
The method returns a single value code, which is a numeric






list.capa() – the method retrieves a list of all capabilities
supported by the BSB.
The method does not require any parameters and returns an
array of character strings called capa. There is no code
value in this case – any non-empty response should be
regarded as conﬁrming the result BSBI_SUCCESS, while an
empty response should be interpreted as BSBI_UNKNOWN.
get.logs(zipmode) – the method retrieves new log entries
from the BSB. Selection of the entries depends on the
conﬁguration of BSB, the protocol does not provide any
method of controlling it.
The optional parameter zipmode speciﬁes the compression
method which should be applied to the logs. It is a string
from a well deﬁned set of values. Currently, the deﬁned
values are ZIP, GZ and NONE, new ones may be added in
the future. The values are not case sensitive. The BSB
must use the speciﬁed compression method, unless it does
not support it – in that case, no compression should be used
(as if the value of zipmode was NONE).
The method returns one or four values. The ﬁrst value is
code, which is a numeric error code. The following error
codes are possible in this method:
– BSBI_SUCCESS,
– BSBI_UNKNOWN,
– BSBI_PROC_INTERNAL (reserved for errors generated
when parsing BSB’s logs),
– BSBI_PROC_UNKNOWN.
The other three values are returned if and only if the value
of code is BSBI_SUCCESS.
The value logs contains the log entries in BASE64 encod-
ing. If the zipmode parameter was speciﬁed and not NONE,
the entries may be compressed before BASE64 encoding is
applied. There is a limit set on the length of this value –
it may not exceed 32 kilobytes after BASE64 encoding.
The value zipmode deﬁnes whether compression has been
used and is either a copy of the input parameter with the
same name, or NONE if the speciﬁed compression method
is not supported.
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Finally, the value hasnext is a boolean value, true if and
only if not all available entries ﬁt under the 32 kilobyte
limit. The host system should then immediately call this
method again to retrieve the missing lines.
5. Prototype
The prototype implementation (as shown in Fig. 2) was
completed in the C language, using a preexisting XML-
RPC library. The BSBI was implemented as a portable li-
brary, easily adaptable to new uses.
Fig. 2. The structure of the prototype implementation of the BSB:
(a) veriﬁcation requests are handled by a special PAM module
using the BSBI library; (b) communication with the biometric
module uses a simple wrapper library; (c),(d),(e),(f) events from
the biometric module (c) and system-level events (d) are logged
into ﬁles, which are (e) monitored by a special module of the BSBI
library and (f) selected entries are reported to the host station’s
syslog.
The BSB has been equipped with Apache HTTP server
conﬁgured to enable SSL-protected connections from the
BSB. The connection requires authentication with a regis-
tered certiﬁcate by both the client and the server, ensuring
a secure pairing of the BSB with the host system. The
BSBI module on the server handles BSBI calls by translat-
ing them to calls to functions of a specially designed thin
wrapper around the ACIrisSDK library, responsible for the
actual biometric processing. The module also collects re-
sults of a separate process which parses logs generated on
the BSB and extracts the entries, which will be sent to the
host system on the next call to get.logs.
On the client side, the library is used to generate calls
to BSB. It could potentially be used by regular applica-
tions requiring biometric veriﬁcation of identity, but in the
designed system it is reserved for use in the initial user
authentication process.
Given that the host operating system in the project is Red
Hat Enterprise Linux, the natural way to include the BSB
in the user authentication process is to implement a module
for the PAM (Pluggable Authentication Modules) system.
The module is then included in PAM conﬁguration as the
second step after standard password authentication. Such
a module, called pam_biometric.so, has been imple-
mented. However, the most obvious authentication policy,
strictly requiring successful biometric veriﬁcation, is not
acceptable in practice. The design of the secure worksta-
tion prohibits any external modiﬁcations (e.g., after booting
from a live CD), the only way to change its conﬁguration
is to authenticate successfully as an administrator. This
means that any failure of the BSB makes the host system
completely unusable – even replacing the BSB is not pos-
sible, unless the original private key can be recovered.
For this reason the PAM conﬁguration is a bit more com-
plex. Another simple module for the PAM system was
developed, called pam_spec.so. This module performs
a simple password-based veriﬁcation. However, the mod-
ule only accepts users belonging to a special group spec,
and the password is never used normally. It is also stored
in a separate ﬁle, /etc/spec_shadow, protected using
SELinux. The approach is quite secure, especially if pass-
word and BSB are not the only authentication modules used
by the workstation.
The ﬁnal conﬁguration can be as follows:
First, a successful password-based authentication is re-
quired. If it succeeds, the identity of the user is already
tentatively established and a BSB-based authentication can
be attempted using his identiﬁer. As the second line spec-
iﬁes, successful BSB authentication is suﬃcient and ends
the process. Rejection by BSB also ends the process – au-
thentication fails. However, if the module reports that it is
unavailable, i.e., the BSB cannot be contacted, then pro-
cessing continues. The third line rejects any users not in
group spec and the fourth line attempts special password
authentication as the ﬁnal, decisive step. The audit option
used in both modules implemented in the project turns on
detailed logging for audit purposes and can be omitted if
not necessary.
The integration package includes both PAM modules, the
BSBI library and some helper programs. The helper pro-
grams enable pairing of the host system with the BSB,
testing the connection, enrollment and removal of users,
setting the special passwords, etc.
6. Possible Extensions
While the BSB + BSBI veriﬁcation mechanism is imple-
mented and working well, it is still only a prototype. A fully
mature commercial system would require further extensions
and modiﬁcations. Some of the extensions described in this
section are planned as future work, others are just proposals
which may or may not be considered for implementation
in the future.
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Most importantly, to be used as part of a secure worksta-
tion, especially one certiﬁed for processing of classiﬁed
information, the BSB would have to adhere to the same
stringent security requirements as the workstation itself.
Several steps in that direction were already made. The
BSB, once conﬁgured, does not have any connected hu-
man interface devices and the touchscreen built into the
computer used in the prototype is used only as an output
device. Nevertheless, the casing is a purely temporary so-
lution, not acceptable for production use, as it does not
oﬀer any physical security. All ports of the computer are
relatively easy to access. In a ﬁnal implementation the com-
puter and the camera would be installed in a locked casing
with secure, well placed ventilation holes, so that accessing
any ports would require a key (it is normally only neces-
sary during installation and initial pairing with the host).
Protection of the link is also important, although as long
as the BSBI communication is cryptographically protected
this may not be crucial. Also note that the BSB is not
really designed for use in the ﬁeld – processing of classi-
ﬁed information typically takes place in rooms providing
signiﬁcant physical security and well documented access
control. In other applications the BSB would likely not be
a separate piece of equipment. Whether wall-mounted or
built into a larger device, it would probably be suﬃciently
protected. Even now, physical integration with the host
workstation is perfectly possible if the workstation’s casing
is large enough. However, in the envisioned application
a smaller, standalone veriﬁcation device connected to the
host with a cable seems much more usable as it oﬀers a lot
more ﬂexibility in placing the camera so that using it would
not require leaving the chair.
The security requirements, especially at higher levels, may
require replacing SSL-based encryption and symmetric au-
thentication with encryption hardware. This is however
easy to do and does not require any changes in the BSBI
protocol.
Another security-related shortcoming of the current solu-
tion is the relatively low security of the BSB itself. As long
as there are no input devices connected to it (apart from the
camera, of course), this is not a serious problem. However,
the computer used in the BSB is small enough to carry in
an average bag. The consequences of stealing the BSB or
making a copy of its data are hard to deﬁne. The BSB does
not have any useful metadata associated with the biomet-
ric (or other) veriﬁcation data stored on it. The identiﬁer
passed to it by BSBI is not easily identiﬁable. However,
the data may be quite useful anyway, especially if the set
of registered users is suﬃciently small. The connection be-
tween a person and its veriﬁcation data can be recovered in
several ways, e.g., by analysing the logs present on the BSB
and comparing them with observations of the times when
individual users accessed the workstation. The veriﬁcation
data, especially biometric templates, should deﬁnitely be
considered sensitive.
Another interesting piece of information on the BSB is its
private key, used to pair with the host. Having this certiﬁ-
cate, it is generally possible to develop a fake BSB, which
will pair correctly with the host, but will, e.g., always reply
to verify.user calls with a positive veriﬁcation. It may
be possible to use the Trusted Platform Module (TPM) of
the BSB to protect the key. This method, however, will not
suﬃce to protect the veriﬁcation data.
One method worth trying would be to put the biometric
software along with the database on an encrypted vol-
ume. The key necessary to access that volume would be
stored on external storage during the setup phase, and af-
terwards it could be put on the host system, preferably en-
crypted using the host’s TPM. The BSBI protocol would
then require two extensions. One new error code, called,
e.g. BSBI_NOT_READY would be used to inform the host in
reply to any call that the BSB’s veriﬁcation modules are not
yet running. Then, a separate method of the BSBI protocol
(e.g. init) would be used to send the necessary key to
the BSB, which would then be able to start the veriﬁcation
services. This way the sensitive data could not be accessed
without connection to the right host.
Another possible extension would be to enrich the
get.logs method with the possibility to specify the re-
quested type of logs, or even to implement two-way com-
munication, where the logs are simply pushed to the host
machine. The latter variant is easiest to do using syslog
instead of extending BSBI.
7. Conclusions
The architecture and protocol described in this paper have
been implemented and tested as part of the project “Se-
cure workstation for special applications”, but the solu-
tion is more general, not limited to this one application.
We have shown that the approach borrowed from credit
card terminals – making the veriﬁcation station a sepa-
rate, autonomous module and developing the main system
as agnostic of the inner workings of that module – is in-
deed workable for this application. The approach may be
used whenever advanced identity veriﬁcation is necessary
in a system in which such solutions are not readily avail-
able or may not be possible to implement due to, e.g., lack
of suﬃcient computing power.
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Abstract—We discuss the problem of a secure login to a virtu-
alized workstation. For increased security, the workstation’s
hard drive is encrypted. During the startup, a decryption
password to the drive must be entered by a user. We pro-
pose a solution that involves mutual authentication between
the workstation and the user and ensures the password may
be entered securely.
Keywords—drive encryption, evil maid, Linux, secure login,
TPM, virtualization, Xen.
1. Introduction
Our work is a part of a project aiming at a development
of a virtualization-based secure workstation, designed for
running classified software or processing sensitive data.
An important component of the overall security is hard
drive encryption (portable media encryption is considered
as well). Also, a workstation may be regarded as secure
only if it runs original, unmodified software. Assuring this
is easier in a physically protected environment; in case of
portable computers, however, it poses a challenging prob-
lem. In the paper, we propose a solution that allows to
combine hard drive encryption with a trustful boot process,
preventing risk of software tampering.
The paper is organized as follows: First, we briefly describe
the project. Then, we overview drive encryption software.
The subsequent part of the paper defines the problem of
secure logon, and discusses the boot process in details.
We assess the security level offered by our solution, then
propose further work and end the paper with conclusions.
2. Secure Station for Special
Applications
The work described in the paper has been performed as
a part of Secure Workstation for Special Applications1
project, implemented by a consortium of four companies
(the Military University of Technology, the Research and
Academic Computer Network (NASK), Filbico, and the
Military Communication Institute). The project’s goal is
1The project “Secure Workstation for Special Applications” has been
founded by the Polish Ministry of Science and Higher Education under
grant no. 0140/R/T00/2010/11.
to develop a virtualization-based workstation, designed for
special applications. It is assumed that each virtual ma-
chine (except for the “control” domain 0) processes data
from a different domain – by ”data domain” we understand
either a classification level (unclassified, restricted, etc.) or
a purpose (e.g., a financial system, a human resources sys-
tem, an IT software project), and because of that the data
and related processing activities should be separated. This
separation, together with increased security, provided by
a hypervisor, is the most important reason for the selection
of a virtualized environment.
By “special applications” of a workstation we mean its typ-
ical use in a classified system, e.g., in a chancellery for
storing sensitive documents or as a machine for running
classified software. While the focus of the project is put on
desktop workstations, we also consider mobile computers
(laptops). At this stage of the project, we do not con-
sider networking (and related security risks). Generally,
we silently assume the workstation is a standalone system.
After a review of open-source hypervisors that could be
employed by the project, the consortium members selected
Xen [1] (the version is 4.1). KVM [2] was another strong
candidate. The final decision was made mainly on the basis
of market presence and the significance of research projects
related to each of the two hypervisors, and we believe in
these two areas Xen evidently prevails.
3. Drive Encryption for Linux
The Linux distribution used in project is RedHat Enter-
prise 6.1. The default encryption system for this distribu-
tion is dm-crypt [3]. Our evaluation of dm-crypt confirmed
that it fulfills all of our requirements, listed below:
– widely used and well-documented solution,
– open-source (or, with a friendly license),
– capable of full system encryption,
– easy to use in scripts,
– using standard format for encrypted volume
(LUKS [4]),
– using a state-of-the-art encryption algorithm (AES).
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Other solutions, namely, TrueCrypt [5] or eCryptfs [6],
were also an option, although we rejected them as an un-
necessary complication.
The dm-crypt (device mapper crypto target) pack-
age provides transparent encryption and decryption
of block devices. It creates a logical device (e.g.,
/dev/mapper/sda2crypt) for each file or partition (e.g.,
/dev/sda2) we would like to encrypt. Reading from such
a logical device involves a decryption operation performed
in a background, while writing data through the device re-
sults in data encryption.
4. The Actual Problem: Secure Logon
In order to decrypt the drive, we need to pass a password
(or, a key) to drive encryption software. Of course, as
the password cannot be stored within the workstation (at
least, in a plain form; but if it is encrypted, then we need
a password-to-password), it must be entered by a user dur-
ing workstation startup. This leads to an important ques-
tion whether the workstation’s environment can be trusted –
that no malware is waiting to intercept the password (and
store it somewhere for further retrieval, as in the evil maid
case [7], [8]).
As one can see, for our secure workstation, we only selected
an existing encryption package and had no plans to develop
dedicated software, nor modify the selected one. However,
the actual problem we face here is how a user could securely
provide the password, or, how we could assure that the
workstation has not been modified in any way. That is to
say, we need to assure a secure logon. Or, we require the
workstation to authenticate itself to a user before a user
authenticates in the workstation [8].
The above mentioned evil maid attack is less likely in
a secure (physically protected) external environment, where
a workstation is intended to be installed and used. However,
as we have mentioned previously, our project also consid-
ers a “mobile workstation” in the form of a laptop, and is
trying to deliver a flexible solution for both cases.
5. Requirements
Drive encryption, correlated with secure logon, should
fulfill a number of requirements. Some of them are more
obvious, and some sound less apparent. The paramount
requirements are as follows:
– efficient and effective data encryption, resistant to
crypto attacks;
– workstation configuration (virtual machines and
users) protected from disclosure;
– workstation environment (both software and data)
shielded from tampering.
Additional, less apparent requirements are listed below:
– authentication of the workstation to a user: the work-
station should convince the user that its environment
is original and untampered;
– authentication of a user in the workstation, prefer-
ably, involving additional hardware and/or biometric
elements;
– support for multi-access: we assume a number of
user accounts, even in the case of a laptop;
– effective means to limit access to virtual machines
for users that have no accounts there;
– easy and effective means to withdraw a user’s access
to the workstation.
The scope of encryption includes the whole hard drive
without the content of /boot directory of the host system
(domain 0). This directory contains the boot image, the
initial file system (initramfs [9]) and user account data,
packed and encrypted as a single blob file (refer to the next
Section for details).
6. The Boot Process Step-By-Step
During the boot process, a number of software pieces are
executed in a sequence (or, a chain). The boot may be con-
sidered secure if all the pieces are original (not modified
by an attacker). To ensure this, every executing element
measures its successor in the chain before passing the con-
trol to it, and writes the measurement to a Trusted Plat-
form Module (TPM [10]) register. The first element in the
chain, the Core Root of Trust for Measurement (CRTM) is
a hardware-protected boot block code (e.g., the BIOS boot
block code). The CRTM is considered trustworthy. The
last element in our case is initramfs, measured by a boot-
loader. If all the measured values are correct and match the
values of the data the TPM has sealed – i.e., when worksta-
tion boot software has been prepared and configured [11],
the TPM enters the desired state and is able to perform
cryptographic operations.
Before we proceed, we describe the content of a USB stick,
which acts as a hardware key, and is prepared for each
user during account creation. A BESTSTICK (BEST is an
acronym from the Polish title of the project) contains four
files, residing in an archive encrypted by the TPM:
– login: the file contains the user name;
– password: this is the random part of a pass-
word (to password, see below), generated using the
/dev/random device; note that /dev/random, un-
like the /dev/urandom pseudo-random device, may
be considered as a true random generator, as it uses
environmental “noise” (e.g., mouse movements or
keyboard strokes);
– phrase: this is the authentication phrase;
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– image: this file contains the authentication image,
also selected by a user during the account creation.
In practice, the image should be copied from another
portable storage medium during the stick preparation.
The boot process, after initramfs has been loaded and the
control passed to its main executable – /init, proceeds in
the following steps:
1. A RAM drive is created and mounted. All further
file operations are performed using the RAM drive.
2. A user’s BESTSTICK is mounted and the archive it
contains is copied to the RAM drive.
3. The archive is decrypted using the TPM, and the in-
dividual files are extracted. The stick is no more
needed, so it is unmounted.
Note that the TPM will switch to the desired state
only if the workstation boot software chain (from
CRTM to initramfs) has not been modified (also
assuming that the software is bug-free). Otherwise,
the attempt to unseal (decrypt) the secret will fail and
the subsequent steps will not execute.
4. Now, the splash screen (plymouth [12]) is config-
ured to display the phrase and picture, and the user
is asked for his part of drive encryption password
(userpass) – see Fig. 1.
5. The file containing encrypted password to the drive,
username.dom0.aes, is extracted from the en-
crypted archive /boot/best/users; again, the
TPM chip performs the decryption.
6. The file username.dom0.aes is decrypted using the
AES algorithm, with a password composed of two
parts – the random part and the user-provided part:
(userpass || password).
7. The password to the hard drive is passed to
cryptsetup; the RAM drive’s content is overwritten
with zero bytes, and then gets unmounted.
8. The user can log in to the workstation.
Fig. 1. The login screen (the phrase is visible after switching to
console view).
In case of a “virgin” run (with no configured users), the
above procedure is skipped and a special script is executed
that allows to create the first (administrator) account.
The main components of the process are summarized in
Fig. 2.
Fig. 2. Key components of the login process.
The process is executed by quite a large number of shell
scripts. Most of them are embedded into initramfs (we
use dracut [13] to automate initramfs generation).
Some additional scripts perform administrative tasks (e.g.,
create a new user account and configure a USB stick, etc.),
some are used for testing. Additional software installed on
the workstation included TrustedGRUB [14] (the GRUB
bootloader with TPM support), and two packages provid-
ing access to TPM: TrouSerS [15] and tpm-tools.
Note that the final effect we have reached is not completely
satisfying. It is quite difficult to manage the display of
the picture (a large picture happens to partially cover the
password area, which looks bad). Also, we would prefer
the phrase to be shown directly on the login screen. Un-
fortunately, while it was possible to modify and recompile
plymouth code, we failed, for an unknown reason, to make
it work after re-installation. Perhaps it requires some spe-
cific approach at some step.
7. Drive Encryption Revisited
We performed a broad set of tests to assess the efficiency
of drive encryption of our Seagate Constellation 1000 GB
HDD drive. A few jumbo files and a lot of small files were
copied between encrypted and unencrypted partitions. The
tests required some care as the system “cheats” by caching
data read from the drive (for example, we rebooted the sys-
tem often enough to prevent this behavior). Also, during
the experiments we observed that the physical location on
the drive where data are read from (or, written to) signifi-
cantly influences performance, probably due to differences
in drive access times. Moreover, these times often domi-
nate the encryption. As a result, we can issue a conclu-
sion that, while the overhead of encryption is difficult to
measure precisely, it is quite small and does not lead to
a negative user experience. We also performed tests for
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a double encryption case, assuming that virtual domains
may use additional encryption – see Section 8. This time,
the performance degradation was observable but the overall
system performance was still regarded as acceptable.
8. Security Assessment
In this Section, we assess the security of our architecture –
the strong and weaker points and possible improvements.
Note that we generally assume the worse usage scenario of
a laptop stored and used in a (potentially) insecure envi-
ronment.
CRTM and TPM. First, we rely on the Core Root of
Trust Management and the Trusted Platform Module – that
the whole boot process could be trusted. While some
first successful attacks on TPM have been reported [16],
they are enormously time- and resource-consuming (one
could argue that with sufficient time and unlimited technical
means every security mechanism could be compromised),
and it seems we can assume that boot elements are secure
enough.
At the same time, we assume the whole boot software
chain is correct and immune to attacks (such as buffer over-
flows). Otherwise, an attacker could modify its behavior
to prepare subsequent hostile actions while supplying orig-
inal hash values to the TPM.
Phrase. This is an additional and quite a weak mechanism
as the phrase could be intercepted relatively easily (e.g.,
by a hidden camera in a hotel room). Having said that,
we can add that the mechanism could be augmented using
a set of phrases, with a user selecting a phrase to display
using some identifier (a phrase number or a few first letters).
Assuming the user is careful enough and changes phrases
during subsequent logins, the mechanism would be greatly
strengthened.
Picture. At present, we assume it is much more difficult
to “steal” the picture (e.g., with a precise photo). Unfortu-
nately, even an imperfectly copied picture could suffice if
the user is not careful enough (he might not notice some
subtle differences at the pixel level). As above, a set of
pictures could be employed to make an attack harder to
prepare.
Password typing. A simple attack could be performed us-
ing a hidden camera in order to observe the password dur-
ing typing. For increased security, if a user is able to type
without looking at the keyboard, some form of a keyboard
cover would prevent the snooping.
Hardware key (USB stick). The key must not be kept to-
gether with the workstation. The secrets (phrases and pic-
tures) used for the workstation to authenticate itself to a user
are decrypted automatically at startup, so they are revealed
to any user, legitimate or not, who is powering the work-
station with the hardware key present. There could be an
additional (preliminary) password applied to decrypt the
stick’s content (together with TPM, of course – that is, both
the preliminary password and TPM would be necessary to
decrypt the stick). This would yield increased security at
the cost of increased complexity of the login process.
Also, a plain USB stick may easily be copied (without
leaving any trace), which also constitutes a security hole.
Thus, we consider a smart card as a replacement for the
stick.
Biometrics. Most modern laptops are already equipped
with some sort of biometry device (e.g., fingerprint scan-
ner), which would help in user identification.
Access withdrawal. This is relatively easy, as it is
sufficient to remove a user’s account by deleting the
username.dom0.aes file (containing the encrypted pass-
word to domain 0). Even if a user refuses to return the
USB stick (or, makes a copy of it), there is no way the
user can log in to the workstation, and the stick becomes
unusable.
Workstation configuration: users. User accounts (their
presence and number) are protected; their data are en-
crypted.
Workstation configuration: virtual domains. Domains
could be stored either as files within the encrypted file sys-
tem, or using separate (encrypted) partitions (see the next
paragraph). In the latter case, it seems that the number of
domains could be observed but, having a sufficiently capa-
cious hard drive, one could configure a large (sufficient in
all scenarios plus some spare ones) number of partitions;
some of them would be used by actual virtual domains,
while other would contain random data. In this way, the
presence and the number of domains would be concealed.
However, this is not the full story yet: An attacker could
observe changes in raw data and infer which partitions are
used and which lie dormant, so some additional effort (al-
tering the bytes from time to time) would be necessary.
Virtual domains encryption. Although our proposal con-
cerns logging to domain 0, we assume that user domains
Fig. 3. Virtual domains as files within domain 0 (left) or separate
drive partitions (right).
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will be additionally encrypted, each using a separate pass-
word. The reason is that in case a malicious user (or,
a malware that infected one of his virtual machines) is able
to successfully break into domain 0, he will not be able
to immediately attack inactive domains (lying dormant on
the drive), as he does not know the decryption password.
This is not a perfect protection mechanism (the attacker
could install password interception malware), but it makes
the attack on the other domains harder and more time-con-
suming.
We consider two possible approaches. The virtual domains
may reside in files within the domain 0, or be stored in
separate disk partitions (see Fig. 3).
Summary. As we have shown above, the logon process of-
fers a reasonable level of security. This level could be in-
creased by some additional mechanisms (multiple phrases,
additional password, etc.). However, this also results in in-
creased complexity. As [17] demonstrates, a user (human
being) is the weak point; if a user finds the login process as
unacceptably complex, he will also discover a way to sim-
plify it in a way that definitely will also relax the security.
Thus a sensible compromise must be found.
For an in-depth discussion of security of a system with
encrypted drive in the context of the evil maid attack, pos-
sible prevention methods and ways to bypass them, refer
to [7], [8], [18].
9. Related Work
The work [8], [19] concerns the same problem. We learned
a lot from that work (especially the discussion of possible
attacks), although technically our solution is different and
offers some additional features required in our project –
with multi-access (support for multiple user accounts) being
probably the most important issue. In our case, the stick
is not bootable; it serves for authentication purposes only.
Other differences between [8], [19] and our solution are
listed in Table 1. Note that by showing the comparison, we
are not going to argue that our work is better in some way.
We believe that it should be treated as a sort of continuation,
and the table is presented for a reader’s convenience.
Table 1
Comparison of features between [8] and our work




System authentication data phrase
phrase
and picture
Ability to use SRK password yes no
Part of the disk password
no yes
on the stick
Part of the password
no yes
stored locally
Location of the boot files
stick hard drive
(kernel, initramfs, . . . )
10. Future Work
The main issues we would like to take into account in future
involve the application of smart cards (as a replacement
for the current USB sticks) and experiments with on-board
biometric devices (in laptops). Also, we would like to
make yet another attempt to modify plymouth and make
it display both phrase and picture in a neat way.
11. Conclusions
In the paper, we have presented our proposal to implement
a secure login to a Linux-based workstation with an en-
crypted hard drive. We believe it offers a reasonably high
level of security; this level may additionally be increased
at the cost of making things more complex (and, probably,
less tolerated by a user). As a final remark we would like to
note that our work remains valid also for a non-virtualized
Linux system.
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Abstract—Data security and energy aware communication
are key aspects in design of modern ad hoc networks. In
this paper we investigate issues associated with the devel-
opment of secure IEEE 802.15.4 based wireless sensor net-
works (WSNs) – a special type of ad hoc networks. We fo-
cus on energy aware security architectures and protocols for
use in WSNs. To give the motivation behind energy efficient
secure networks, first, the security requirements of wireless
sensor networks are presented and the relationships between
network security and network lifetime limited by often in-
sufficient resources of network nodes are explained. Second,
a short literature survey of energy aware security solutions for
use in WSNs is presented.
Keywords—energy aware security architectures, routing proto-
cols, security protocols, wireless sensor networks, WSN.
1. Introduction
A Wireless Sensor Network (WSN) is a distributed system
composed of hundreds or thousands small-size, inexpen-
sive, embedded devices deployed densely over a signiﬁcant,
often hostile area [1]. Each device can run applications
and participate in transferring data to recipients within its
range. The lack of ﬁxed network infrastructure components
in WSN allows creating unique topologies and enables the
dynamic adjustment of individual nodes to the current net-
work structure in order to execute assigned tasks.
WSNs have been identiﬁed as one of the most important
technologies of this century. Due to their sensing capa-
bilities, CPU power and radio transceiver plenty of sensor
devices can be deployed in a sensing area, hence they can
be used in applications, in which traditional networks are
inadequate. However, nodes comprised by the network are
often small battery-fed devices, which means their power
source is limited [1]–[3]. The network’s throughput is also
limited. Moreover, the quality of wireless transmission de-
pends on numerous external factors, like weather condi-
tions or landform features. Part of those factors change with
time.
Conventional networks with ﬁxed infrastructure require
protection against injection or modiﬁcation of dissemi-
nated data packets and eavesdropping. Most applications of
WSNs require the same protection. All well known attacks
including traﬃc analysis, node replication, Denial of Ser-
vice (DOS) and physical manipulating should be concerned.
The security threads and attacks for all layers of the OSI
model are discussed in [4]. Moreover, due to the sponta-
neous nature and shared wireless medium, sensor networks
are more vulnerable to security attacks than wired ones.
Using a computer with a wireless network adapter, anyone
can gain an access to an unprotected network. Hence, the
outsider can monitor the network, participate in the com-
munication and easily launch attacks.
The main contribution of this paper is to point out the prob-
lems concerned with energy aware security architectures
and protocols for IEEE 802.15.4 based WSN. It is a topic
that has been a subject of intensive research in the recent
years. The question is how to ensure the expected secu-
rity level taking into account scarce resources of devices
(network nodes). In Sections 2 and 3, we brieﬂy sum-
marize security requirements and security issues in WSN.
Next, we present energy aware security architectures and
protocols (Section 4), and energy eﬃcient secure routing
protocols (Section 5). The paper concludes in Section 6.
2. Security Requirements of WSN
Security for wireless sensor networks should focus on the
protection of the data itself and the network connections be-
tween the nodes [5]–[8]. In general, security requirements
often vary with application. In WSNs we can distinguish the
following important requirements of security capabilities:
authentication and authorization, availability, conﬁdential-
ity, integrity and freshness. Thus, we need some mechanism
for access authorization and protecting a mobile code. In
many applications we need to protect fair access to com-
munication channels and at the same time we often need to
hide the information about physical location of our sensor
node. Moreover, we need to secure routing and we have
to defend our network against denial of service, malicious
ﬂows, node capturing and node injection, etc.
Authorization. Data authorization speciﬁes access rights
to resources and is strongly related to access control. Ac-
cess control should prevent unauthorized users from par-
ticipating in network resources. Hence, only authorized
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users can join a given network. Access control relies on
access policies that are formalized, like access control rules
in a computer system. Most modern operating systems in-
clude access control.
Authentication. Message authentication implies a sender
veriﬁcation using cryptographic key. Authentication mech-
anisms are used to detect maliciously or spoofed packets.
They are especially important in WSNs which use a shared
wireless medium. In case of unicast transmission, an au-
thentication can be guaranteed by symmetric key cryptog-
raphy, using Message Authentication Code (MAC) in IEEE
802.15.4. Broadcast authentication requires more complex
solutions (see [9]).
Availability. In secure network data should be safe and
accessible at all times. Availability guarantees the surviv-
ability of network services against Denial-of-Service (DoS)
attacks that can be launched at any layer of a wireless
sensor network, and may disable a given device (network
node) permanently. Moreover, DoS attack involved exces-
sive computation and communication may exhaust battery
charge of a sensor device.
Confidentiality. In WSN keeping sensitive data secret is
the most important issue in case of critical applications
in which highly sensitive data (secret keys, sensitive mea-
surements, etc.) are collected and transmitted. Data con-
ﬁdentiality ensures that sensitive data is never disclosed to
unauthorized users or entities. Hence, measurement data
should not be available to neighboring nodes, and secure
channels between nodes should be created. To protect a net-
work against cyberattacks and malicious nodes, the routing
information and sensor identities should remain conﬁden-
tial too. The standard approach to prevent end-to-end data
conﬁdentiality is to encrypt the data with a secret key.
Integrity and freshness. Data integrity is the quality of
correctness, completeness, wholeness, soundness and com-
pliance with the intention of the creators of the data. It
is achieved by preventing unauthorized insertion, modiﬁ-
cation or destruction of data. In WSNs a malicious node
may change messages to perturb the network functional-
ity. Moreover, due to unreliable communication channels
it is easy to inject infected packets or alerted data. In
WSNs data integrity guarantees that a message being trans-
ferred is never corrupted, but providing data integrity is
not enough for wireless communication. The compromised
sensor nodes can listen to transmitted messages and replay
attacks. Data freshness protects data against replay attacks
by ensuring that the transmitted data is recent one.
3. Security in WSN
Cryptography is the common approach for defense against
cyber attacks. However, maintaining an appropriate level of
security and protection of sensitive information transmitted
by a wireless sensor network requires solving many issues
that are not present in traditional computer networks, and
it is a challenging task [8], [10]. It should be underlined
that the primary objective of wireless sensor networks is to
make measurements for as long as possible. To do this it is
essential to minimize energy use by reducing the amount of
inter-node transmission and using energy aware algorithms
and protocols [1], [2]. Due to limited resources of nodes
forming WSN a balance between security capability and
lifetime performance has to be obtained. Strong security
protocols based on an asymmetric cryptography are diﬃ-
cult to implement. In general, asymmetric signatures are
long and need high communication overhead, thus they are
impractical for WSN applications. On the other side, week
security protocols based on a symmetric cryptography may
be easily broken. Moreover, due to a hostile deployment
area, it is diﬃcult to perform continuous surveillance of
a network. To design a completely secure sensor network,
security must be integrated into each node of WSN. Any
network node implemented without any security could eas-
ily become a point of attack. Therefore, it is crucial to de-
sign WSN with security in mind from the very beginning. It
is obvious that security usually adds some communication
overhead and requires intensive computation and memory
that is concerned with increased power consumption. The
integration of security techniques in processing and com-
munications simply allows for more eﬃcient use of limited
resources.
In general, three types of key management security schemes
can be considered:
• Trusted server scheme. The symmetric key cryptog-
raphy for data encryption is used. The process of
establishing the key agreement between two commu-
nicating nodes is executed in the base station. Each
node has to store only a single secret key. Thus,
this solution is memory eﬃcient, but energy expen-
sive due to transmission overhead – each node has to
communicate with the base station many times.
• Self enforcing scheme. The public key cryptography
for communication between sensor nodes is used –
DSA or RSA cryptography schemes. The disadvan-
tage is that both DSA and RSA require complex com-
putations (computing and energy expensive solution).
• Key-predistribution scheme. The symmetric key
cryptography with limited number of keys stored in
each sensor node is proposed. This solution is en-
ergy eﬃcient – it does not introduce any additional
transmission overhead for key exchange.
In many secure architectures and routing protocols, the
clustering schemes for grouping all network nodes into dis-
joint and mostly non-overlapping clusters are applied to
WSN [11], [12]. Generally, a cluster formation in WSN is
based on the following characteristics: every node has to
be connected to some clusters, nodes in a cluster must be
able to communicate with others, often maximum diameter
of all clusters in the network is the same. Most algorithms
form clusters in distributed way through local broadcasts
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with a maximum one or several (not many) hops. The
cluster size is adapted to network capabilities and objec-
tives. The cluster head is usually pre-assigned or picked
randomly from the deployed set of nodes. Finally, we ob-
tain a hierarchical communication structure: base station,
cluster heads (various levels) and the lowest level formed
by members of clusters (remaining nodes).
4. Energy Eﬃcient Security
Architectures and Protocols
In this section, we survey some of more and less com-
mon security solutions for IEEE 802.15.4 based networks.
We start from the short description of the IEEE 802.15.4
security implementation. Next, we present various energy
eﬃcient architectures that can be employed in physical, data
link, network, and middleware layers of the OSI communi-
cation model.
4.1. Security in IEEE 802.15.4
IEEE 802.15.4 is one of the ﬁrst standards deﬁning the ra-
dio and the medium access control layer for a low-power
wireless sensor networks. ZigBee [13] is an industry al-
liance working on the 802.15.4 and upper protocol layers.
Medium Access Control (MAC) protocols guarantee eﬃ-
cient access to the communication media while carefully
managing the energy allotted to the node. This goal is
typically achieved by switching the radio to a low-power
mode based on the current transmission schedule. The
comprehensive summary of MAC protocols for WSNs, and
results of simulations that show their capabilities and eﬃ-
ciency in terms of the energy consumption are presented
in [14]. The IEEE 802.15.4 network standard speciﬁcation
provides several security suits [15], [16]. The security suite
speciﬁcation deﬁnes the algorithms and operations that will
be performed depending upon the security services to be
provided. Each node can operate in secured or unsecured
mode. A globally shared secret cryptographic key to mes-
sage encryption and authentication is implemented. Eight
security suites are deﬁned in the IEEE 802.15.4 standard,
and presented in Table 1. Each suit means a kind of cryp-
tographic algorithm, the mode of block cipher, message
Table 1
IEEE 802.15.4 security suite
Security suite Description
#0 Null No security (default)
#1 AES-CTR Encryption only, CTR mode
#2 AES-CBC-MAC-32 32 bit MAC
#3 AES-CBC-MAC-64 64 bit MAC
#4 AES-CBC-MAC-128 128 bit MAC
#5 AES-CCM-32 Encryption and 32 bit MAC
#6 AES-CCM-64 Encryption and 64 bit MAC
#7 AES-CCM-128 Encryption and 128 bit MAC
authentication code, and the size of message authentica-
tion code. We can classify these suits based on provided
properties, i.e., no security, encryption only (AES-CTR),
authentication only (AES-CBC-MAC), and both encryp-
tion and authentication (AES-CCM). Thus, conﬁdentiality
is achieved through Advanced Encryption Algorithm (AES)
in Counter mode (CTR), integrity through AES in Cipher
Block Chaining Message Authentication Code (CBC-MAC)
mode. The combination is oﬀered with AES in the CTR
with CBC-MAC mode (CCM).
4.2. SPINS: Security Protocol for Sensor Network
The SPINS protocol developed by A. Perrig et al., is de-
scribed in [17]. It consists of two secure building blocks,
i.e., Secure Network Encryption Protocol (SNEP) and mi-
cro version of Timed Eﬃcient Stream Loss-tolerant Authen-
tication (µTESLA). SNEP is used to provide conﬁdentiality
using encryption, and authentication, integrity and fresh-
ness of data using Message Authentication Code (MAC). In
this approach all cryptographic primitives are constructed
from a single block cipher for code reuse. Thus, the com-
munication overhead is limited.
µTESLA is used for broadcasted data authentication.
µTESLA requires that the base station and network nodes
are loosely time-synchronized, and each node knows an
upper bound on the maximum synchronization error. It
generates authenticated broadcast message using symmetric
key, and introduces asymmetric cryptography by delaying
the disclosure of the symmetric keys. Therefore, µTESLA
provides stronger security for networks with constrained
resources. The implementation of SPINS requires about
220 bytes of RAM and 1580 to 2674 bytes of program
space. An increase of energy consumption for security is
about 20%.
4.3. TinySec: Link Layer Security Architecture for
Wireless Sensor Networks
The problem with SPINS is that it has not been yet fully
speciﬁed and implemented. TinySec is a link layer security
architecture designed by Ch. Karlof et al., and presented
in [18]. Similarly to the SNEP protocol, it provides au-
thentication, message integrity and conﬁdentiality services.
Replay protection has been intentionally omitted – the au-
thors argued that this service belongs to the higher layers of
the OSI model. The message authentication and integrity
is provided using MAC, message conﬁdentiality using en-
cryption. Two security modes are possible – authentica-
tion only and authenticated encryption. In case of the ﬁrst
mode, the entire packet is authenticated using MAC, but
the payload data is not encrypted. In case of the second
mode, the payload data is encrypted and then authenticated
with a MAC. Any keying mechanisms can be employed
(single network-wide keys, per-link keys, group keys, etc.).
TinySec is designed as a lightweight, energy eﬃcient se-
curity package. It can be easily integrated into any WSN
application. The implementation of TinySec requires about
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728 bytes of RAM and 7146 bytes of program space. An
increase of energy consumption depends on the mode and
network technology, and is about 3% to 9,1% higher in
compare to a normal TinyOS packet transmission.
4.4. LLSP: The Link-Layer Protocol
A Link-Layer Protocol (LLSP) was designed by L. E. Ligh-
foot et. al., and is described in [19]. The aim was to de-
velop a protocol with less energy requirements than Tiny-
Sec. LLSP guarantees various security requirements but
focuses on three security services: message authentication,
message conﬁdentiality, and replay protection. AES-CBC
mode of operation as the data encryption scheme is im-
plemented in LLSP. The unique design of AES-CBC pro-
vides semantic security, i.e., encrypting the same plaintext
twice will produce two diﬀerent ciphertexts. A synchronous
4-byte counter between the sender and receiver pair is pro-
posed to replay protection. Feedback Shift Register (FSR)
is used to update this counter. The LLSP packet format is
based on the TinySEC one (see Fig. 1). The diﬀerence is
in a size – two byte counter values (Ctr) are removed from
the security overhead in LLSP. As it was mentioned above
both sender and receiver maintain a synchronous counter.
Hence, the counter value has not to be transmitted, so the
counter bytes are eliminated from each message packet.
Thus, the LLSP security protocol reduces the energy usage
without decreasing the security level.
Fig. 1. Packet format in TinySec (a) and in LLSP (b).
The LLSP secure protocol was evaluated via simula-
tion and compared with the TinySec protocol. Both
applications were executed in the TOSSIM simulator
(docs.tinyos.net/index.php/TOSSIM). The results are pre-
sented in [19]. From these results we can see that similar to
most security protocols, the computational and energy costs
increase for each packet transmission. It is concerned with
extra computations and the larger packet size due to the se-
curity overhead. However, the authors of the LLSP protocol
claim that using their solution the energy consumption is
about 15% smaller than for TinySec, and latency reduction
is about 3%.
4.5. LEAP/LEAP+: Localized Encryption and
Authentication Protocol
LEAP [20] and LEAP+ [21] are lightweight, energy ef-
ﬁcient security protocols for large scale sensor networks.
They provide conﬁdentiality and authentication services.
LEAP was designed as a key management protocol to pro-
vide secure communication in WSNs. Due to various secu-
rity requirements for diﬀerent types of messages four types
of keys for each network node are established: an individ-
ual key shared with a base station, a pairwise key shared
with another node, a cluster key shared with a group of
neighboring nodes, and a group key globally shared with
all nodes in a network. The implementation of LEAP re-
quires about 17.8 KB of program space. The RAM usage
and energy costs depend on the number of nodes in a net-
work.
4.6. Security Protocol Based on NOVSF
The cluster-based security protocol proposed in [22] uses
a symmetric cryptography algorithm to guarantee security.
To reduce the drawbacks of a symmetric cryptography and
provide complete security, it employs the code-hopping
technique using the Non-Orthogonal Variable Spreading
Factor (NOVSF) codes. The NOVSF is an implementation
of the non-blocking transmission of CDMA. In NOVSF
codes, each OVSF code has 64 time slots, and any number
of these time slots can be assigned to a channel. In NOVSF,
the data blocks are assigned to time slots using diﬀerent
permutations in every session, Fig. 2. Hence, the blocks
Fig. 2. Code-hopping technique.
of data are ﬁnally mixed, and such reordering method
supports security. The algorithm operates as follows. First,
it is assumed that all network nodes are grouped into
disjoint and mostly non-overlapping clusters. As a result,
a hierarchical communication structure consisting of
a base station, cluster heads and the lowest level formed by
members of clusters is obtained. Secondly, the following
steps of the algorithm are performed:
Step 1: A base station periodically broadcasts the session
key.
Step 2: Sensor nodes generate their cryptographic keys.
Step 3: The encrypted data are transmitted from sen-
sor nodes to cluster heads using NOVSF code-
hopping technique.
Step 4: Each cluster head appends its identiﬁer number
(ID) to this data and then forwards such data to
the higher level cluster heads.
Step 5: The message is decrypted and authenticated by
the base station.
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To sum up, the transmission between nodes and cluster
heads is encrypted. Based on periodically changed user
speciﬁc session keys and NOVSF codes assigned to each
node the authentication of messages is performed. More-
over, changing encryption keys from time to time guaran-
tees data freshness in a network. The CBC-MAC protocol
is used to provide data integrity. The total memory space
for applied cryptographic primitives are about 2 KB. Hence,
applying the NOVSF code-hopping technique increases se-
curity capabilities without requiring additional energy.
4.7. LSec: Lightweight Security Protocol
The Lightweight Security Protocol for distributed wireless
sensor network (LSec) is described in [23]. It is the energy
and memory eﬃcient technique that assumes grouping net-
work nodes into clusters. LSec provides following security
capabilities: authentication, authorization, conﬁdentiality
of data, and protection against intrusions and anomalies.
Both symmetric and asymmetric security schemes are used.
Fig. 3. LSec system architecture.
The LSec architecture consists of the following modules
(see Fig. 3):
• KMM key management module: stores public and
shared secret key of each node with a base station
(BS) to the database (KM),
• TGM token generator module: generates the tokens
for the requesters,
• AzM authorization module: checks whether a partic-
ular node is allowed to communicate with other node
or a group of nodes,
• IDS intrusion detection; cluster heads send alert mes-
sages to IDS (lightweight mobile agents are installed
in cluster heads).
LSec combines the features of trusted server scheme and
self enforcing security scheme described in Section 3. It is
assumed that the base station is the trusted party that never
is compromised. Only the base station has an access to the
public keys of all nodes in the network, and communicat-
ing nodes know each other’s public keys only during the
time of connection establishment. For every session, new
random secret key is used. Each node has to store six keys
(public key of node, private key of node, public key of BS,
group key, public key of other node, session key). 72 bytes
of memory are needed to store these keys. An asymmetric
scheme is used for sharing ephemeral secret key between
communicating nodes. Data is encrypted by using sym-
metric schemes. LSec is employed in the middleware layer
of the communication model. It is scalable and memory
eﬃcient solution.
Authors claim that LSec is highly scalable and memory ef-
ﬁcient – it introduces only 74.125 bytes of transmission and
reception cost per connection. It provides stronger security
and has the advantage of simple secure defense mechanism
against compromised nodes.
4.8. HASF: The Hybrid Adaptive Security Framework
Hybrid Adaptive Security Framework (HASF) is a secu-
rity architecture developed by T. Shon et al., and described
in [24]. This framework provides security capabilities with
less extra energy usage than TinySec. In HASF, security
functions are embedded to the network layer and the link
layer (MAC) of the OSI model separately. The main idea
is to provide hybrid adaptive security suite to each packet
transmitted in a given WSN. The Hybrid Adaptive Security
Suite (HASS) proposed in HASF is almost the same as the
security suite proposed for IEEE 802.15.4, and presented
in Table 1. The diﬀerence to commonly used architectures
in HASS are as follows:
– null security is not provided,
– security suite is dynamically applied to MAC frame
due to a type of a given WSN.
Three network characteristics are distinguished: public,
commercial, private. Various security capabilities are pro-
vided to these groups of network. None conﬁdentiality is
guaranteed for public networks, more security capabilities
are provided in commercial networks, and the strongest se-
curity is provided in private networks. All data are divided
into control and application. Control data means a message
or signal to manage the network operation. Application
data means a kind of data concerned with WSN services.
The attributes of these data are: periodic, urgent-periodic,
on-demand, event-driven. The decisions on security levels
in case of diﬀerent network characteristics are presented in
Table 2. In [24] authors discuss the results of application
of their framework to a testbed network formed by the de-
vices using HASS approach. They compared three kinds
of nodes: IEEE 802.15.4 based system with no security,
HASS based system with the AES encryption algorithm,
Table 2
Hybrid Adaptive Security Suite decision table
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Table 3
Summary of selected security architectures for WSN
Architecture Security services Properties
SPINS Authentication, Consists of SNEP and µTesla (secure building blocks).
authenticated broadcast, Symmetric cryptography support. Encryption (CTR mode), Block Cipher (RC5).
conﬁdentiality, Not fully implemented and speciﬁed.
integrity, freshness. Requires 2674 bytes of program space (max).
Transmission overhead to 20%.
TinySec Authentication, Link layer architecture easily integrated into WSN.
conﬁdentiality, Symmetric cryptography support. Encryption (CBC mode), Block Cipher (Skipjack).
integrity, Requires 728 bytes of RAM, 7146 bytes of program space (max).
replay protection. Transmission overhead to 9.1%.
LLSP Authentication, Link layer architecture. Symmetric cryptography support. Semantic security.
conﬁdentiality, 2 bytes less packet format (energy cost reduction without security decreasing).
replay protection. Transmission overhead to 7.7%.
LEAP/LEAP+ Authentication, Symmetric cryptography support. Encryption (RC5), Block Cipher (RC5).
conﬁdentiality, Four types of keys available for each sensor node:
intrusions protection, individual, pairwise, cluster, group.
anomalies protection. Defence against: HELLO Flood, Sybil, Wormhole attacks.
Requires about 17.8 KB of program space.
RAM usage and transmission overhead depend on the number of nodes.
NOVSF-based Authentication, Works partially in the physical layer.
conﬁdentiality. Symmetric cryptography support. The security increased via code-hoping technique
integrity, freshness. using NOVSF data blocks (assigned to time slots using permutations
in every session). User speciﬁc session keys (periodically changed).
Clustering-based algorithm.
Requires about 2 KB of memory space.
LSec Authentication, Both symmetric and asymmetric cryptography support.
authorization, Public Key cryptography support.
conﬁdentiality, Base station – the trusted party – a single point of failure.
replay protection, Implemented in the middleware. Clustering-based algorithm.
intrusions protection, Simple Secure key exchange scheme: 6 keys that takes only 72 bytes of memory.
anomalies protection. Transmission overhead to 8.33%.
HASF Authentication, Provides Hybrid Adaptive Security Suite.
conﬁdentiality, Security functions embedded to network and link layer separately.
integrity. Security mechanism dynamically applied to MAC frame.
Three network types with diﬀerent security (public, commercial, private).
Transmission overhead to 4.8%.
and the Crossbow device based on TinySec architecture and
the RC5 encryption algorithm. In the case of described ex-
periments, the extra energy usage due to providing security
functionalities was about 4.8% in case of HASS based sys-
tem and 5.2% in case of TinySec based Crossbow system.
The results conﬁrmed that HASF outperforms the other
common security techniques.
4.9. Summary of Security Architectures
The Table 3 presents the summary of our survey – security
architectures, provided services and their main properties.
5. Secure Energy Eﬃcient Routing
Protocols
Security architectures using a globally shared key are in-
eﬀective in presence of insider attacks or compromised
nodes. Therefore, more sophisticated defense mechanisms
are necessary to provide reasonable protection against
wormholes and insider attacks, and detect malicious nodes.
Secure routing protocols can be used to improve WSN se-
curity. In this section, selected routing protocols for se-
cure networks are presented. Similarly to the solutions de-
scribed in previous sections we focus on energy aware so-
lutions.
5.1. SERP: Secure Energy Efficient Routing Protocol
The secure energy eﬃcient routing protocol for wireless
sensor networks (SERP) is described in [25]. The main
idea of this protocol is to provide a robust transmission
of authenticated and conﬁdential data from the source sen-
sor with limited energy budget to the base station. It is
dedicated to WSNs with densely deployed relatively static
sensor devices.
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Three main objectives were considered during design of
SERP:
– energy aware organization of the network to ensure
energy eﬃcient transmission, and ﬁnally maximum
lifetime of the network,
– secure transmission; nodes should have the capability
to detect falsely injected reports,
– robust and resilient transmission; any node failure
would not greatly hamper the performance of a net-
work.
The protocol operates in two main phases: creating a back-
bone network and secure data transmission. A sink rooted
tree structure is created as the backbone of the network tak-
ing into consideration balanced energy consumption. Next,
a minimum number of forwarding nodes in the network
is selected. The backbone network is restructured peri-
odically. It is used for authenticated and encrypted data
delivery from the source sensors to the base station. A one
way hash chain and pre-stored shared secret keys are used
for ensuring secure data transmission. An optional key re-
freshment mechanism that could be applied depending on
the application is introduced for data freshness.
The energy saving mechanism is based on disable the ra-
dio transceivers of selected nodes. The nodes in a net-
work can operate in two main states: non-forwarding – the
transceiver is switched oﬀ, forwarding – both transceiver
and sensing devices are switched on. It is assumed that
after the backbone structure is constructed, all nodes are ei-
ther in forwarding or non-forwarding states. Nodes with the
non-forwarding state turn oﬀ their radio transceivers while
keeping the sensing device active. On the other hand, for-
warding nodes keep both radio and sensing device active.
All nodes sense the environment, and after detecting any
event the non-forwarding nodes turn on their radios and
transmit data towards the base station via nodes in a se-
lected path.
The SERP protocol was evaluated via simulation. Ns-2
simulator (www.isi.edu/nsnam/ns/) was used for perfor-
mance analysis. SERP was compared with two popular en-
ergy aware routing protocols – LEACH [26] and EAD [27].
The simulation results are presented and discussed in [25].
The authors claim that SERP is a very competitive solution
compared to the LEACH and EAD protocols w.r.t. energy
requirements. Moreover, SERP provides security function-
alities.
5.2. EENC: Energy Efficiency Routing with Node
Compromised Resistance
A novel energy eﬃciency routing protocol with node com-
promised resistance (EENC) was developed by K. Lin et
al., and described in [28]. EENC bypasses the compro-
mised nodes and improves the accuracy of packets under
the condition of balancing the energy consumption. The
reinforcement learning based on the ant colony optimiza-
tion is used to complete routing tables. The trust values
are assigned to all nodes of a network. The trust value
is computed and based on the multiple behavior attributes
such as: packet drop rate, forwarding delay rate, etc. These
values are used to detect the malicious nodes. Each node in
a WSN computes the trust values of its one hop neighbors.
The idea of EENC was to provide security with minimal
energy consumption. To achieve this, each node storages
trust values of all its neighbors and manages its energy
resources.
The EENC protocol operates as follows. To transmit data
the secure and energy eﬃcient route is computed. The
calculation process consists of many rounds, each divided
into three phases.
• Routing detecting phase. A certain number of for-
ward ants are generated to search for route leading
to the sink. Each ant records the information about
the minimum amount of energy and minimum trust
value for nodes along the path, and the hop number
for each node.
• Pheromone updating phase. The sink node generates
a backward ant, which carries all data collected by
the forward ant. These data are used to update the
pheromone value concerned with each node in a path.
• Routing maintaining phase. The route for a given
source and sink nodes is established based on trust
values and updated pheromone values of the nodes
carried during the pheromone updating phase.
The EENC protocol was evaluated via simulation. The con-
sidered performance metric included lifetime of a network
and a packet correctly received ratio. The EENC perfor-
mance was compared with two other routing algorithms,
i.e., DRP and MTRP described in [29]. Simulation results
presented in [28] conﬁrm that the routing established via
EENC can bypass most compromised nodes in the trans-
mission path and EENC has high performance in energy
eﬃciency. It was observed in the experiments that the cal-
culated lifetime and the successful packet delivery ratio
were much higher for EENC than those obtained for DRP
and MTRP.
5.3. REWARD Routing Protocol
The REceive WAtch ReDirect (REWARD) routing proto-
col for WSNs is described in [30]. This algorithm can
be used to detect black hole attacks [4]. In such attacks,
a malicious node acts as a black hole to attract all the traﬃc
in a WSN through a compromised node. A compromised
node is usually placed in the center and looks attractive
to surrounding nodes and collect most traﬃc destined for
a base station.
In REWARD, the distributed database including suspicious
nodes and areas is created. Two types of broadcast mes-
sages, i.e., MISS (Material for Intersection of Suspicious
Sets) and SAMBA (Suspicious Area, Mark a Black-hole
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Attack) are used to organize this database. MISS is used to
detect identiﬁers of malicious nodes, and SAMBA is used
to identify physical locations of suspicious nodes.
The operation of the REWARD protocol is as follows. In
case of demand-driven routing protocols, the query for path
establishing is sent to the destination node. The destination
node sends its location and waits for a packet. The desti-
nation node broadcasts a MISS message if a packet does
not arrive within a speciﬁed period of time. It copies the
list of all the involved nodes from the query to this MISS
message – these nodes are under suspicion. The ratings for
the nodes are introduced, and path metrics are calculated
by averaging the node ratings in the path. The path with the
highest value of a metric is selected – in this way the sus-
picious nodes are avoided. If a node attempts a black hole
attack and drops a package, it is detected by the next node
in the path. After a predeﬁned time period, the node trans-
mits the packet changing the path and broadcasts a SAMBA
message that provides the location of the black-hole
attack.
REWARD is the energy aware protocol and can be ap-
plied to networks formed by devices that can tune their
transmit power. Diﬀerent levels of security with less and
more overhead according to a network capabilities are pro-
vided. The performance of the protocol is discussed in [30].
The authors compared the energy overhead of two variants
of REWARD.
6. Summary and Conclusions
Many challenges arise from application of wireless ad hoc
networking. We focused on one of them that is very im-
portant in wireless sensor networks – secure data protection
and data transmission in WSN with limited resources. The
paper provides a short overview of some representative en-
ergy eﬃcient security techniques. We brieﬂy discussed the
security requirements of WSNs and showed the relation-
ships between techniques for forming secure networks, and
energy aware WSNs. Next, we described and compared
based on literature survey selected energy aware architec-
tures and protocols in WSNs that can be implemented in
the physical, data link, network, and middleware layers of
the OSI model.
In summary, we can say that due to scarce resources, unique
properties of wireless sensor networks, and often hostile
environments it is a challenging task to protect sensitive
information transmitted by nodes forming a WSN. Due
to limited resources of nodes that form WSN many so-
lutions providing strong security are impractical in this
type of network. Therefore, we can ﬁnd many security
considerations that should be investigated in the nearest
future.
Acknowledgment
This work was partially supported by National Science Cen-
tre grant NN514 672940.
References
[1] M. C. Vuran, I. F. Akylidiz, Wireless Sensor Networks. Wiley,
2010.
[2] E. Niewiadomska-Szynkiewicz, P. Kwaśniewski, and I. Windyga,
“Comparative study of wireless sensor networks energy-eﬃcient
topologies and power save protocols”, J. Telecom. Inform. Technol.,
no. 3, pp. 68–75, 2009.
[3] A. Tiwari, P. Ballal, and F. L. Lewis, Energy-efficient wireless sen-
sor network design and implementation for condition-based mainte-
nance, ACM Trans. Sensor Netww (TOSN), vol. 3, no. 1, pp. 1–23,
2007.
[4] K. Sharma, M. K. Ghose, D. Kumar, “A comparative study of various
security approaches used in wireless sensor networks”, Int. J. Adv.
Sci. Technol., vol. 17, pp. 31–44, 2010.
[5] M. Ahmad, M. Habib, and J. Muhammad, “Analysis of security
protocols for Wireless Sensor Networks”, in Proc. 3rd Int. Conf.
Comp. Res. Develop. ICCRD 2011, Shanghai, China, 2011, vol. 2,
pp. 383–387.
[6] C. Castelluccia, A. C.-F. Chan, E. Mykletun, and G. Tsudik, “Ef-
ﬁcient and provably secure aggregation of encrypted data in wire-
less sensor networks”, J. ACM Trans. Sensor Netw. (TOSN), vol. 5,
no. 3, 2009.
[7] S. R. Gandham, M. Dawande, R. Prakash, and S. Venkatesan, S.,
Energy efficient schemes for wireless sensor networks with multiple
mobile base stations, in Proc. IEEE Global Telecom. Conf. GLOBE-
COM’03, San Francisco, USA, 2003, vol. 1, pp. 377–381.
[8] J. P. Walters, Z. Liang, W. Shi, and V. Chaudhary, “Wireless sensor
network security: a survay, in Security in Distributed Grid, Mo-
bile and Pervasive Computing, Y. Xiao, Ed. Auerbach Publication,
2007.
[9] P. Baronti, P. Pillai, V. W. C. Chook, S. Chessa, A. Gotta, and Y.
Fun Hu, “Wireless sensor networks: a survey on the state of the art
and the 802.15.4 and ZigBee standards”, Comp. Commun., vol. 30,
no. 7, pp. 1655–1695, 2007.
[10] H. Kumar and A. Kar, “Wireless sensor network security analysis”,
Int. J. Next-Generation Netw. (IJNGN), vol. 1, no. 1, 2009.
[11] S. K. Singh, M. P. Singh, and D. K. Singh, “A survay of energy-
eﬃcient hierarchical cluster-based routing in wireless sensor net-
works”, Int. J. Adv. Netw. Appl., vol. 2, no, 2, pp. 570–580, 2010.
[12] S. K. Singh, M. P. Singh, and D. K. Singh, “Energy-eﬃcient ho-
mogenous clustering algorithm for wireless sensor networks”, Int. J.
Wirel. Mob. Netw., vol. 2, no. 3, pp. 49–61, 2010.
[13] ZigBee Alliance, “ZigBee Speciﬁcation v1.0”, New York, USA,
2005.
[14] M. I. Shukur, L. S. Chyan, and V. V. Yap, “Wireless sensor net-
works: delay guarantee and energy eﬃcient MAC protocols”, World
Academy of Sci., Engin. Technol., vol. 50, pp. 1061–1065, 2009.
[15] N. Sastry, D. Wagner, “Security consideration for IEEE 802.15.4
networks”, in Proc. 5th Int. Conf. Web Inform. Sys. Engin. WISE
2004, Brisbane, Australia, 2004, pp. 32–4.
[16] R. Struik and G. Rason, “Security and security architectural rec-
ommendations for the IEEE 802.15.4 Low-Rate WPAN”, Certicom
Corp., 2002.
[17] A. Perrig, R. Szewczyk, J. D. Tygar, V. Wen, and D. Culler, “SPINS:
security protocols for sensor networks”, Wirel. Netw., vol. 8, no. 5,
pp. 521–534, 2002.
[18] C. Karlof, N. Sastry, and D. Wagner, “TinySec: a link layer security
architecture for wireless sensor networks”, in Proc. 2nd Int. Conf.
Embedded Networked Sensor Sys., Baltimore, MD, USA, 2004,
pp. 162–175.
[19] L. E. Lighfoot, J. Ren, and T. Li, “An energy eﬃcient link-layer
security protocol for wireless sensor networks”, in Proc. IEEE
Int. Con. Elec.-Infor. Technol. EIT 2007, Chicago, IL, USA, 2007,
pp. 233–238.
[20] S. Zhu, S. Setia, and S. Jajodia, “LEAP: Eﬃcient Security Mecha-
nisms for Large-Scale Distributed Sensor Networks”, in Proc. 10th
ACM Conf. Comp. Commun. Secur. CCS 2003, Washington, DC,
USA, 2003, pp. 62–72.
71
Krzysztof Daniluk and Ewa Niewiadomska-Szynkiewicz
[21] S. Zhu, S. Setia, and S. Jajodia, “LEAP+: Eﬃcient security mecha-
nisms for large-scale distributed sensor networks”, ACM Trans. Sen-
sor Netw. TOSN, vol. 2, no. 4, pp. 500–528, 2006.
[22] H. Cam, S. Ozdemir, D. Muthuavinashiappan, and P. Nair, “Energy
eﬃcient security protocol for wireless sensor networks”, in Proc.
IEEE 58th Veh. Technol. Conf. VTC 2003, Orlando, Florida, USA,
2003, vol. 5, pp. 2981–2984.
[23] R. A. Shaikh, S. Lee, M. A. U. Khan, and Y. J. Song, “LSec:
lightweight security protocol for distributed wireless sensor net-
work”, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 4217, 2006.
[24] T. Shon, B. Koo, H. Choi, and Y. Park, “Security architecture for
IEEE 802.15.4-based wireless sensor network”, in Proc. 4th Int.
Symp. Wirel. Pervasive Comput. ISWPC 2009, Melbourne, Australia,
2009, pp. 1–5.
[25] A. K. Pathan and C. S. Hong, “SERP: secure energy-eﬃcient routing
protocol for densely deployed wireless sensor network”, Annales des
Telecomm., pp. 529–541, 2008.
[26] W. R. Heinzelman, A. Chandrakasan, H. Balakrishnan, “Energy-
eﬃcient communication protocol for wireless microsensor net-
works”, in Proc. 33rd Annual Hawaii Int. Conf. Sys. Sciences
HICSS’00, Maui, Hawaii, USA, 2000, pp. 3005–3014.
[27] B. Azzedine, C. Xiuzhen, and J. Linus, “Energy-aware datacentric
routing in microsensor networks”, in Proc. 6th Int. Symp. Model.
Analys. Simul. Wirel. Mobile Sys. MSWiM 2003, San Diego, CA,
USA, 2003, pp. 42–49.
[28] K. Lin, Ch. F. Lai, X. Liu, and X. Guan, “Energy eﬃciency rout-
ing with node compromised resistance in wireless sensor networks”,
Mob. Netw. Appl., vol. 17, pp. 75–89, 2012.
[29] Z. Yu and Y. Guan, “A dynamic en-route scheme for ﬁltering false
data injection in wireless sensor networks”, in Proc. 25th IEEE Int.
Conf. Com. Commun. INFOCOM 2006, Barcelona, Spain, 2006,
pp. 1–12.
[30] Z. Karakehayov, “Using REWARD to detect team black-hole attacks
in wireless sensor networks”, in Proc. Worksh. Real-World Wirel.
Sensor Netw. REALWSN’05, Stockholm, Sweden, 2005, pp. 1–5.
Krzysztof Daniluk received
his M.Sc. in Computer Sci-
ence from the Trinity Col-
lege Dublin, The University of
Dublin, in 2010 and Polish-
Japanese Institute of Informa-
tion Technology, Warsaw, in
2010. Currently he is a Ph.D.
student in the Institute of Con-
trol and Computation Engineer-
ing at the Warsaw University of
Technology. His research area focuses on wireless sensor
networks, energy-eﬃciency together with security issues,
computer networks.
E-mail: K.Daniluk@stud.elka.pw.edu.pl
Institute of Control and Computation Engineering
Warsaw University of Technology
Nowowiejska st 15/19
00-665 Warsaw, Poland
Ewa Niewiadomska-Szynkiewicz – for biography, see this
issue, p. 38.
72
Paper Improvement of the Performance
of Database Access Operations
in Cellular Networks
Mustafa Vahabzadeh Dolama and Akbar Ghaffarpour Rahbar1
Computer Networks Research Lab, Department of Electrical Engineering, Sahand University of Technology, Tabriz, Iran
Abstract—Reducing the traffic volume of location updating is
a critical issue for tracking mobile users in a cellular network.
Besides, when user x wants to communicate with user y, the
location of user y must be extracted from databases. There-
fore, one or more databases must be accessed for updating,
recording, deleting, and searching. Thus, the most important
criterion of a location tracking algorithm is to provide a small
database access time. In this paper, we propose a new loca-
tion tracking scheme, called Virtual Overlap Region with For-
warding Pointer (VF), and compare the number of database
accesses required for updating, deleting, and searching opera-
tions for the proposed scheme and other approaches proposed
for cellular networks. Our VF scheme like Overlap Region
scheme reduces the updating information when a user fre-
quently moves in boundaries of LAs. Unlike Overlap Region,
the VF can reduce number of database accesses for searching
users’ information.
Keywords—Cellular networks, deleting cost, GSM, searching
cost, tracking mobile users, UMTS, updating cost.
1. Introduction
In mobile communications (e.g., GSM, UMTS, 3G, . . . ),
the location of users is not fixed and may change in time.
Therefore, to make a communication between user x and
user y, the system must first find the location of user y.
Therefore, the location of users must be tracked from time
to time [1]. In mobile communications, a small geograph-
ical area (called cell) is served by a Base Station (BS).
Several cells are grouped into a Location Area (LA) and
several LAs make a mobile communications network. The
Mobile Terminals (MTs) in a cell directly communicate
with the BS of the cell. Several BSs are connected to
a Base Station Controller (BSC) and several BSCs are con-
nected to a Mobile Switching Center (MSC) [2], [3].
In a typical telephone system, we have one database that
stores all users’ information permanently. Therefore, the
location of each user can be found easily by searching the
database. However, in cellular networks the location of
users is not fixed. When a user enters a new location, the
information of this user must be updated. With the in-
crease of the number of mobile users in cellular networks,
the database access time becomes a bottleneck because
more database access operations (for updating, deleting,
1 Corresponding Author.
searching, and recording new information) are necessitated
in time [4]. Thus, choosing a good algorithm for tracking
users in cellular networks depends on the number of needed
database accesses.
The objective of this paper is to propose a new method for
tracking mobile users and compare the number of database
accesses for the proposed method with other available meth-
ods. The proposed scheme uses the concept of virtual over-
lap region and forwarding pointer, but with a different pol-
icy for updating the information when a user frequently
moves in boundaries of LAs in one overlap region. In-
deed, the number of database accesses for searching users’
locations and updating their information can be reduced
efficiently. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first
time mobile tracking schemes have been compared based
on their database access operations (updating, searching,
deleting, etc.), except our recent work in [5].
Our contributions in this paper are proposal of the Vir-
tual Overlap Region with Forwarding Pointer (VF) loca-
tion tracking scheme, and comparison of location tracking
schemes based on database access operations.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Loca-
tion management schemes are explained in Section 2. The
proposed VF method is described in Section 3. In Sec-
tion 4, we compare location management methods. Finally,
a brief conclusion is presented in Section 5.
2. The Schemes Proposed for Tracking
Mobile Users
Many strategies have been proposed to reduce the over-
head of database accesses in mobile communications net-
works [6]–[13]. In this section, we will briefly describe
and compare some location management approaches such
as two-tier architecture [7], Forwarding Pointer [6], Virtual
Layer [8], Virtual Layer with Forwarding Pointer [9], and
Overlap Region [10].
2.1. Two-Tier Architecture
Two-tier architecture [7] uses a two-level database system:
HLR that maintains all permanent information of each user
and a pointer to another database; and Visitor Location
Register (VLR) that stores temporary location information
73
Mustafa Vahabzadeh Dolama and Akbar Ghaffarpour Rahbar
of users. The VLR database is maintained at each LA.
Therefore,
• When mobile user x enters the mobile communica-
tions network (i.e., user turns the mobile on), a new
record is created in both HLR and VLR in order to
store the information of user x. Thus, one HLR and
one VLR accesses are required.
• When mobile user x moves from LAi to LA j, the in-
formation of the user x in VLRi is deleted and a new
record is created in VLR j. In addition, a message is
sent to HLR by VLR j in order to update the user x
pointer from VLRi to VLR j. Therefore, one HLR
access and two VLR accesses are necessary.
• When mobile user x decides to call mobile user y:
– if both user x and user y are in the same LAi, the
location of user y is found from VLRi. Thus,
one VLR access is needed;
– if both user x and user y are not in the same LAi,
first, the location of user y is searched in VLRi.
Since the information cannot be found in VLRi,
the relevant VLR j can be found from HLR.
Finally, the location of user y is found from
VLR j. Therefore, one HLR access and two
VLR accesses are required to find the location
of user y.
Since the access of the HLR database takes more time
than the access of a VLR database due to the large
size of the HLR database, the two-tier architecture
can reduce the search cost when both user x and
user y are in the same LA. However, when user x
and user y are not in the same LA, the HLR, the
new VLR, and old VLR all must be accessed for
appropriate functions. This, in turn, increases the
number of database accesses.
• Finally, when user x turns his/her mobile off or exits
from the mobile communications network, the infor-
mation of user x in HLR and VLR should be deleted.
To delete the information of user x, one HLR and one
VLR accesses are necessitated.
2.2. Forwarding Pointer
When a user frequently moves in a boundary between LAs,
more HLR accesses are required for updating in the two-
tier architecture and HLR may likely become a bottleneck.
The Forwarding Pointers scheme [6] has been proposed
to efficiently reduce the volume of HLR accesses required
for updating. In this approach, the main idea is to set up
a forwarding pointer from an old database to a new database
when a user leaves the old LA toward a new LA. Therefore,
• When mobile user x enters a mobile communications
network (i.e., user x turns his/her mobile on), a new
record is created in both HLR and VLR in order to
store the information of user x. Thus, one HLR and
one VLR accesses are needed.
• When mobile user x moves from LAi to LA j, a new
record is created in VLR j and a pointer is set to
VLR j from VLRi. Therefore, two VLR accesses are
only needed.
• When mobile user x calls mobile user y:
– If both user x and user y are in the same LAi, the
location of user y is either directly found from
VLRi, or is following the pointers chain. Thus,
l VLR accesses are necessitated where l is the
length of the pointers chain. We have l = 1 if
the information is retrieved directly from VLRi.
– If both user x and user y are not in the same
LAi, the location of user y is first searched in
VLRi and the relevant pointers chain. Since the
information cannot be found, the relevant VLR j
can be found from HLR. Finally, the location
of user y is either directly found from VLR j or
by following the pointers chain. Therefore, one
HLR access and 2× l VLR accesses are needed
to find the location of user y.
• Finally, when user x turns his/her mobile off or exits
from the mobile communications network, the infor-
mation of user x in HLR and VLR must be deleted.
One HLR and l VLR accesses are needed to delete
the information of user x.
Since no update is required in the HLR database, the update
cost goes down. When the length of the pointer chain is
less than five, according to analytical estimation in [6], this
scheme can reduce the total cost by 20% to 60%. Although,
this scheme can reduce the total cost, the frequent updates
problem still exists when a user moves back and forward
in the boundary of an LA.
2.3. Virtual Layer Scheme
The virtual layer scheme [8] has been proposed to construct
a new location database architecture (see Fig. 1). The bold
lines in Fig. 1 represent the original layer and the dotted
lines represent the virtual layer. For every virtual layer, one
VLR is needed (i.e., subVLR).
In this scheme, one SubMSC is necessitated for each virtual
layer. The SubMSCs are connected to the covered MSC.
For example in Fig. 1, consider MTx moves from position
A to B, B to C and then comes back to position A. Initially
in position A, HLR and VLR1 have created an entry for
MTx. When MTx moves to position B, the SubMSC4 cre-
ates a new entry for MTx and VLR1 must be updated. Then,
when MTx moves from position B to C and C to A, no up-
date is needed because the virtual layer has not changed.
The goal of this scheme is to reduce both location updating
rate and location updating cost, especially when the MTs
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Fig. 1. The demonstration of the virtual layer.
reside near the boundaries of LA and frequently cross
through the boundary to another LA.
• When mobile user x enters the mobile communica-
tions network (i.e., user x turns the mobile on), a new
record is created in both HLR and VLR in order to
store the information of user x . Thus, one HLR and
one VLR accesses are necessitated.
• When VLR is active: mobile user x moves from one
LAi to LA j:
– If the information of user x already exists
in subVLRk, VLRi must be deactivated and
subVLRk must be activated. Therefore, one
VLR and one subVLR accesses are necessary.
– If the information of user x does not exist in
subVLRk, a new record is created in subVLRk
and the information in previous subVLR must
be deleted. Besides, VLRi must be deactivated
and subVLRk must be activated. Therefore,
one VLR and two subVLR accesses should be
done.
• When subVLR is active: mobile user x moves from
virtual layer i to virtual layer j:
– If the information exists in VLRk, the informa-
tion in VLRk is updated. VLRk must be acti-
vated and subVLRi must be deactivated. There-
fore, one VLR and one subVLR accesses are
required.
– If the information does not exist in VLRk,
a new record is created in VLRk and the previ-
ous record must be deleted. Hence, a message
is sent to HLR by VLRk in order to update
the user x VLR pointer (from previous VLR
to VLRk). Besides, VLRk must be activated and
subVLRi must be deactivated. Thus, one HLR
access, one subVLR, and two VLR accesses are
required.
• When mobile user x calls mobile user y:
– If both user x and user y are in the same LAi, the
location of user y is found from VLRi. Thus,
one VLR access is needed.
– If both user x and user y are not in the same
LAi, the location of user y is first searched in
VLRi. Since the information cannot be found
from VLRi, the relevant VLR j can be found
from HLR. Finally, the location of user y is
found from VLR j. Therefore, one HLR access
and 2 VLR accesses are necessitated to find the
location of user y.
• Finally, when user x turns his/her mobile off, or exits
from the mobile communications network, the infor-
mation of user x in HLR and VLR should be deleted.
For this purpose, one HLR and one VLR accesses are
necessary.
2.4. Virtual Layer with Forwarding Pointers
Chang and Lin have proposed an improved scheme [9] that
uses forwarding pointers in virtual layer to reduce the up-
date cost. The possible state of a user in this scheme is:
• When mobile user x enters the mobile communica-
tions network (i.e., user x turns the mobile on), a new
record is created in both HLR and VLR in order to
store the information of user x. Thus, one HLR and
one VLR accesses are necessitated.
• When VLR is active: mobile user x moves from one
LAi to LA j:
– If the information of user x already exists
in subVLRk, VLRi must be deactivated and
subVLRk must be activated. Therefore, one
VLR and one subVLR accesses should be per-
formed.
– If the information of user x cannot be found in
subVLRk, a new record is created in subVLRk
and the information in previous subVLR must
be deleted. Besides, VLRi must be deactivated
and subVLRk must be activated. Therefore, one
VLR and two subVLR accesses are required.
• When subVLR is active: mobile user x moves from
virtual layer i to virtual layer j:
– If the information exists in VLRk, the informa-
tion in VLRk is updated. VLRk must be acti-
vated and subVLRi must be deactivated. There-
fore, one VLR and one subVLR accesses are
needed.
– If the information does not exist in VLRk, a new
record is created in VLRk and a message is sent
by VLRk to previous VLR to set a pointer to
VLRk. Furthermore, VLRk must be activated
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and subVLRi must be deactivated. Thus, one
subVLR and two VLR accesses are required.
• When mobile user x calls mobile user y:
– If both user x and user y are in the same LAi,
the location of user y is directly found from
VLRi or by following the pointers chain. Thus,
l VLR accesses are needed.
– If both user x and user y are not in the same
LAi, first the location of user y is searched in
VLRi and relevant pointers chain. Since the in-
formation cannot be found, the relevant VLR j
can be found from HLR. Finally, the location of
user y is directly found from VLR j or by fol-
lowing the pointers chain. Therefore, one HLR
access and 2× l VLR accesses are required to
find the location of user y.
• Finally, when user x turns his/her mobile off, or exits
from the mobile communications network, the infor-
mation of user x in HLR and VLR should be deleted.
To do this, one HLR and l VLR accesses are required.
2.5. Overlap Region
The Virtual Layer scheme [8] requires the reconstruction
of the mobile communications network architecture. The
architecture requires extra equipments. To overcome the
reconstruction of the mobile communications network, the
Virtual Overlap scheme [10] with time stamp has been
proposed. Figure 2 depicts the structure of the Virtual
Overlap [10]. Each Overlap Region (OR) has seven LAs.
The bold line in Fig. 2 represents the Overlapping Region
for LA5, and therefore, we have OR5 = {LA1, LA2, LA4,
LA5, LA6, LA9, LA10}. In Fig. 2, the OR for LA6 is
OR6 = {LA2, LA3, LA5, LA6, LA7, LA10, LA11}. Each
LA has an associated MSC and VLR.
Fig. 2. The structure of virtual overlap in mobile communications
network.
In the Virtual Overlap scheme [10], each VLR has two
fields: TS which indicates the time that a mobile user enters
the associated LA, and OR which indicates the Overlap
Region in which the mobile user has registered last time.
Therefore,
• When mobile user x enters the mobile communica-
tions network (i.e., user x turns his/her mobile on),
a new record is created in both HLR and VLR in
order to store the information of user x. Thus, one
HLR and one VLR accesses are necessary.
• When mobile user x moves from LAi to LA j:
– If LAi and LA j are in the same virtual overlap
region, a new record is created in VLR j and
the TS field of VLR j records the current time.
Therefore, one VLR access is necessitated.
– If LAi and LA j are not in the same virtual over-
lap region, a new record is created in VLR j and
the TS field of VLR j records the current time.
Thus, a message is sent to HLR in order to
update the user x data. Furthermore, the infor-
mation of user x in previous OR (with seven
VLRs) must be deleted. Therefore, one HLR
and eight VLR accesses are required.
• When mobile user x calls mobile user y:
– If both user x and user y are in the same LAi,
the location of user y is found from seven VLRs
in the relevant OR. Thus, seven VLR accesses
are needed.
– If both user x and user y are not in the same
LAi, first the location of user y is searched in
VLRi. Since the information cannot be found
from VLRi, a message is sent to HLR by VLRi
and then the relevant VLR j can be found in
HLR. Finally, the associated overlap region is
found from the OR field of VLR j, and then the
location of user x is searched in seven VLRs
in the relevant OR. Therefore, one HLR access
and eight VLR accesses are required to find the
location of user y.
• Finally, when user x turns his/her mobile off or leaves
the mobile communications network, the information
of user x in HLR and seven VLRs on the OR that
user has resided before should be deleted. To delete
the information of user x, one HLR and seven VLR
accesses are necessary.
3. The Virtual Overlap Region with
Forwarding Pointer Scheme
In this section, we shall propose a new approach for location
updating based on the concepts of the virtual overlapping
region and forwarding pointers. The goal of our VF is to
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reduce the number of database accesses for updating and
searching the information.
3.1. The Architecture of VF
Now, we detail the VF scheme. The VLR database that
maintains current user location information keeps two fields
as the LA ID and pointer PO. The LA ID field indicates the
identification number of a LA and the PO field is a pointer
to another VLR. Note that each LA has a unique identifier
number. If the LA ID is –1, the PO field is used to find
the LA ID in another VLR.
3.2. The Procedure of Location Registration
When a new mobile user (i.e., mobile user x) resides in
a location area LAi, the associated database VLRi will cre-
ate a new entry for mobile user x and will record the LA
identification number. Then, the system gives the LA ID
to the mobile user x and sends a message to the HLR to
record the current location of mobile user x. When mobile
user x moves, the procedure of the location registration is
as follows:
• When mobile user x detects a new LA j, the mobile
user x sends the LA ID that assigned previously in
LAi to the associated service switch through its BS.
• Determine if the new LA j and previous LAi belong
to the same overlap region.
• If yes, the VLRi will update its LA ID to LA j ID.
• If no, the VLR j will create a new entry for mo-
bile user x and sends a message to VLRi in order
to set a pointer to VLR j and change the LA ID field
to –1. Then, a new location number is sent by VLR j
to mobile user x.
3.3. The Procedure of Call Delivery
When mobile user x wants to call mobile user y in LAi, the
following steps are required for the call delivery as:
• The system first searches mobile user y in VLRi.
• Determine whether mobile user y can be found in
VLRi.
• If yes, the mobile user y’s LA is retrieved from the
LA ID field:
– According to the location information of VLR,
the service switch MSC j can be found.
– The service switch MSC j determines the cell
location of the mobile user y and assigns a Tem-
porary Location Directory Number (TLDN) to
mobile user y. Then, the TLDN is returned
from the MSC j to the MSCi. By this way,
MSCi knows where to send the information rel-
evant to mobile user x.
• If no, a message is sent to HLR:
– From the HLR, the associated VLR can be
found.
– According to the location information of VLR,
the service switch MSC j can be found.
– The service switch MSC j determines the cell
location of the mobile user y and assigns
a TLDN. Then, the TLDN is returned from the
current VLR to the HLR.
– Upon receiving the TLDN, if the current VLR is
different from the last VLR registered, the HLR
updates the relevant pointer to point to the cur-
rent VLR, and deletes the chain of forwarding
pointers.
– The HLR sends the TLDN to the original switch
(i.e., MSCi) and the connection between the
caller user and the called user is set up using
the TLDN.
According to the above details, the numbers of database
accesses in VF are as follows:
• When mobile user x enters a mobile communications
network (i.e., user x turns his/her mobile on), a new
record is created in both HLR and VLR in order to
store the information of user x. Thus, one HLR and
one VLR accesses are necessary.
• When mobile user x moves from LAi to LA j:
– If LAi and LA j are in the same virtual overlap
region, the LA ID field in VLRi is updated.
Therefore, one VLR access is necessitated.
– If LAi and LA j are not in the same virtual over-
lap region, a new record is created in VLR j and
a pointer is set up from VLRi to VLR j. there-
fore, two VLR database accesses are needed.
• When mobile user x calls mobile user y:
– If both user x and user y are in the same LA j,
the location of user y is found from LA ID in the
relevant VLR. Thus, one VLR access is needed.
– If both user x and user y are not in the same
LA j, first the location of user y is searched in
VLR j. Since the information cannot be found
from VLR j, a message is sent to HLR by VLR j
and then the relevant VLRi can be found in
HLR. Finally, the location of user x is obtained
from LA ID in the relevant VLR. Therefore, one
HLR access and 2 VLR accesses are required
to find the location of user y.
• Finally, when user x turns his/her mobile off or leaves
the mobile communications network, the information
of user x in HLR and l VLRs must be deleted. To
delete the information of user x, one HLR and l VLR
accesses are necessary.
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Table 1










Operation HLR VLR HLR VLR HLR VLR HLR VLR HLR VLR HLR VLR
User is turned on 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
User is turned off 1 1 1 l 1 1 1 l 1 7 1 l
Searching
minimum













1 2 0 2 1 3 0 3 1 8 0 2
access
Table 2










User is turned on 1 1 1 1 1 1
User is turned off 1 2 1 2 3 2
Searching a user 1 2 1 2 3 2
User moves from one LA
5 1 3 2 4 1
to another LA
4. Performance Evaluation
In this section, we shall compare VF scheme with the
schemes stated in Section 2. First, the number of database
accesses under different schemes will be illustrated for each
possible action of a user. Then, we shall discuss the number
of databases by an example.
4.1. Performance Evaluation of Database Accesses
In mobile communications, tracking mobile users could be
the most important issue. Therefore, a good scheme must
provide a small database when a user moves from one LA
to another LA. Table 1 shows the comparison of different
schemes in terms of the number of database accesses for
possible status of a user. In this table, VF, Virtual Layer and
Virtual Layer with Forwarding Pointers have small database
accesses, but Virtual Layer and Virtual Layer with Forward-
ing Pointers need reconstruction of the mobile communica-
tions network. Furthermore, when the length of the chain
in Forwarding Pointer and Virtual Layer with Forwarding
Pointer schemes goes up, the number of database accesses
increases. Since the access of HLR database takes more
time, Overlap Region and VF reduces an update cost when
an user goes back and forth in boundary of LAs (just need
one VLR access) which is comparable with the two-tier
architecture (that needs one HLR and two VLRs accesses).
While searching the user location, the VF, two-tier archi-
tecture and Virtual Layer always provide small number of
database accesses, and Overlap Region has more database
accesses than other schemes.
Based on the number of database accesses, Table 2 ranks
the proposed schemes when the Forwarding Pointer chain
length is l < 7. When a user mobile is turned on, a new
record is created in HLR and VLR databases. Therefore,
the number of database accesses for all schemes are the
same. When a user mobile is turned off, all information
must be deleted. In this case, the overlap region scheme
is the worst. For searching user information, again, the
overlap region scheme has more database accesses. For
a movement from one LA to another, which is more im-
portant in cellular networks, VF and Forwarding Pointer
schemes are the best candidates and the two-tier scheme is
the worst.
On the other hand, Table 3 depicts the ranking of schemes
when the Forwarding Pointer chain length is l ≥ 7. In this
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Table 3










User is turned on 1 1 1 1 1 1
User is turned off 1 3 1 3 2 3
Searching a user 1 3 1 3 2 3
User moves from one LA
5 1 3 2 4 1
to another LA
situation, the number of database accesses for deleting and
searching the information in VF, Forwarding Pointer and
Virtual Layer with Forwarding Pointer goes up.
4.2. Impact of Users’ Mobility
Figure 3 shows an example in which user x moves from
position A to position F through positions B, C, D, E,
and F.
• Initially, user x enters LA5 or is turned on in LA5.
The following procedures are performed:
– VLR5 creates a new entry for user x.
– VLR5 sends a registration message to HLR to
create an entry and to set a pointer to VLR5.
• When user x moves from A to B:
– Two-tier architecture. VLR9 creates a new
record for user x and sends a message to HLR
to update information. Then, the information in
VLR5 is deleted.
Fig. 3. An example of user movement in mobile communications
network.
– Forwarding Pointer. VLR9 creates a new
record for user x and sends a message to VLR5
to set a pointer to VLR9.
– Virtual Layer. When user x enters LA9, a new
record is created in subVLR2 and VLR5 is de-
activated. Then, user x enters the virtual layer 3
from virtual layer 2. Therefore, a new record is
created in VLR9 and the information in VLR5
is deleted. Hence, a message is sent to HLR by
VLR9 to update relevant information.
– Virtual Layer with Forwarding Pointer.
When user x enters LA9, a new record is cre-
ated in subVLR2 and VLR5 is deactivated.
Then, user x enters the virtual layer 3 from vir-
tual layer 2. Therefore, a new record is cre-
ated in VLR9 and the information in VLR5 is
deleted. Hence, a message is sent to VLR5 to
set a pointer to VLR9.
– Overlap Region with Time Stamp. When
a user enters LA9, because LA9 is in OR5 a new
record is created in VLR9 and the TS field of
VLR9 stores the time that user has entered LA9.
Moreover, the OR field of VLR9 stores the user
x overlap region number (OR5).
– VF. When a user enters LA9, the LA ID field
in VLR5 is updated from 5 to 9 since LA9 is
in OR5.
• Movement from position B to position C:
– Two-tier architecture. VLR10 creates a new
record for user x and sends a message to HLR
to update information. Then, the information in
VLR9 is deleted.
– Forwarding Pointer. VLR10 creates a new
record for user x and sends a message to VLR9
to set a pointer to VLR10.
– Virtual Layer and Virtual Layer with For-
warding Pointer. When user x enters LA10,
a new record is created in subVLR5 and VLR9
is deactivated. Furthermore, the information of
user x is deleted from subVLR2.
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– Overlap Region with Time Stamp. When
a user enters LA10, because LA10 is in OR5
a new record is created in VLR10 and the TS
field of VRL10 records the time that user has en-
tered LA10. In addition, the OR field of VLR10
stores the user x overlap region number (OR5).
– VF. When a user enters LA10, the LA ID field
in VLR5 is updated from 9 to 10 because LA10
is in OR5.
• When user x moves from position C to position D:
– Two-tier architecture. VLR5 creates a new
record for user x and sends a message to HLR
to update information. Then, the information in
VLR10 is deleted.
– Forwarding Pointer. VLR5 updates user x in-
formation, because the information already ex-
ists in VLR5. Then, a message is sent to VLR10
to set a pointer to VLR5.
– Virtual Layer. When user x crosses the bound-
ary of virtual layers in the direction of C to D,
VLR10 creates a new record and sends a mes-
sage to HLR to update information. Then, the
information in VLR9 is deleted. When a user
reenters LA5 again, a new record is created in
subVLR4 and VLR10 is deactivated. Further-
more, the information of user x is deleted from
subVLR5.
– Virtual Layer with Forwarding Pointer.
When user x crosses the boundary of virtual
layers in the direction of C to D, VLR10 creates
a new record and sends a message to VLR9 to
set a pointer to VLR10. Then, when a user en-
ters LA5, a new record is created in subVLR4
and VLR10 is deactivated. Furthermore, the in-
formation of user x is deleted from subVLR5.
– Overlap Region with Time Stamp. When
a user enters LA5, because LA5 is in OR5 and
the information already exists in VLR5, the TS
field of VLR5 is only updated.
– VF. When a user enters LA5, because LA5 is
in OR5 the LA ID field in VLR5 is updated
from 10 to 5.
• When user x moves from position D to position E:
– Two-tier architecture. VLR5 creates a new
record for user x and sends a message to HLR
to update information. Then, the information in
VLR10 is deleted.
– Forwarding Pointer. VLR6 creates a new
record for user x and sends a message to VLR5
to set a pointer to VLR6.
– Virtual Layer and Virtual Layer with For-
warding Pointer. Since the movement is in the
same virtual layer, no update is required.
– Overlap Region with Time Stamp. When
a user enters LA6, because LA6 is in OR5 a new
record is created in VLR6 and the TS field of
VLR6 stores the time that user has entered LA6.
Furthermore, the OR field of VLR6 stores the
user x overlap region number (OR5).
– VF. When a user enters LA6, because LA6 is
in OR5 the LA ID field in VLR5 is updated
from 5 to 6.
• Finally, user x moves from position E to position F:
– Two-tier architecture. VLR11 creates a new
record for user x and sends a message to HLR
to update information. Then, the information in
VLR6 is deleted.
– Forwarding Pointer. VLR11 creates a new
record for user x and sends a message to VLR6
to set a pointer to VLR11.
– Virtual Layer. When user x crosses the bound-
ary of virtual layers in the direction of E to F,
VLR6 creates a new record and sends a mes-
sage to HLR to update information. Then, the
information in VLR10 is deleted. Then, when
user enters LA11, a new record is created in
subVLR7 and the information of user x is
deleted from subVLR4.
– Virtual Layer with Forwarding Pointer.
When user x crosses the boundary of virtual
layers in the direction of E to F, VLR6 creates
a new record and sends a message to VLR10 to
set a pointer to VLR6.Then, when a user enters
LA11, a new record is created in subVLR7 and
VLR6 is deactivated and subVLR7 is activated.
– Overlap Region with Time Stamp. When
a user enters LA11, because LA11 is not in OR5,
a new record is created in VLR11 and the TS
field is set to the current time. In addition,
the OR field of VLR11 is set to OR11. Then,
a message is sent to HLR by VLR11 to update
the information. After all, the information of
user x is deleted from all VLRs in OR5.
– VF. When a user enters LA11, because LA11 is
not in OR5 a new record is created in VLR11
and a pointer is set up from VLR5 to VLR11.
In addition the LA ID field in VLR5 is updated
to –1 and user x takes new LA ID from VLR11
(i.e., 11).
Let’s suppose that user y in LA14 wants to call user x. First,
VLR14 is queried, but the relevant information cannot be
found. Hence, a message is sent to HLR by VLR14.
– Two-tier architecture. From the HLR database, the
associated VLR (i.e., VLR11) is found and the infor-
mation is retrieved from VLR11.
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Table 4










Path HLR VLR HLR VLR HLR VLR HLR VLR HLR VLR HLR VLR
A (Initial) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
A → B 1 2 0 2 1 3 0 3 0 1 0 1
B → C 1 2 0 2 0 3 0 3 0 1 0 1
C → D 1 2 0 2 1 5 0 5 0 1 0 1
D → E 1 2 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1
E → F 1 2 0 2 1 5 0 5 1 8 0 2
User y call user x 1 2 1 5 1 2 1 5 1 8 1 2
Total database access 7 13 2 16 5 19 2 22 3 21 2 9
Normalized cost CU,T /CU,V 7α + 13 2α + 16 5α + 19 2α + 22 3α + 21 2α + 9
– Forwarding Pointer. From the HLR database, the
associated VLR (i.e., VLR5) is found and the in-
formation is retrieved from VLR5 by following the
chains (i.e., VLR6, VLR11).
– Virtual Layer. From the HLR database, the associ-
ated VLR (i.e., VLR11) is found and the information
is retrieved from VLR11.
– Virtual Layer with Forwarding Pointer. From the
HLR database, the associated VLR (i.e., VLR5) is
found and the information is retrieved from VLR5 by
following the chains (i.e., VLR6, VLR11).
– Overlap Region with Time Stamp. From the HLR
database, the associated VLR (i.e., VLR11) is found.
Then, the information is searched in OR11 that
consists of VLR6, VLR7, VLR10, VLR11, VLR12,
VLR15, and VLR16.
– VF. From the HLR database, the associated VLR
(i.e., VLR5) is found and the information is retrieved
from VLR5 by following the chains (i.e., VLR11).
Table 4 shows the number of database accesses among
different schemes for this example. We assume that all
database accesses have the same cost.
Let the database access cost for HLR (CU,H ) be equal to
CU,H = α×CU,V , (1)
where CU,V is the VLR access cost and α ≥ 1. Then, the
total database access cost (CU,T ) according to VLR access
cost can be obtained from Eq. (2).
CU,T = CU,H +CU,V . (2)
From Eq. (2), the normalized access cost value of
CU,T /CU,V can be obtained (see the last row in Table 4).
As a result for the example in Fig. 3, the VF has the small-
est database accesses in total (11 accesses: 9 VLR and
2 HLR accesses). Therefore, this scheme is better than
others. Virtual Layer and Virtual Layer with Forwarding
Pointer need reconstruction of the mobile communications
network. Overlap Region scheme reduces database access
for updating, however, it needs more database accesses for
searching the location of users.
Fig. 4. Normalized cost for example of Fig. 3 for different values
of α .
According to Fig. 4, with the increase of α , the two-tier
architecture scheme has larger cost than the other schemes.
Note that the HLR database must be accessed for every ac-
tion in mobile communications network including search-
ing, updating, deleting, and creating new record. Since in
VF, Forwarding Pointer and Virtual Layer with Forwarding
Pointer, access to HLR is avoided by using the forwarding
pointer chain from one VLR to another VLR, the cost of
these schemes is lower than others.
5. Conclusion
In this paper, we have studied five location management
schemes and the number of database accesses for inserting,
updating, deleting, and searching operations. When a user
frequently makes a call to other users, Overlap Region
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needs more database accesses than others. In Forwarding
Pointer, when a user frequently moves within boundaries
of LAs, the number of database accesses becomes high.
Virtual Layer and Virtual Layer with Forwarding Pointer
need the reconstruction of mobile communications network.
With the increases of the mobile users in the mobile com-
munications network, the size of the HLR database goes
up and the two-tier architecture cannot be a good scheme
at all. This is because the HLR database must be accessed
for every action including inserting, updating, deleting, and
searching operations.
In addition, we have proposed a new scheme (VF) and com-
pared it with other schemes. According to our comparisons,
VF has a small number of database accesses when a user
frequently moves within the boundary of LAs. For search-
ing the user location, VF still has smaller database accesses
than others. Therefore, VF could be the best candidate ei-
ther when a user frequently moves within boundaries of
LAs or frequently makes a call to other users.
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Abstract—Video sharing services like YouTube have become
very popular which consequently results in a drastic shift of
the Internet traffic statistic. When transmitting video con-
tent over packet based networks, stringent quality of service
(QoS) constraints must be met in order to provide the com-
parable level of quality to a traditional broadcast television.
However, the packet transmission is influenced by delays and
losses of data packets which can have devastating influence on
the perceived quality of the video. Therefore, we conducted
an experimental evaluation of HTTP based video transmission
focusing on how they react to packet delay and loss. Through
this analysis we investigated how long video playback is stalled
and how often re-buffering events take place. Our analysis re-
vealed threshold levels for the packet delay, packet losses and
network throughput which should not be exceeded in order to
preserve smooth video transmission.
Keywords—multimedia communication, network measurements,
quality of service, video streaming.
1. Introduction
During the past years video sharing services like YouTube
in the US, Smiley in Japan, the now defunct Megavideo in
Hong-Kong, and Dailymotion in France have become very
popular. YouTube users alone request millions of videos
every day. Consequently, popularity of this kind results in
a drastic shift in Internet traffic statistic, which reports that
the share of P2P traffic is declining, primarily due to an in-
crease in traffic from Web-based video sharing services [1].
So far, there is no indication that this trend will decrease
and indeed is more likely to sustain. Thus, fulfilling the
rising demand for video traffic will be a challenging task
for both content providers as well as ISPs (Internet Service
Providers).
Video streaming in the above mentioned services is either
web-based or HTTP-based, therefore being transported us-
ing the TCP. The TCP is currently the most widely used
transport protocol in the Internet but conventionally re-
garded as inappropriate for media streaming. The primary
reason lies in the TCP reliability and retransmission mech-
anisms which can lead to undesirable transmission delays
and may violate timeliness requirements for streamed live
media. In this context, coping with packet delay and loss,
which can occur due to congestion or packet corruption, de-
mands new solutions as classical transmission procedures,
used in unreliable protocols, e.g. UDP, may be not suffi-
cient. It should also be taken into account that the HTTP
and TCP are general purpose protocols and were not specif-
ically designed or optimized for streaming media delivery.
Thus, attempts are being made to adapt media delivery to
the Internet instead of trying to adapt the Internet to mul-
timedia content streaming.
In our work we concentrate on YouTube which represents
a service that is unlike the traditional VoD systems in sev-
eral important aspects. From our perspective, the most
important difference between YouTube and other more
traditional VoD systems is that the latter usually of-
fer professionally-produced video content such as movies,
news, sport events, or TV series. The quality and popu-
larity of this content are well-controlled and predictable.
In contrast, YouTube videos can be uploaded by anyone
with access to the Internet. The quality of these video clips
vary significantly making network optimizations for spe-
cific content unreasonable.
Internet connections are characterized by a number of sta-
tistically determined characteristics including latency and
reliability. These traits are not guaranteed – in fact, they
can fluctuate considerably depending on the local ISP net-
work load, remote server load, background traffic, as well
as network infrastructure quality. Video delivered by more
traditional channels such as satellite, DVD, cable or digi-
tal TV broadcasting requires usually not to much buffering
space at a client side because data arrives at a media player
with mostly deterministic delay, rate and very limited or
infrequent data drops. Video delivered over the Internet
is much more problematic because there is no guarantee
that the data will flow to a user at a sufficient rate and
determined delay. Instead, it arrives with a rate and de-
lay that can change consistently during video file transmis-
sion. Therefore, buffering is of increasing importance for
video streams when they are transmitted over the Internet,
including Web-based streaming. The YouTube client soft-
ware manages buffering and playing of the received content
using several behaviors [2].
In our work we study the efficiency of three possible stream-
ing client playback strategies. Our goal is to investigate
how often the player buffer runs out under different net-
work interferences, especially packet loss and delay. As
a consequence, we want to investigate how these param-
eters influence the perceived quality of video received by
end users. An ISP may have partial influence on these char-
acteristics and therefore may be able to tune the quality of
video transfer and influence its users’ satisfaction.
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2. Video Distribution
2.1. Protocols
Contemporary media delivery systems can be classified into
two categories: systems with and systems without feedback
control mechanism.
One of the options for multimedia delivery systems with
feedback control is an usage of the Real-Time Streaming
Protocol (RTSP). The RTSP is a stateful protocol, which
means that the server keeps track of the client’s state from
the first time the client connects to the streaming server
until the time it disconnects. The client communicates its
state to the server by sending commands such as play,
pause or disconnect. The server begins sending the me-
dia as a steady stream of small RTP (Real-time Transport
Protocol) packets. The data is sent at the media bitrate
and the client buffer is filled with just few packets before
playback begins. If the client or server discover any inter-
ferences in their communication, like increasing latency or
packet drops, they can renegotiate transmission parameters,
e.g., the server can send the same video content but with
reduced encoding rate. The transmission is usually based
on unreliable transport protocols, most commonly the UDP.
However, when using the UDP, data packets often have dif-
ficulty getting around firewalls and network address transla-
tors. Thus, sometimes the TCP is preferred when firewalls
or proxies block UDP packets, although at the expense of
potentially unnecessary reliability.
Such problems are limited when using the HTTP as a media
delivery protocol because firewalls and routers know how to
pass HTTP traffic through. It also does not require special
proxies or caches. The HTTP is a stateless protocol. Thus,
multimedia transmission based on it share this feature and
behave as a system without feedback control. Basically,
if an HTTP client requests data, the server responds by
sending the required data, but it does not remember the
client or its state which means that each HTTP request is
handled completely independently.
HTTP streaming may be implemented in several ways. In
our work we focus on an implementation which can be de-
scribed as a progressive download. The progressive down-
load is nothing more than a transfer of a video file from
a HTTP server to a client where the client may begin play-
back of the file before the download is complete. Con-
trary to the above mentioned systems with feedback control,
which rarely send more than a few seconds of video con-
tent to a client in advance, HTTP streaming (web) servers
progressively push the whole video content to a client, usu-
ally does not taking into account how much data have been
already sent in advance. Simultaneously, most players are
capable of playing the video file while its download is still
in progress. Most web-based streaming platforms, includ-
ing Vimeo, MySpace, and MSN Soapbox, are based on
HTTP and do not have a feedback control. However, some
HTTP streaming services, e.g. YouTube, implement addi-
tional application layer flow control mechanisms that limit
the transmission rate to the same magnitude as the video
bitrate [3].
Currently, it is thought that HTTP media streaming is eas-
ier and cheaper to deploy because web streaming can use
generic HTTP solutions and does not require specialized
servers at each network node. Standard HTTP caching
mechanism allow to move media content to an edge of
the network, closer to users. Nonetheless, the above tech-
nology have also shortcomings. The congestion avoidance
algorithm of the TCP produces a saw-tooth shaped trans-
mission rate. Furthermore, the reliability of TCP results in
variable transmission delays due to retransmissions of lost
packets. As a consequence, it was commonly assumed that
the TCP is not suitable for multimedia streaming, which is
to some extent loss tolerant but delay sensitive. The instan-
taneous transmission rate and transmission delay variation
of the TCP must be smoothed out by receiver-side buffer-
ing. Despite these drawbacks, currently a dominant share
of multimedia traffic is being delivered using the HTTP
and TCP [1].
2.2. Video Buffering
Most of HTTP players are able to concurrently play and
download the same file. In the simplest case the player fills
its internal buffer at the beginning of the video transmission
and starts the video playback as soon as a minimum buffer
level is achieved. While simultaneously playing and down-
loading the content, the amount of video data in the buffer
is variable and depends mainly on the download bandwidth,
video bitrate and video playing rate. When the download
bandwidth is larger than the video rate the buffer grows.
In the opposite case, the buffer will shrink and if the situ-
ation last long enough it may also run out. In such cases
the video stalls and the player waits until the buffer will be
refilled again.
Let’s assume that G(t) represents the number of data pack-
ets generated at a HTTP server by time t, Fig. 1 with
a packet transmission rate limited only by the infrastruc-
ture conditions like TCP throughput, server performance,
etc. The first packet is generated at time 0 and sent immedi-
ately to a client. Let A(t) denote the number of packets ar-
riving at the client by time t and B(t) denote the number of
packets played by the client by time t. Since the transmis-
Fig. 1. Player buffer occupancy in the time function.
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sion rate is constrained by the generation rate at the server,
we have A(t)≤G(t). A packet arriving earlier than its play-
back time is referred to as an early packet. At time t, the
number of early packets is counted as N(t) = A(t)−B(t).
A negative value of N(t) indicates that the packet arrival is
behind the playback by −N(t) packets.
During streaming, there can be many time periods ∆ti for
which N(∆ti) has a negative value. In our work we try to
answer the question: what is the value of ∑i ∆ti and i, i.e.
the total video stall time in a relation to video clip length
and the number of stalling events for several video files
transmitted from YouTube.
2.3. Video Playing Strategies
For video streaming YouTube currently uses amongst oth-
ers device-dependent 3GP containers with RTSP dedi-
cated for mobile streaming applications and Adobe Flash
with HTML5 employing HTTP streaming of Flash Video.
Adobe Flash, henceforth referred to as Flash, is the default
container when YouTube is accessed via a PC. Users need
to install a proprietary plug-in for viewing Flash videos.
HTML5 supports videos that do not require any propri-
etary plug-ins running directly.
When streaming with the Flash Player, it basically behaves
like a simple HTTP player described above i.e. it starts
the video playback as soon as a minimum buffer level is
achieved. However, thanks to the flexibility of the Flash
authoring platform, the buffering functionality can be addi-
tionally enhanced using client-side ActionScript code. The
standard buffering process is believed to be susceptible to
bandwidth drops, as well as being unable to exploit a sud-
den increase of bandwidth. The enhancement is called
a dual-threshold buffering strategy and assures a faster start
and, at the same time, should provide better resilience to
bandwidth fluctuations, or other adverse network condi-
tions. Therefore, the playback of a video file starts when the
first threshold in the buffer is filled with a given amount
of data. But, instead of trying to keep the buffer full to
this level, the modified strategy attempts to fill the buffer
to a second, higher threshold. This additional data may be
useful later if the network connection encounters temporary
impairments like bandwidth drops or fluctuations.
In the case of HTML5 streaming, the playing strategy de-
pends on particular video player implementation. The W3C
HTML5 specification [4, Section 4.8] states, that in the case
of autoplay “the user agent [...] will automatically begin
playback of the media resource as soon as it can do so
without stopping”. To approximate this difficult to fulfil
condition every implementation differs. We investigated
Firefox’s implementation of this spec as its code is open
source and the behaviour can therefore be studied not just
by observing network traces but also by reading the sources.
The algorithm in the Firefox is summarized in algorithm in
Fig. 2 and Table 1. Rather than using static thresholds it
facilitates moving averages to estimate the development of
the transmission rate. It does not differentiate between the
initial video startup time and intermittent buffering events.
if sMA > vMA then
c← (bb = 20s∨bT = 20s)
else
c← (bb = 30s∨bT = 30s)
end if
Fig. 2. Firefox playback (re-)start decision algorithm.
This implementation requires large playback buffers due to
the chosen high video buffering amounts, but could also
result in very few stalling events.
Table 1
Variables involved in buffering decisions
Variable Explanation
sMA Moving average of the transmission speed.
vMA Moving average of the video bitrate.
c
Condition upon which to start/resume
playback.
bb Amount of video data the buffer contains.
bT
Amount of time spent in non-playing
buffering state.
The HTML5 network traffic also differs from the Flash
traffic. The works [5] and [2] identified YouTube’s block
transmission behaviour, which uses longer and client appli-
cation controlled block phases for Google Chrome and no
blocking at all for Firefox.
3. Previous Works
A major research area related to our work is concerned with
the analysis and characterization of streaming services in
the Internet. Early works in this area go back to the twen-
tieth century and focused amongst others on the character-
ization of videos on the Web [6], video access statistics of
users [7], developing UDP-based streaming protocols and
providing mechanisms for TCP-friendliness and loss recov-
ery, e.g. [8], [9].
When to concentrate on the HTTP video, several YouTube
measurement studies have been reported in literature in
the last few years. These works focused on characteriz-
ing various aspects of YouTube videos, as well as its us-
age patterns. On the one hand, we have work based on
user traffic trace analysis including deep packet inspection,
e.g. [2], [10]–[12]. Their authors operated on real world
measurements obtained from, e.g., ISPs’ networks and they
characterized video popularity, durations, size and playback
bitrate, as well as usage pattern statistics such as day ver-
sus night patterns or traffic volume. Additionally, in [10]
the investigation of YouTube user sessions statistics was
presented. In [2] the authors presented a traffic charac-
terization of Netflix and YouTube, and identified different
streaming strategies deriving also a model for the aggre-
gate traffic generated by these services. Plissonneau et al.
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in [12] described the impact of YouTube traffic on a French
regional ADSL point of presence revealing that YouTube
video transfers are faster and larger than other large Web
transfers.
On the other hand, there are publications based on crawling
the YouTube site for an extended period of time [13]–[15].
These works examined video popularity and user behaviour
and found that statistics such as length, access patterns,
growth trend, and active life span were quite different com-
pared to traditional video streaming applications. Further-
more, in [13] information directly available from YouTube
servers was used to analyse the characteristics of videos
served by YouTube while [14] investigated social network-
ing in YouTube videos. Also Abhari and Soraya in [15] in-
vestigated YouTube popularity distribution and access pat-
terns through the analysis of a vast amount of data col-
lected by crawling the YouTube API. On the basis of the
observations, the authors presented essential elements of
the workload generator that can be used for benchmarking
caching mechanisms.
A global study of user experience for YouTube videos us-
ing PlanetLab nodes from all over the world is performed
in [16]. Results from this analysis show that on average
there are about 2.5 pauses per video, and on average 25%
of the videos with pauses have total pause time greater than
15 seconds.
The closest work to ours is [17] where the authors evalu-
ated the responsiveness of adaptive HTTP algorithms (tak-
ing into account YouTube amongst others) under variable
network conditions. The authors claimed that the perfor-
mance of the streaming algorithm increases with the de-
crease of network delay and by providing information to
the client, particularly about the achievable throughput. It
compensates for the structural noisiness of measurements
and improves the ability of the client to accurately estimate
the throughput.
4. Experiments
In order to observe the behaviour of YouTube, and, for
that matter, any other, streaming under varying network
conditions, we created a controlled, isolated environment
for our tests, depicted in Fig. 3. Analyses are conducted
in two phases. In phase one, Python scripts on a client
computer simulate a streaming application by issuing HTTP
GET requests to videos at a YouTube cache. Any video data
is stored and analysed for its frame characteristics, such as
the size, type and relative playback time. Furthermore,
the client captures the packet trace using tcpdump/libpcap,
allowing oﬄine analysis of the packets to and from the
HTTP server.
The transmission is done through a network emulation node
using the built-in Linux Kernel netem module capable of
altering the network QoS parameters, such as packet delay
distribution, packet loss rate, or transmission throughput.
Random packet losses are limited due to access network
link layer and transport protocol retransmissions. However,
through this mechanisms, loss acts as another source of
Fig. 3. Two-pass measurement environment used to capture net-
work traces independently of playback strategies.
delay and jitter. We focus on asymmetric access networks,
such as ADSL phone lines, which are assumed to form the
bottleneck links.
In the second phase, the video file with the frame dataset
are re-assembled. Then they are used to feed models in
a media playback emulation process, which combines the
transmission and video frame traces to calculate the play-
back buffer fill level for every point in time during the play-
back. Each frame has its own playing time which specifies
the time at which the frame should be played in relation
to the initial frame. From this analysis, we can determine
how much data is required to play each frame of the video
without any delay to allow for an uninterrupted playback.
On this basis, we generate statistics about user-perceivable
artifacts such as re-buffering events that would occur dur-
ing the playback. These statistics can then be compared to
the results of other models and network QoS.
For our experiment we used a 92 s video file encoded at
850 Kbit/ps.
4.1. Quality Measures
From the user’s perspective, the key performance character-
istic of a network is the QoS of received multimedia con-
tent. However, in the case of HTTP video the transmission
is reliable, so there is no packet loss induced video degra-
dation. Nevertheless, packet losses introduce additional de-
lay caused by TCP retransmissions which consequently can
lead to re-buffering events resulting in jerky playback. The
packet delay and loss reduce also TCP throughput. When
the throughput is lower than the playback rate and the buffer
has drained, the video playback will pause and wait for new
video data. A user expects that delays resulting from con-
tent buffering will be minimized and do not occur during
normal video play.
Thus, to characterize the relationship between the network
QoS and application QoS, for our purpose, we use two
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measures for HTTP videos. The first measure of the ap-
plication QoS takes into account relative total stalling time




where ti are times for which N(∆ti) has negative value and
T denotes a total duration of the video file when played
without interruptions. As the above measure is the ratio of
total stalling time to the the video duration, it is desirable
to minimize its value by an ISP.
The application QoS defined in (1) did not differentiate be-
tween the cases in which a user can experience one long
stalling period ∆t l or several shorter stalling periods ∆ts
where ∆t l = ∑i ∆tsi . Thus, in our analysis we also use a
second, complementary measure which value is the num-
ber of re-buffering events i associated with every stalling
period.
In our experiment every video playing scenario has at least
one re-buffering events which is a result of an initial buffer-
ing. The initial buffering is used to accommodate initial
throughput variability or inter-packet jitters. Some stream-
ing strategies may achieve smoother streaming with larger
initial buffering, nonetheless it increases the startup latency
of received video content. The re-bufferings, which take
place in the middle of video playback, are usually a conse-
quence of the congestion avoidance algorithm of the TCP.
In our analysis we compared the SR (1) and stalling
frequency for the earlier mentioned buffering algorithms:
Flash, HTML5 and simple buffering strategy (Simple). The
last strategy assumes that the algorithm always starts play-
back as soon as any data is available in the buffer. This
means that, if the player is currently stalling and a com-
plete frame becomes available in the buffer, playback will
immediately restart and the frame will be shown even if this
means stopping playback after that frame again. This re-
sults in the lowest required buffer space. Moreover, playing
the video as soon as possible, gives the fastest end. Con-
sequently, the Simple strategy give the lowest SR and an
upper limit for the number of stalls occurring. Conversely,
the best way to minimize the number of stalls is to wait for
the entire file to be downloaded.
5. Results
5.1. Delays
The delay in an experienced by video content consists of
two components: delay introduced by network, which is the
time it takes a data packet to travel from sender to receiver
and TCP-level delay, which is a consequence how the TCP
reacts to fluctuations in the effective network throughput.
While throughput fluctuations can occur due to application-
level flow control, they are primarily the result of network
congestion.
As results of our experiments we obtained statistics of
buffer occupancy as a function of time for the three exam-
ined playing strategies. An exemplary trace of the buffer
occupancy for the Simple strategy is presented in Fig. 4.
Fig. 4. Player buffer occupancy as a function of time.
We may notice that with increasing latency the buffer occu-
pancy, measured as video playback time, is decreasing and
re-buffering events happen more often. When the packet
delay is 50 ms, there is only one stalling event on the begin-
ning of the video transmission. According to the formula
throughput∼ 1/delay describing theoretical TCP through-
put, in this case the delay is the lowest, thus the theoretical
connection throughput is the highest. Therefore, the down-
load of the whole video finishes after about 80 s of the
experiment. From this moment the buffer is no longer sup-
plied. It decreases at a constant rate as the video player
pulls the remaining video data and presents it to its user.
Fig. 5. The influence of packet delay: (a) stalling ratio; (b) re-
buffering events.
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However, when the delay rose to 100 ms or 200 ms, watch-
ing the video is quite inconvenient due to the frequent buffer
under-runs. In these situations more re-buffering events oc-
cur, the total playing time exceeds the original video length
and the file downloading completes after about 92 s.
Generally, we were interested not in a transient buffer analy-
sis but in its examination in the context of application QoS
for which measures were defined in the Subsection 4.1.
Thus, in the further experiments, except for the packet de-
lay, we obtained statistics of the buffering behavior in sce-
narios with additional packet loss and network throughput
limitation.
As it is shown in Fig. 5(a), packet delay has a certain in-
fluence on application QoS which is defined as the SR
in Eq. (1). Increasing gradually the packet delay up to
1000 ms caused the successive rise of the SR from less
than 1% to about 100% in average. From the three exam-
ined playback strategies, the Simple strategy experienced
the lowest SR while the highest SR was obtained by Fire-
fox HTML5 strategy. Nonetheless, with increasing delay,
the differences between the playing algorithms diminished.
When it comes to measuring the number of stalls, the sit-
uation looks quite different. When increasing latency up
to 300 ms, a user using the Flash or HTML5 strategies
usually experienced only a single re-buffering event which
occurred at the beginning of the playback. When the delay
exceed 500 ms the HTML5 strategy has the lowest number
of stalls from all the three examined strategies. The Simple
strategy was not able to successfully mitigate the network
impairments which resulted in several re-buffering events
during the playback, Fig. 5(b).
5.2. Packet Loss
Packet loss can be caused by a number of factors includ-
ing signal degradation over the network medium due to
multi-path fading, packet drop because of channel conges-
tion, corrupted packets rejected in-transit, faulty networking
hardware, faulty network drivers or normal routing routines.
When transmitting HTTP video, in the event of packet loss,
the receiver asks for retransmission or the sender automat-
ically resends any segments that have not been acknowl-
edged. Nevertheless, retransmitting missing packets causes
the throughput of the connection to decrease due to the
sliding window mechanism used for acknowledgement of
received packets, implemented in the TCP.
For the packet loss up to 2% the SR graph resembles
S shape, Fig. 6(a). For packet loss below 0.8% the SR
has value 1 for the Flash and HTML5 strategies, and about
0.2 for the Simple strategy. Such values of the SR can be
considered relatively low and should not have much impact
on the received video quality. However, for the packet loss
between 1% and 1.2% the SR rises rapidly achieving val-
ues of several tens. The further increase of the packet loss
rate results in a relatively small rise of the SR. Generally,
the Simple strategy has the lowest value of the SR. We can
also notice that for 1% packet loss there is a significant
difference between the Flash and HTML5 strategies which
diminishes for the other packet loss values.
Fig. 6. The influence of packet loss: (a) stalling ratio; (b) re-
buffering events.
When to measure the video streaming resilience against
the packet loss as number of stalls, Fig. 6(b), the shape of
the chart is similar to the shape of the SR presented in the
Fig. 6(a). We can also observe here the steady rise of the
stalls number when the packet loss is lower than 0.8% and
higher than 1.2%. For the packet loss value between 0.8%
and 1.2% the stalls number grow quite fast. Contrary to
the results presented in the Fig. 6(b), this time the Simple
strategy has the worst performance. The HTML5 strategy
is little better than the Flash strategy for the packet loss
higher than 1%.
5.3. Throughput
In this section we investigate how the download through-
put limitation influence the YouTube video streaming. The
upload throughput in the experiments was fixed and set to
10 Mbit/s. Figure 7(a) shows the dependency between the
SR and download throughput ranging from 256 Kbit/s up
to 10 Mbit/s. We can observe that the 1 Mbit/s down-
load throughput is sufficient for our streamed video in-
dependently of the playing strategy used. Increasing the
throughput beyond 1 Mbit/s does not significantly improve
the SR. From the other side, even a small throttle of
the network throughput results in a dramatic rise of the
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SR value. Taking into account that the video encoding rate
is 850 Kbit/s, such streaming behavior is common sense
and the network throughput below this threshold value
should be insufficient. Furthermore, the mentioned thresh-
old will be additionally increased by network protocols
overhead.
The similar situation is when we used the stalls number
measure, Fig. 7(b). For the 1 Mbit/s network throughput
and and above the number of stalls is 1 for the Flash and
HTML5 strategies. The Simple playing strategy experi-
ences two re-buffering events.
Fig. 7. The influence of throughput limitation: (a) stalling ratio;
(b) re-buffering events.
Generally, we can conclude that the all three playing strate-
gies cannot satisfactorily cope with even small limitation
in the network throughput, and the initial buffering imple-
mented by the Flash and HTML5 strategies fails in this
situation.
6. Conclusions
In the paper we tried to answer how network defects, man-
ifested as latency, packet loss and throughput limitations
impacts the quality of HTTP based video playback. For
this purpose, we conducted an experimental evaluation of
YouTube video transmission examining the quality of ex-
perience of end user applications expressed as a function
of playback buffer occupancy. Through this analysis we in-
vestigated how long the video playback is stalled and how
often re-buffering events take place.
Generally, in order to watch the 850 Kbit/s video without
interruptions and extensive buffering time, the packet delay
introduced by the network should not exceed 200 ms. The
packet loss higher than the 0.8% makes the viewing of
online video very inconvenient. For smooth transmission
of the video, network connection throughput should be at
least 1 Mbit/s.
Our analysis revealed that there exists some small differ-
ences between the Flash and HTML5 strategies, however, in
the most cases they will remain unnoticed by the end user.
The buffering algorithm used in an HTML5 player showed
the highest resilience against the packet delay and loss when
taking into account the number of re-buffering events expe-
rienced during the video play. However, when comparing
these both strategies with the Simple strategy, it is obvi-
ous that starting the video playback as soon as a minimum
buffer level is achieved is insufficient. Although the Simple
strategy has lower stalling time compared to the other two
strategies, nonetheless, the number of re-buffering events
which occur during the video streaming in unacceptable
for an end user. All the three playing strategies cannot sat-
isfactorily cope with even small limitation in the network
throughput. The initial buffering mechanism implemented
by the Flash and HTML5 strategies fails in that situation.
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Abstract—Large scale potable water transmission system con-
sidered in this paper is the Toronto Water System, one of the
largest potable water supply networks in North America. The
main objective of the ongoing Transmission Operations Op-
timizer project consists in developing an advanced tool for
providing such pumping schedules for 153 pumps, that all
quantitative requirements with respect to the system opera-
tion are met, while the energy costs are minimized. We de-
scribe here a linear, so-called Simplified Model (SM), based on
mass-balance equations, which is solved on week horizon and
delivers boundary conditions for so-called Full Model (FM),
which is nonlinear and takes into account hydraulic phenom-
ena and water quality.
Keywords—linear programming, minimum cost operative plan-
ning, pump scheduling, water supply.
1. Introduction
Toronto Water System (TWS) delivering water to 4 mil-
lion people is the largest potable water supply network in
Canada and the ﬁfth largest in North America. It includes
the whole City of Toronto (COT) and southern portion of
the Region of York (ROY). TWS is supplied by 4 water
ﬁltration plants located at the north shore of Lake On-
tario, and additionally by a number of wells at southern
part of ROY. The average daily water demand from TWS
is 2500 ML, while the total storage of reservoirs 2200 ML.
It has 1300 km of pipelines, 153 pumps in 29 pumping sta-
tions, 19 pressure districts, 28 reservoirs and elevated tanks
(many with two or more cells). The annual cost of water
pumping is about 36 millions CAD (data from 2007). Since
the electrical tariﬀs and costs structure are very volatile
and unstable (changes are from hour to hour, and even at
15-minutes intervals), there is a need for an automatic con-
trol system of the network, reacting in a proper way to both
the changes in customers demands and the market energy
prices.
The main objective of the ongoing Transmission Opera-
tions Optimizer (TOO) project consists in developing an ad-
vanced tool for providing such pumping schedules for 153
TWS pumps that all quantitative requirements with respect
to the system operation are met, while the energy costs are
minimized [5]. It is assumed that TOO should produce
detailed optimal schedules for all pumps which will be fur-
ther passed to water transmission system by a Supervisory
Control And Data Acquisition (SCADA) module.
The following modules of TOO has been developed: de-
mand forecasting module, energy rates forecasting module,
pumping schedule optimizer and, ﬁnally, an assessment
module consisting mainly of hydraulic, EPANET based,
TWS simulator (Fig. 1).
Fig. 1. TOO functionality.
This paper presents one of the key components of TOO,
namely, the Simpliﬁed Model (SM), based on the solu-
tion of a linear programming (LP) problem with complex
objective function expressing the cost of electrical energy
consumption at pumping stations.
This component of TOO uses water distribution model
based on mass-balance equations for pressure district vol-
umes consisting of aggregated volumes of reservoirs and
elevated tanks. For the 7-day control horizon with one-hour
discretization and aggregation of pump’s ﬂows at pumping
stations, the resulting LP problem is solved. After that, the
optimal aggregated ﬂows at pumping stations are disaggre-
gated by a scheduler into individual pump ﬂows and their
start/stop times.
The solution obtained from SM is supposed to deliver ter-
minal conditions for the precise, based on hydraulic de-
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pendencies, Full Model (FM) at 24th or 48th hour of the
control horizon, and the reference control trajectories for
those obtained from the FM.
In the paper, a part of the overall system was studied. This
included all the facilities within the City of Toronto which
account about 97% of the energy used. The Region of
York facilities (3% energy use) were not included. One-
hour and 15-minute intervals were used as the discretization
step. The computations were started with reservoir levels
at 95%, and at the end of the 7-day period they were taken
back to 95% of the total capacity (or higher).
2. Optimization Problem Formulations
for the SM
2.1. Optimization Problem 1
A simpliﬁed discrete-time system model (mass-balance) for
the entire system can be written as:







i = 1,2, . . . ,ND, k = 0,1, . . . ,N−1, (1)
where:
ND – number of pressure districts,
NPS – number of pumping stations,
Vi(k) – volume stored in district i at time k (in
ML),
bi j = ci jQ j – matrix (units are ML/D, Firm Capacity
matrix),
ci j – 1 if pumping station j is pumping into
district i,
−1 if pumping station j is pumping out
of district i,
0 otherwise,
Q j = ∑N jpm=1 Q jm – total station capacity (in ML/D),
Q jm – pump capacity for the m-th pump at the
j-th pumping station,
u j(k) – accumulated ”control vector” at time k,
u j(k) ∈ [0,1] (a continuous variable),
di(k) – demand/consumption from the i-th pres-
sure district in period between k and
k + 1 time instant (in ML),
T – time interval (typically one-hour),
N – number of time intervals (= 168 for
7-days and T = 1 hour).
We must take into account time varying minimum and max-
imum reservoir levels:
Vi,min(k)≤Vi(k)≤Vi,max(k), (2)
where Vi,min(k) and Vi,max(k) are the minimum and max-
imum storage volumes speciﬁed (typically these will be
constants with respect to time k).
The total cost is the sum of pumping stations energy cost
and water production cost:
JTOTAL = JSTATIONS+ JPLANTS, (3)










CC j(k)+(DCR j−TAR j)MaxKVA j
+TCNR j PeakKW j+TCCR j MaxKW j
+DRCR j PKWHtotal j
+WOCR j LFactor PKWHtotal j, (5)
where:
CC j – Commodity Charge, per kWh; ﬂat or increasing
block tariﬀs charge,
DCR j – Distribution Charge, per maximum KVA
through the week,
TAR j – Transmission Allowance, per maximum KVA
through the week,
TCNR j – Transmission Charge – Network, per maximum
kW from 7:00 a.m. to 7:00 p.m. weekdays (re-
ferred to as ”peak kW”), through the week,
TCCR j – Transmission Charge – Connection, per maxi-
mum kW from 7:00 p.m. to 7:00 a.m., through
the week,
DRCR j – Debt Retirement Charge, per kWh in the week,
WOCR j – Wholesale Operation Charge, per kWh in the








PKWH j(k) = PKW j(k) T (7)






where PKW j(k) is used power (kW) at station j at time k,
N jp is the number of pumps at the j-th pumping station and
PRATING jm is the pump power rating for the m-th pump
at the j-th pumping station.
Maximum KVA through the week is:









where PF j is the power factor for the j-th pumping station
(eg., 0.92).
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Peak KW through the week is:
PeakKW j = max
{
PKW j(k),




Maximum KW through the week is:
MaxKW j = max
{
PKW j(k),




The cost function (5) depends on the maximum values over
the time period of optimization:
JMAX, j = (DCR j−TAR j)MaxKVA j+TCNR j PeakKW j
+TCCR j MaxKW j (14)
The above component can be converted into a conventional
linear programming form by introducing auxiliary variables
z1 j, z2 j and z3 j to represent peak factors. We express the
transformed model as
¯JMAX, j =(DCR j−TAR j)z1 j +TCNR j z2 j+TCCR j z3 j
(15)
subject to constraints:
PKVA j(k)≤ z1 j, k = 0, . . . ,N−1
PKW j(k)≤ z2 j, k = 7 a.m. to 7 p.m. weekdays
and k = 0, . . . ,N−1
PKW j(k)≤ z3 j, k = 7 p.m. to 7 a.m. weekdays
and k = 0, . . . ,N−1 (16)
The commodity charge (CC j) is variable, dependent on the
time of a day and the rate structure. It is assumed that
there are a maximum of four blocks for the cost rates, as
depicted below:
If PKW j(k) < p1 j
CC j(k) = R1(k)PKWH j(k) (17)
Else if PKW j(k) < (p1 j + p2 j)
CC j(k) = (R1(k)−R2(k))p1 j T + R2(k)PKWH j(k) (18)
Else if PKW j(k) < (p1 j + p2 j + p3 j)
CC j(k) = (R1(k)−R3(k))p1 j T +(R2(k)−R3(k))p2 j T
+ R3(k)PKWH j(k) (19)
Else
CC j(k) = (R1(k)−R4(k))p1 j T +(R2(k)
−R4(k))p2 j T +(R3(k)−R4(k))p3 j T
+R4(k)PKWH j(k) (20)
The CC j(k) can be modeled as a piecewise-linear function,
and because costs are non-decreasing, i.e., R1(k)≤ R2(k)≤
R3(k) ≤ R4(k), it is also convex, so as a result of total
modeling, we obtain large-scale linear programming model
(without binary variables).
JPLANTS is the cost of producing water at the four water
treatment plants:
JPLANTS = λRLC ·VOLtotalR.L.CLARK
+ λRCH ·VOLtotalR.C.HARRIS
+ λFJH ·VOLtotalF.J.HORGAN
+ λISLAND ·VOLtotalISLAND, (21)
where λs are the production costs in $/ML for the respective
plants. The total volume from the plants is formulated in







VOLR.L.CLARK(k) = FlowR.L.CLARK(k) ·T (23)
Each of the pumping station ﬂows can be expressed at
time k as:
Flow j = Q j T24 u j(k). (24)
Optimization goal is to ﬁnd u j(k),k = 0,1, . . . ,N−1 to min-
imize JTOTAL Eq. (3) subject to mass-balance equations (1),
bounds (2) and 0 ≤ u j(k)≤ 1.
2.2. Optimization Problem 2
This optimization problem is similar to Optimization Prob-
lem 1 with the only diﬀerence that we have individual con-
trol variables for each pump u jm(k), 0 ≤ u jm(k) ≤ 1, for
j = 1, . . . ,NPS, m = 1, . . . ,N jp, and k = 0,1, . . . ,N−1.
93
Jacek Błaszczyk, Andrzej Karbowski, Kamil Krawczyk, Krzysztof Malinowski, and Alnoor Allidina
3. Disaggregation in Optimization
Problem 1
Our disaggregation problem which is solved at every stage
(every hour or every quarter of an hour; for simplicity we
will omit the time index k) and for every pumping station










η jm Q jm u jm = ˆQ j, (26)
u jm ∈ [0,1], ∀m (27)
where:
u jm – individual pumping as a contin-
uous variable (% of the inter-
val T when the pump is ON) for
the m-th pump at the j-th PS,
u j =(u j1,u j2, . . . ,u jPS j) – vector of all pumpings at the
j-th PS,
η jm – the eﬃciency of the m-th pump
at the j-th PS,
ˆQ j = Q j T24 uˆ j – the desired ﬂow of the j-th PS;
it results from the solution of the
Optimization Problem 1.
The cost of the energy in Eq. (25) is proportional to the
power used. Because price is the same for all pumps, it is
proportional to the sum of the power used by all pumps.
The number of these LP problems is not bigger than N NPS.
Probably, there would be much less of them, because we
omit these PS-es for which ˆQ j equal zero (then automati-
cally all uˆ jm equal zero too).
We will disaggregate control in such a way that we will get
at every stage (of the length T ) the minimal power used.
Let us replace now the components η Qu with the new
variables y:
y jm = η jm Q jm u jm (28)
Hence:
u jm = y jm/(Q jm η jm) (29)
Let us denote:
α jm = PRATING jm/(Q jm η jm) (30)










y jm = ˆQ j, (32)
y jm ∈ [0,η jm Q jm],∀ j (33)
This is nothing, but an auction problem.
We can get the optimal solution by sorting (before the
optimization) for every PS the elements α jm from the
smallest to the largest and allocate the maximum, that is
y jm = η jm Q jm (=the pump is ON over the whole stage) un-
til their sum reaches ˆQ j. The last element before reaching
ˆQ j will be usually smaller then η jm Q jm (this pump will be
ON over a fraction of T), the remaining pumps (with the
larger coeﬃcients α jm) will be OFF during the given stage.
4. Numerical Results
The full 7-day model with discrete variables for pump
switches was intractable in reasonable time period (the
obtained computation times for 2-day subproblems were
much longer than 5-minute time limit assumed for TOO),
for two popular commercial mixed-linear optimizers:
CPLEX, Xpress-MP and one mixed-nonlinear optimizer:
MINLPBB, so we decided to use continuous control vari-
ables u jm(k) from interval [0,1] for each pump indi-
vidually.
We solved Optimization Problems 1 and 2 (linear) for
ﬂat and increasing energy tariﬀs, for full 7-day optimiza-
tion horizon with a one-hour and 15-minute intervals. The
cost of optimized operations, problem statistics, and so-
lution times are summarized in Table 1. For the op-
timization we used commercial Xpress-MP solver (ver-
sion 2008A, on evaluation license, 64-bit Linux binary)
with options barrier, barthreads=4, mipthreads=4
(multithreaded mode).
It is seen from the Table 1 that, quite surprisingly, the value
of costs in both ﬂat and increasing block energy tariﬀs case
does not depend on the time discretization. Hence, there
is no motivation to use time step equal 15 minutes instead
of 1 hour. The cost of suboptimal, aggregated solution is
not more than 2% higher than that of the optimal one, so
the approach presented as Optimization Problem 1 is rather
acceptable.
5. Conclusions and Future Work
We have implemented a simpliﬁed mass-balance based
model for COT. The resulting continuous LP problem is
solved very fast by both commercial and free LP solvers.
The results obtained for the aggregation of pumping vari-
ables case are satisfactory. However, there are some doubts
about applicability of the SM, because it neglects hydraulic
phenomena in the network, such as ﬂows and head-losses
in pipes and valves, dynamics of individual reservoirs and
elevated tanks, pumpage and eﬃciency curves of pumps,
continuity laws for junctions, etc. Owing to this, the
next step will be the full hydraulic model of the system.
The current solvers allow for solving such problems on
only shorter horizon – 24 or 48 hour long. The presented
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Table 1
Optimization results with Xpress-MP 2008A solver for problems with one-hour (1h) or 15-minute (15m) intervals,
and ﬂat (F) or increasing (I) block energy tariﬀs (n – number of linear variables, m – number of linear constraints,
JSTATIONS = JCC + JOTHER + JMAX, T – optimization time)
Problem n m JTOTAL [$] JCC [$] JOTHER [$] JMAX [$] JPLANTS [$] T [sec]
OP1-F-1h 8651 9528 528590 219980 61070 244569 2970 1
OP2-F-1h 23603 9528 521747 214514 60151 244111 2970 1
OP1-I-1h 12179 10872 539119 226849 61960 247340 2970 1
OP2-I-1h 27131 10872 529622 222655 60866 243129 2970 2
OP1-F-15m 34307 38001 528590 219980 61070 244569 2970 9
OP2-F-15m 94115 38001 521747 214514 60151 244111 2970 19
OP1-I-15m 48356 43353 539119 226849 61960 247340 2970 8
OP2-I-15m 108164 43353 529622 222655 60866 243129 2970 10
SM model will be used to deliver for this future FM ter-
minal conditions, as well as the reference control and state
trajectories.
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